

F.O.

492

N
1307



CLOSED
UNTIL
2,004

7

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

SECRET

(19237)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ISRAEL

PART 5

January to December 1953

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
General Correspondence			
1 Sir F. Evans... No. 8 E.	1953 Jan. 13	Economic situation ... The delay in the payment of December 1952, salaries to civil servants; the Government now able to take unpopular measures owing to the disarray of the Left-wing parties by the Prague trials; the policy of slowly depressing the general standard of living; details of the recent price changes and new taxation.	1
2 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 18	Jan. 23	Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador ... The anti-Jewish aspect of the Prague trials; representations on the subject of the delivery of jet aircraft to the Arab States; Israel interest in any arrangement for collective defence which might result from the Anglo-Egyptian discussions; the German-Israel Reparations Agreement.	3
3 Mr. Furlonge ... No. 43 (Tel.)	Jan. 29	Israel-Jordan frontier incident: Israeli attacks on the villages of Falama and Rantis ...	4
4 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 24	Feb. 7	Israel-Jordan frontier incidents ... Her Majesty's Government's concern; the major degree of Israel responsibility for recent incidents.	5
5 Sir A. Gascoigne ... No. 69 (Tel.)	Feb. 12	Rupture of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel ... Pretext for severing relations considered to have been welcome to the Soviet Union.	6
6 Sir F. Evans ... No. 33	Feb. 13	Annual review for 1952 ...	6
7 Sir F. Evans ... No. 34	Feb. 14	Report on a bomb explosion outside the Soviet Legation ... Extensive damage done to the ground floor of the Legation; suspicion rests on the Anti-Communist League; Government deeply concerned for the fate of Jews living in Communist countries; crime unanimously condemned by the press; rupture of diplomatic relations the culmination of the Soviet Government's hostility to Israel.	10
8 Mr. Eden ... No. 96 (Tel.)	Mar. 2	Move of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem: United Kingdom representations ...	12
9 Mr. Eden ... No. 97 (Tel.)	Mar. 2	Move of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem: Transfer planned for May ...	12
10 Sir F. Evans ... No. 68 (Tel.)	Mar. 4	Move of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem: United Kingdom representations ... Move stated to have universal popular approval in Israel; our main aim to avert any increase in tension.	13
11 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 45	Mar. 11	Conversation between Sir J. Bowker and the Deputy Director of the Israel Foreign Office ... Israel's position in regard to Middle East defence.	13
12 Sir F. Evans ... No. 65 E.	April 1	Comments on the Compulsory Loan Law passed on March 24 Loan to bear a 2½ per cent. interest free of income tax and to be repayable between 1957 and 1971; approximately £1.45 millions expected to be raised; exemptions made for war invalids and foreign property owners.	15
13 Sir E. A. Chapman-Andrews No. 90	May 18	Lebanese Government's reaction to Sir W. Churchill's statements on Egypt and Israel ... Conversation between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the new Lebanese Foreign Minister; Mr. Hakim's contention that Sir W. Churchill's remarks about Israel and Zionism were offensive to the whole Arab world.	16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
14 Mr. Furlonge ... Enclosure to No. 73	1953 May 26	Jordan Government's reaction to Sir W. Churchill's references to Israel ... Jordan Government's note of May 26; their "regret for and repudiation of this open attack against the just Arab national aspirations".	17
15 Sir F. Evans ... No. 112	May 26	The worth of Israel ... An appraisal of the country's political and social stability, its economic and military strength and the moral fibre of the people.	18
16 Mr. Montagu-Pollock No. 81	May 26	Syrian Government's reaction to Sir W. Churchill's references to Israel ... Syrian note of May 21; conversation between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs; Syrian interpretation of Sir W. Churchill's remarks on Israel and Zionism as a deliberate act of unfriendliness.	22
17 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 83	May 27	Conversation between the Minister of State and the Israel Ambassador ... Her Majesty's Ambassador's concern at the growing tension between Israel and Jordan; recent incursions into Jordan territory by Israel troops acting under orders.	26
18 Sir F. Evans ... Enclosure to 10117/2/53	June 5	Memorandum on Israel by the Hon. John Wilson ... Israel likely to survive and to become a country second or third rate by Western European standards, but for a long time incomparably more effective, more determined and more reliable than the Arabs; Israel agriculture; the idealism of the Zionist movement and the irritating qualities of the Israelis; the quality of the Government.	27
19 Sir J. Troutbeck ... No. 33 Saving (Tel.)	June 5	Iraqi Government's reaction to Sir W. Churchill's references to Israel ... Iraqi contention that the statement is a plain contravention of the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930.	29
20 Mr. Pelham ... No. 76	June 15	Saudi reaction to Sir W. Churchill's references to Israel The Saudi Government's "dissatisfaction and strong disapproval".	31
21 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 91	June 15	Conversation between the Assistant Under-Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador ... The situation on the Israel-Jordan frontier; the Ambassador's representations about recent incidents; the Ambassador told that it seemed inappropriate that every incident should be the subject of diplomatic representations.	32
22 Sir F. Evans ... No. 124 E.	June 16	Israel Government's policy of Monetary deflation ... The changes in internal economic conditions caused by the devaluation of the Israel pound in February 1952; the problems of increasing costs and decreasing production.	33
23 Sir F. Evans ... No. 222 (Tel.)	July 10	Move of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem: Move planned for July 12 ...	35
24 Mr. Walmsley ... No. 27	July 15	Israel and Jordan relations with the Truce Supervision Organisation ... Israel's disquieting record over the past three years; M. Vigier's view that Israel desires to prove that the General Armistice Agreements have broken down and that the only possible solution is for Israel to settle matters in her own way direct with the Arab States and without the intervention of the United Nations or anyone else.	36
25 Sir F. Evans ... No. 160	July 21	Resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union ... Preliminary discussions opened in Sofia; main difficulty to agreement the Soviet desire for a clear definition by Israel of her future policy of alliances.	41

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
	1953		
26 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 122	July 24	Conversation between Sir W. Strang and the Israel Ambassador on July 22 ... The transactions leading up to the renewal of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union; Sir W. Strang informed that no change of policy was involved in the assurance given to the Soviet Government by the Israel Government that they would not enter into any treaty or aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union.	43
27 Sir F. Evans ... No. 168	Aug. 4	United States' refusal of a loan for Israel ... Refusal a disappointment, but not a surprise to the Israel Government; refusal considered to be the first manifestation of a new American approach to Middle East affairs.	44
28 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 153	Sept. 21	Conversation between the Acting Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador on September 18, 1953 ... Israel concern that the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations should not result in any weakening of Israel's security and that the principle of free transit through the Suez Canal should be safeguarded; arms deliveries to the Middle Eastern countries; Israel request for Centurion tanks and credit terms for surplus British equipment.	44
29 Sir F. Evans ... No. 204	Sept. 22	Orthodox Jewish opposition to the passage of a Bill for the National Service of Women ... The fanaticism of the opponents of the measure passed on August 26; problems set by the adjustment of ancient and rigid custom to the changing demands of a modern society.	45
30 Mr. Walmsley ... No. 179 (Tel.)	Sept. 25	Jordan waters: Work in the demilitarised zone: Syrian allegations of a breach of the Armistice provisions ...	48
31 Sir F. Evans ... No. 214	Sept. 29	Uneasiness among the more thoughtful Israelis about their Government's policy towards the Arab minority in Israel ... Desire by responsible Israelis for equal rights for Arabs in Arab Israel; liberal views opposed by military; difference between good intentions and practice by Israel Administration.	49
32 Sir F. Evans ... No. 224 E.	Oct. 13	Report on a new Foreign Exchange Budget for the period July 1, 1953, to March 31, 1954 ... New Budget hailed with scepticism in the independent liberal press; Budget reveals only too clearly the artificial basis of Israel's economy; lowering of living standards for a considerable time believed to be the only solution.	51
33 Mr. Monypenny ... No. 206 (Tel.)	Oct. 15	Jordan waters: Work in the demilitarised zone: Request to Israelis to cease work ...	53
34 Mr. Eden ... No. 429 (Tel.)	Oct. 16	Condemnation of Israel by Her Majesty's Government for attacks on Jordan ...	54
35 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 168	Oct. 16	Conversation between the Minister of State and the Israel Ambassador on October 16, 1953 ... Her Majesty's Government's horror at the Israel attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya, in which the village was systematically destroyed and over forty people were killed.	54
36 Sir R. Makins ... No. 2253 (Tel.)	Oct. 21	United States aid to Israel ... Allocation deferred owing to Israel's defiance of the United Nations.	55
37 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 176	Oct. 28	Conversation between Sir W. Strang and the Israel Ambassador on October 28, concerning the Qibya incident ... The Israel Government's view that Her Majesty's Government had unfairly put the responsibility for the incident upon Israel and had not put it in its context of repeated incidents from the Jordan side; the Ambassador's remarks about compensation for the victims, the disposition of Israel forces and his Government's desire for high-level contacts with Jordan.	56

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
	1953		
38 Mr. Furlonge ... No. 178	Oct. 28	Comments on the resolutions passed by the Political Committee of the Arab League on October 23 ... Resolutions contain no new departure in Arab League policy; policy of giving aid to Jordan to be continued; desire to strengthen the Truce Supervision Organisation; wish for stronger international supervision to prevent further Israel frontier attacks.	58
39 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 182	Nov. 2	Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador on November 2, 1953 ... Israel's view that the United Nations should concern itself not only with the Qibya incident but also with its deeper causes; the Secretary of State's view that it would first be necessary to pronounce upon the incident itself.	60
40 To Sir F. Evans ... No. 200	Nov. 17	Conversation between the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador on November 17, 1953 ... The latter's representations in support of the Israel proposal for direct talks upon the Israel-Jordan frontier between senior officials of both sides; Her Majesty's Government's opinion that it would be better to use, and if necessary to strengthen, the existing machinery of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Truce Supervision Organisation.	61
41 Sir F. Evans ... No. 251	Nov. 24	The effect of Her Majesty's Government's policy regarding Arab-Israel tension on Anglo-Israeli relations ... Anti-Israeli policy attributed to Her Majesty's Government's desire to please the Arab world; no serious wave of anti-British feeling; position of the United Kingdom not weakened by firm stand in the Security Council.	63
42 Sir F. Evans ... No. 256	Dec. 1	Report on the Knesset debate on foreign affairs ... Attack made on the Security Council resolution on the Kibya incident; tribute paid to the work of the Israel delegation to the United Nations; threat to abandon the Armistice Agreement; conscience of Israel obviously still troubled by the Kibya incident; main interest focused on the coming Israel-Jordan talks.	64
43 Sir J. Troutbeck ... No. 684 (Tel.)	Dec. 6	Proposed Israel-Jordan Conference ... Jordan Government not prepared to attend a conference after gaining so little from the Security Council; possibility of a conference if we and the United States support Jordan in the Security Council.	66
44 Sir F. Evans ... No. 260	Dec. 8	Problem of relations between Israel and the Arab States ... Difficulties of enforcing a settlement owing to our many military and economic considerations; dangers of an active policy by the United Kingdom; prospect of peace receding rather than approaching; dependence of Israel on Western support.	66
45 Sir G. Jebb ... No. 1292 (Tel.)	Dec. 10	Jordan waters: Security Council resolution ... Action of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation on the Syrian complaint endorsed.	70
46 Sir G. Jebb ... No. 1293 (Tel.)	Dec. 11	Jordan waters: Comments on the Security Council resolution ... New texts intended to give General Bennike clear guidance; texts drafted in a fair and uncontentious way.	71
47 Sir G. Jebb ... No. 302 Saving (Tel.)	Dec. 12	Jordan waters: Security Council meeting ... M. Malik (Lebanon) points out that to give permission for work on the Canal without agreement being reached would be to give <i>de facto</i> recognition to the annexation of the zone by Israel.	71
48 Sir G. Jebb ... No. 1316 (Tel.)	Dec. 16	Jordan waters: United Kingdom resolution ... Instructions of General Bennike ignored by Israel; problem primarily one with which Dr. Bennike should deal; conflicting interests should be reconciled without breaking the terms of the armistice.	72

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
49 Sir G. Jebb No. 304 Saving (Tel.)	1953 Dec. 17	Jordan waters: Security Council discussion ... Mr. Lodge points out that strict compliance with the Armistice Agreement is necessary for the preservation of peace in the area.	74
50 Mr. Moore No. 270	Dec. 22	Withdrawal of Mr. Ben Gurion to the southern desert ... Extreme fatigue given as reason for voluntary relinquishment of office; explanation may be partly a desire for detached study; record of life-long struggle for the Israeli State; recent anxiety of the former Prime Minister over the lack of idealism of many immigrants.	75
51 Sir J. Troutbeck No. 213	Dec. 28	Israeli-Arab relations ... Opinion on the Palestine problem hardening; attempt by Her Majesty's Representatives to the Arab States to persuade them of the desirability of peace with Israel; possible need for stronger measures for convincing Arab States of need for agreement with Israel; only real solution one that would compel the Israelis to give up land; our safest policy to remain quiet and stand by the Tripartite Declaration.	77

Appendix—Biographical Notes

52 Sir F. Evans No. 182	1953 Aug. 24	Annual report on the leading personalities ...	[1]
53 Sir F. Evans No. 9	Jan. 15	Annual report on the heads of foreign missions ...	[25]

SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

- ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS—28.
- ANGLO-ISRAELI RELATIONS—41.
- ANNUAL REPORT ON THE HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS—53.
- ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEADING PERSONALITIES—52.
- ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1952—6.
- ARAB LEAGUE POLITICAL COMMITTEE—38.
- ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL—31.
- COMPULSORY LOAN LAW—12.
- ECONOMIC AFFAIRS—
Appraisal of the worth of Israel—15.
Economic situation—1.
Memorandum by the Hon. John Wilson—18.
- FINANCIAL AFFAIRS—22.
- FOREIGN EXCHANGE BUDGET—32.
- IRAQI GOVERNMENT, REACTION OF, TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH—19.
- ISRAEL-ARAB RELATIONS—44, 51.
- ISRAEL-JORDAN CONFERENCE—43.
- ISRAEL-JORDAN FRONTIER INCIDENTS—3, 4.
- ISRAEL-JORDAN RELATIONS—
Condemnation of Israel by Her Majesty's Government—34.
Conversation between Mr. Nutting and the Israel Ambassador—40.
Conversation between Sir J. Bowker and the Israel Ambassador—21.
Conversation between the Minister of State and the Israel Ambassador—17.
Relations with the Truce Supervision Organisation—24.
- ISRAEL-SOVIET RELATIONS—
Conversation between Sir W. Strang and the Israel Ambassador—26.
Rupture of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union—5.
Resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union—25.
- JORDAN GOVERNMENT, REACTION OF, TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH—14.
- JORDAN WATERS DISPUTE—30, 33, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.
- KNESSET, DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS—42.
- LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, REACTION TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH—13.
- MIDDLE EAST DEFENCE—
Conversation between Sir J. Bowker and the Deputy Director of the Israel Foreign Office—11.
- MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MOVE OF, TO JERUSALEM—8, 9, 10, 23.
- MR. BEN GURION, WITHDRAWAL OF, TO THE SOUTHERN DESERT—50.
- NATIONAL SERVICE—29.
- PRAGUE TRIALS—
Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador—2.
- QIBYA INCIDENT—
Conversation between the Minister of State and the Israel Ambassador—35.
Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Israel Ambassador—39.
Conversation between Sir W. Strang and the Israel Ambassador—37.
- SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT, REACTION OF, TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH—20.
- SOVIET LEGATION—
Report on the bomb explosion—7.
- SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, REACTION OF, TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S SPEECH—16.
- UNITED STATES AID TO ISRAEL—27, 36.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
ISRAEL—PART 5

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

ER 1103/1

No. 1

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ISRAEL

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st January)

(No. 8 E. Confidential) Tel Aviv,
Sir, 13th January, 1953.

In my despatch No. 321 E. of 18th November about Israel's economic situation, I described the difficulties of the Government in raising enough funds to meet their obligations. By the end of December the lack of funds in the Treasury was critical and the payment of December salaries to civil servants has been delayed. The amount required for this purpose is understood to be between £1.6 and 7 million. About 20,000 civil servants out of a total of 30,000 received the first half of their December salaries on 6th January and hopes of receiving the balance are now being held out for next week. This default bears particularly hardly on civil servants, who by Israel standards are grossly underpaid, and it has naturally caused some concern; but the Government apparently regard it as an essential step to safeguard their deflationary policy and to maintain their undertaking not to increase the volume of Treasury bills on the market. During the last three months the rate of increase in the cost-of-living index has slowed up considerably. The country has, of course, benefited in part from the lower world prices of some raw materials and retail prices of textile consumer goods and footwear in particular have fallen substantially. These reductions have been counter-balanced by the action of the Treasury in reducing its financial commitments on subsidised food-stuffs and imposing considerable increases in luxury taxation. In consequence, the cost-of-living index has continued to rise slowly and industrial workers have gained a further substantial increase in their cost-of-living bonus.

2. The Minister of Finance stated early this month that the deficit on current account at the end of December was £1.12.5 million, but that he expected to balance the ordinary budget by the end of

the financial year. He mentioned that strenuous efforts were being made to keep expenditure within budget estimates (I do not see how this can be done) and he stressed particularly the efforts now being made to this end by the Defence Services, where considerable retrenchment is now being carried through. Cuts are being made in the civil service, too, some of which result naturally from the elimination of a number of commodity controls in the autumn; in addition to these, a special Cabinet Committee has been set up under Mr. Lavon, Minister without portfolio, to co-ordinate the work of the Government departments and it hopes to achieve a further substantial reduction in the civil establishment. Special appeals have been made to income-tax payers, who were promised immunity from penalties if they paid up promptly before the middle of January, and income-tax collections in December at £1.5 million were about £1.1½ million more than in December 1951. Customs revenue, on the other hand, must have fallen considerably, since the number of ships berthing at Haifa is now down to about a quarter or a fifth of what it was two years ago. The Government's main difficulty now is to carry through the development budget. Owing partly to the delay in the ratification of the German Reparations Agreement, and partly to delay in releasing American counterpart funds earmarked for development, it seems that the scale of development expenditure is considerably less than that estimated when the budget was drawn up in the past. Nevertheless, the Government will be hard put to meet the claims upon it from contractors and borrowers resulting from the enormous increase in costs during the past twelve months.

3. I should not care to prophesy whether the Government's policy of rigid deflation will succeed and the sacrifices imposed on the civil service be justified; but it is clear

that the Government, both Mapai and the General Zionists, regard the present month as crucial. The Histadrut Executive, in laying down its wages policy for 1953, has made no new claims, but is quietly continuing the policy of 1952, which of course in practice proved to be highly inflationary. Some of the reductions in subsidies and increased taxes were announced just as the new Coalition Government was taking office and caused initial irritation to the General Zionists, who felt that they should have been consulted. However, they seem now to have accepted the changes as being necessary and in accordance with their own policy. In a speech at Tel Aviv last week the new General Zionist Minister of Commerce and Industry explained and supported the Government's actions. Indeed, the Government seems to be displaying a degree of courage which was lacking a year or even six months ago. This is not, I think, to be directly ascribed to the formation of a new coalition, but rather to the disarray caused in the ranks of the Left-wing parties by the Prague trials; the Government can now adopt with relative impunity unpopular measures to lower the standard of living of a kind which economic advisers have long urged as essential. Moreover, economic facts have become harder and more pressing in the last twelve months; and on the other hand it is easier for the Government to modify its policy of full employment now, when immigration is at a relatively low level, than it was a year ago when large numbers of new immigrants every month had to be found work and shelter.

4. Although progress is now more rapid, the policy of slowly depressing the standard of living is not new. During 1952, the cost-of-living index, fixed at the end of 1951, rose from 113 to 175 points (September 1951 = 100). With each point bringing in an allowance of 800 prutot, wages during the past fifteen months went up by £1. 60. A survey recently made by the Ministry of Labour showed that, in spite of this increase, real wages dropped considerably. Taking the final figures as a basis, the Ministry's survey indicated that the net amount received by a wage-earner in December 1952, after all deductions, was worth considerably less than the money he received a year before, depending on the size of his salary and his family. Married men with children suffered more than bachelors with the same pay and those with higher salaries were affected more than those earning less.

The real wages of a married man with two children dropped by about 4 per cent., if his basic salary was only £1. 80, by roughly 14.5 per cent. on a basic salary of £1. 100 and by about 20 per cent. on a basic salary of £1. 120.

5. Some details of the recent price changes and new taxation may be of interest. Bread prices were raised by 11 per cent. and standard (brown) bread now costs 100 prutot per kilogramme loaf. This increase was accompanied by a reduction in the subsidy on flour, which now costs £1. 136 per ton. It was announced that the price of sugar was raised from 140 to 180 prutot per kilogramme, but this announcement was promptly cancelled. Kerosene prices were raised by 7½ per cent. to 870 prutot per 15 litres. These changes are, I understand, expected to cause an increase in the cost-of-living index of about 1½ points, and the Government have announced that no further increases in the prices of basic commodities will be made before the end of the financial year in March. Other petroleum prices have also been increased, that of petrol going up by 10 per cent. to 143 prutot per litre. The Palestine Electric Corporation announced an 18 per cent. increase in tariffs retroactive to 1st December, but this was later reduced by the Government to an increase of 8 per cent. In November 1951 power for cooking cost 11.5 prutot per kilowatt and for lighting 13.5 prutot per kilowatt. The new prices are 34 prutot and 46 prutot respectively. The cost of installation of a telephone has been raised from the already penal rate of £1. 120 to £1. 200, and the yearly rental of a connexion is now £1. 70. The travel tax has also been increased, with differential rates: travel by air is now subject to a 50 per cent. tax; the tax on first-class sea tickets is 25 per cent., second class 20 per cent., third and fourth class and cargo ships 10 per cent. and any other method of travel 20 per cent. Court fees have been increased.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to his Development Division at Beirut, to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department and Exports Credit Guarantee Department of the Board of Trade and to Her Majesty's Treasury.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

P.S.—Since this despatch was drafted, revenue returns for the nine months April to December 1952 have been published. The figures are as follows:—

	Income £l.	Estimates £l.
Income tax	37,106,000	32,250,000
Customs	11,802,000	13,250,000
Fuel	9,263,000	7,250,000
Excise on tobacco and liquor	11,652,000	15,750,000

	Income £l.	Estimates £l.
Luxury tax	9,870,000	16,500,000
Stamp tax	1,493,000	2,250,000
Land tax	854,000	2,250,000
Loan, investments and State property	9,300,000	4,860,000

These figures exclude revenue of the Ministry of Communications and Posts and of the Price Stabilisation Fund.

ER 1074/1

No. 2

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON 23rd JANUARY, 1953

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 18. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, 23rd January, 1953.

The Israel Ambassador called this morning at his own request. He began by thanking me for the remarks in my broadcast speech of 9th January, when I said that I had been shocked by the anti-Jewish aspect of the recent Prague trials. People in Israel and world Jewry had been deeply touched by the strong and spontaneous reaction of British public opinion. I told Mr. Elath that the least we could do was to express our horror. I was sorry to learn this morning from Her Majesty's Minister at Budapest that in Hungary, too, action was being taken against the Jews. Mr. Elath said that as regards the Prague trials the Israel Government had tried to find some other explanation than anti-semitism and indeed it appeared reasonable to explain what had happened by the need to find scapegoats on which to pin the shortcomings of the régime. In view of the action against the doctors in the Soviet Union and of the latest developments in Hungary, however, it was impossible not to believe that the policy of anti-semitism was being deliberately followed by the Kremlin and imposed upon the satellites. The Ambassador asked whether I agreed and to what lengths I thought the Kremlin would carry such a policy. I replied that I thought the Department had produced a convincing explanation of the Prague trials but I had not yet been able to form a clear view of the

wider question. I would be glad to show the Ambassador in confidence the Department's analysis of the significance of the latest developments.

2. The main purpose of Mr. Elath's visit was to renew the representations on the subject of the delivery of jet aircraft to the Arab States. He assured me that it had been no part of his Government's intentions to embarrass Her Majesty's Government by public expressions of their view. But he wished to convince me of the intensity of feeling in his country on this subject. Israel had given proof of her desire to enter into friendly discussions with her neighbours to see whether they could not reach a settlement which would be in the interest not only of the parties directly concerned but of the world in general. The Arabs had rejected this offer and were threatening Israel. Public opinion in Israel was therefore deeply disturbed. Her territory was too small for her to have much confidence in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

3. I told the Ambassador that I did not believe that the Arab States intended to attack Israel. In the case of Jordan at least, they seemed to think that Israel might attack them. I was sure that Iraq, to whom we were under Treaty obligations, would not attack Israel. However that might be, Her Majesty's Government had carefully considered all the factors in the case and they could not go back on the decision which they had taken some time ago. It was not

practicable to impose a numerical ratio as between deliveries to Israel and deliveries to the Arab States. The actual numbers of jet aircraft involved were, however, quite small and the Israel Government would do well not to exaggerate their significance. I reminded the Ambassador that it might be possible to supply Israel with rather more than the original fourteen aircraft and to provide additional training facilities. I emphasised that the present releases did not constitute any commitment or precedent for the future, though I could not promise that a few more jet aircraft might not be available for Egypt should this prove desirable in the course of our negotiations with that country. In conclusion I handed Mr. Elath an aide-memoire which I asked him to regard not as a written reply—indeed I had decided that I could not correspond with him any further on this matter—but as resuming and confirming my remarks to him. The Ambassador took this communication in good part but begged me repeatedly to believe that his country was genuinely and deeply distressed by our deliveries of arms to the Arab countries.

4. Mr. Elath asked whether I was hopeful of an agreement with the Egyptian Government and reminded me of Israel's close interest in any arrangement for collective defence which might result. I said that we were in some difficulty over the question of the Southern Sudan which was of great importance but I hoped nevertheless that we would achieve general agreement. The prospects were more hopeful. In that, partly as a result of Mr. Byroade's visit, there was now close alignment between our views and the United States in regard to defence. There would be a moment at which we would wish to approach other Arab States and when this came I would certainly bear Israel's interest in mind. The Ambassador

asked when the results of the visit of the British Military Mission to Israel would be known. I said that I understood that the Mission's report was being studied by the Chiefs of Staff at the moment. I would see whether action could be speeded up.

5. Finally Mr. Elath mentioned the fact that the German-Israel Reparations Agreement had not been ratified by the Federal Republic. His Government had entire confidence in Dr. Adenauer's good faith but the failure to implement the Agreement was most embarrassing, particularly at the present moment. It prejudiced Israel's efforts to find the necessary cash to pay the Shell Company for imports of oil, and the current budget was based on the assumption that some money would be available under the Reparations Agreement. The Israeli Government were also worried by the recent American Gallup Poll which suggested that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in Western Germany. The situation was now being exploited in Israel by the Communists and the extreme Right and though the new Israeli Government was stronger than their predecessors they were nevertheless apprehensive. The Ambassador asked whether Her Majesty's Government, to whose good offices the signature of the Reparations Agreement had in so large measure been due, could see their way to expressing to the Federal Chancellor the hope that the ratification would not be further delayed. I undertook to consult Sir I. Kirkpatrick.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Budapest, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Moscow, Prague, Washington, the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Wahnerheide and to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

ER 1091/9

No. 3

ISRAEL-JORDAN FRONTIER INCIDENT: ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE VILLAGES OF FALAMA AND RANTIS

Mr. Furlonge to Mr. Eden. (Received January 29)

(No. 43. Confidential) *Amman,*
(Telegraphic) *January 29, 1953.*

My telegram No. 28.

The small village of Falama (containing only twelve families) 2 km. inside Jordan

near Qalqilya was attacked by a force from Israel about fifty strong during the night of January 23rd. The National Guard compelled the Israeli force to retire and in the morning one Israeli soldier was found

dead on the edge of the village. The reason for the attack is obscure since this village has never caused trouble in the past. Full report by bag.

2. At 2 o'clock this morning the same village was attacked again by a larger force preceded by shelling and machine-gun fire. The head man of the village was killed and ten others wounded (mostly women and children). At the same time the village of Rantis, 15 miles north-east of Lydda, was

also attacked by an Israeli force. Details are not yet available but it is reported that two Arabs were killed and two wounded.

3. The Arab Legion are mystified by this sudden outburst which follows a period of calm on the frontier, and state that recent Israeli accusations of mounting tension (please see Jerusalem telegram No. 11) are unjustified so far as the Arab side is concerned.

ER 1091/30

No. 4

INCIDENTS ON THE ISRAEL-JORDAN BORDER

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 24. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
7th February, 1953.

Sir James Bowker requested the Israel Ambassador to call on 5th February and told him that the Minister of State had wished to speak to him about the incidents over the last few months on the Israel-Jordan border, starting with the barrel incident connected with Mount Scopus, and culminating in the recent Israel attacks at Falama, Rantis and Qalqilya. Sir James Bowker said that Her Majesty's Government were greatly concerned over these incidents, which had increased the tension on the border, and went on to speak in the sense of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of my telegram No. 43 of 4th February. He emphasised that our information suggested that a considerable degree of responsibility for these incidents, particularly the attacks on the Jordan villages, rested with the Israel authorities, and called attention to the deliberate and particularly brutal nature of the attacks at Falama and Rantis. He said that your Excellency had been instructed to speak to the Israel Government on similar lines. He added that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Amman had been instructed to urge the Jordan Government to exercise moderation and, in particular, to do all they could to prevent infiltration into Israel.

2. The Ambassador said he had no doubt that the Israel Government would pay full attention to the representations of Her Majesty's Government in this matter. He assured Sir James Bowker that the Israel Government were anxious to avoid incidents. He said that one had only to look at the map to understand the dangers which

disturbances and incidents on that particular part of the frontier must create for Israel; that, in considering the problem, it was not possible to start and end with any particular incidents, but that it was necessary to look at a period as a whole and see to what extent the Armistice Commission had apportioned blame to one side or the other. Recently the Armistice Commission, in dealing with four cases, had decided one case against Israel and three cases against Jordan. The basic cause of the trouble was the continual infiltration from the Jordan side. The Ambassador also referred particularly to the recent blowing up of a bridge on the railway between Tel Aviv and Haifa. As an indication of the Israel Government's desire to lessen the tension, he said that the Israel Foreign Minister had yesterday in the Knesset refused to agree to a debate on the subject, and insisted on referring it to the Security Committee.

3. Sir James Bowker told the Ambassador that he was not aware that there had been recently a significant increase in infiltration and that in any case it was natural that if infiltration were to take place it should be from Jordan into Israel in view of the numerous villages on the Jordan side of the border which were cut off from their former lands. He felt bound to emphasise once more that information available to Her Majesty's Government suggested that a major degree of responsibility rested with the Israel Government for the recent incidents, and that the Israel authorities had behaved provocatively. As regards the blowing up of the bridge on the Tel Aviv-Haifa railway, Sir James Bowker observed

that the incident seemed to have been carefully organised and that the service attachés of the United Kingdom, United States and French Embassies appeared to have been promptly invited to visit the scene. He went on to say that Her Majesty's Government hoped that the recent incidents would be dealt with effectively through the Armistice Commission machinery and particularly at the proposed meeting between the Israel Chief of Staff and a senior Jordan officer. For this purpose, it was essential

that the tension should be relaxed, and Her Majesty's Government relied on the Israel Government to do what they could in that direction.

4. I am sending copies to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, British Middle East Office, Washington, Paris, United Kingdom Delegation, New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

ER 10338/2

No. 5

RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL

Sir A. Gascoigne to Mr. Eden. (Received February 12)

(No. 69. Confidential) *Moscow,*
(Telegraphic) *February 12, 1953.*

Local press this morning announced rupture of relations with Israel on account of the recent bomb incident at Tel Aviv when, it is stated that the wife of the Soviet Minister and two members of the Soviet staff were injured.

2. The Soviet press further mentions that, despite apology made by the Israeli Government to the Soviet Minister at Tel Aviv, the incident, which was "tolerated" by the Israeli police, cannot be overlooked because of participation of the Israeli Government in the campaign of hatred against the Soviet Union.

3. The Soviet Government will undoubtedly welcome this pretext for severing relations with Tel Aviv, both because of the recent case of the Jewish doctors and, especially so, if they have in mind a future purge of Jews throughout Russia, of which there is as yet no concrete sign, apart of course from those Jews involved in the cleaning-up process.

4. Although the Israeli Legation was more or less isolated from the Jewish population of the Soviet Union, its expulsion will obviously greatly increase their feeling of uncertainty regarding the future.

ER 1011/1

No. 6

ISRAEL: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1952

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received 17th February)

(No. 33 Confidential) *Tel Aviv.*
Sir, *13th February, 1953.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on developments in Israel during 1952, for the preparation of which I am indebted to the Honourable John Wilson, Second Secretary at this embassy.

2. The report brings out the dual sense of insecurity under which the State labours: a sense of military insecurity caused by the unrelenting hostility of her neighbours, and a sense of economic insecurity caused by her still inadequate and overstrained resources. That the spirit of the people remains high

and unshaken is evidence of their profound confidence in themselves and faith in the loyalty of their supporters in other countries. It bears witness also to the honesty and general wholesomeness of the principles under which the country is governed. At the same time, the sense of insecurity which prevails explains the sensitiveness and the frequent truculence and aggressiveness displayed by Israel in her relations with other nations, and her anxiety to win support for her policies and views from countries with which she feels herself to be in some degree of ideological rapport.

I have, &c.,

F. E. EVANS.

Enclosure in No. 6

Annual Review of Israel for 1952

On the whole 1952 was a better year for Israel than 1951. The feeling of crisis was less continuous, and in the last months of the year the atmosphere was a good deal calmer. Public morale remained high, and there was throughout the year an atmosphere of progress and achievement. None the less, the year saw no basic improvement in the country's position. Relations with the neighbouring Arab States have deteriorated rather than improved and no progress was made towards a peace settlement. The country's economic position remained extremely precarious, though the schemes of agricultural expansion begun three years ago brought considerable benefit. The pro-Soviet Left wing in Israel was, however, seriously weakened by the holding of the Communist purge trial in Prague in which Israelis were involved, and by signs that Soviet Russia had decided to abandon Israel and concentrate on the Arabs, and indeed to pursue an anti-Semitic policy in Russia and the satellite States. At the end of the year something like a national Government was formed in Israel, in which Labour and Conservative leaders joined to form a strong administration.

2. The economic problem remained by far the most important and urgent with which the State had to deal, since Israel has very few natural resources and imports seven times as much as she exports. There were several serious economic crises during the early part of 1952, but the Government managed to weather these successfully. At the beginning of January inflation was in full swing, aggravated by the successful demands of the trade unions for wage increases tied

to the cost-of-living index. By April the shortage of foreign currency had become acute, and the Government was hard put to it to arrange for food credits and in particular to find exchange to pay for sterling oil, for which £1 million was required by Israel each month. The Government made strenuous efforts to obtain sterling credits for the purchase of oil from Her Majesty's Government and asked for a credit of £5 million, which, however, had to be refused in May by Her Majesty's Government owing to their own economic difficulties. Subsequently restrictions on the use of fuel were introduced by the Israel Government and the means were secured to pay for adequate supplies of fuel to cover the rest of the year. This episode showed clearly how precarious the foreign currency situation was in Israel. In February the Government introduced a new economic programme designed to curb inflation, to encourage the investment of capital and to increase productivity. The banks were instructed to restrict credit, three rates of exchange were introduced, an export bank was established, efforts were made to balance the entire budget, including the defence budget, and a relatively large number of civil servants were dismissed. The policy was designed to bring about controlled deflation. Prices soared at once but the new policy was moderately successful in keeping these within bounds, although its effects were diminished by the increased allowances paid to workers. Many new factories financed by foreign investment were completed, but a shortage of raw materials caused difficulties in almost all industries. The textile industry was hit by the world-wide slump. About \$65 million of financial assistance was received during the year from the United States Government, and large contributions were also made to Israel's Treasury by the sale of bonds in the United States and collections by the United Jewish Appeal. There were, however, signs that the extraction of funds from American Jewry was becoming more difficult, and fears were also expressed that United States Government aid would be reduced in 1953 under the Republican administration.

3. The immediate economic outlook for Israel was, however, improved by the conclusion in September of an agreement with the Federal Republic of Western Germany under which the German Government agreed to pay Israel a total of 3,450 million marks as a measure of reparation for the Nazi persecution of the Jews and as a contribution to

the cost of absorbing destitute refugees from Germany and former German territories in Israel. It was agreed that these payments should be spread over a period of twelve years, 450 million marks being devoted to Jewish organisations outside Israel. It was also agreed that during the first two years after the agreement came into force 150 million marks would be made available to Israel in sterling by Germany for the purchase of sterling oil. At the end of the year, however, the agreement had still to be ratified by the Bundestag and had not yet entered into force. The negotiations with Germany which led to the conclusion of this agreement were opposed by a considerable section of the Israel population who objected to the whole principle of negotiating with a nation which had been so recently responsible for the death of 6 million Jews, and the Knesset vote authorising the Government to negotiate was 61-50.

4. During 1952 it became clear that the Soviet Government and their allies had given up hope of bringing Israel into the Communist orbit and the Israel Government was denounced in Russia and in the satellite countries as a *bourgeois* nationalist Government acting as the tool of the Anglo-American warmongers. The Communist purge trial in Prague in November, in which the prosecution denounced Zionism and the Israel Government and emphasised the Jewish origin of the majority of the accused, caused consternation in Israel. It was followed towards the end of the year by increased pressure on the Jews in Communist countries and Israelis became apprehensive about the future of the 2½ million Jews living therein. As a result of the events in Czechoslovakia and Russia the fellow-travelling Mapam Party, who have since the second World War been trying to combine revolutionary socialism with Zionism, were badly shaken, the more so as one of their own members, Mr. Oren, had been arrested in Prague at the beginning of the year and had been called as a witness at the trial. The party began to disintegrate at the end of the year, with the minority of pro-Soviet extremists drifting towards the small Communist Party and the majority attacked on all sides and in hopeless confusion. The party had already shown signs of weakness earlier in the year when two Knesset members resigned and formed their own group in protest against the pro-Soviet tendencies of the majority, and at the end of the year it was clear that it was no longer a formidable force in Israel politics.

5. Relations between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab States remained as bad as ever, and relations with Jordan in fact deteriorated. No progress whatever, was made towards the conclusion of a peace settlement, though the Israelis hoped in the summer that the coming to power of General Neguib might help to break the deadlock. In August the Prime Minister made a cautious gesture to the new Egyptian régime, pointing out that there were no grounds for a dispute between Egypt and Israel, welcoming the recent events in that country and pointing out that Israel no longer felt any enmity against Egypt for the events of 1948. This approach, however, met with no response and later in the year it became clear that General Neguib was being compelled to adopt as extreme an attitude on the Palestine issue as his predecessors.

6. Arab infiltration from Jordan into Israel continued throughout the year, and led to continuous robberies and occasional murders by the Arabs, which placed a very serious strain on Israel agricultural settlements near the border, and to sporadic retaliation by the Israelis. In the first half of the year there was a substantial degree of co-operation over the settlement of disputes arising from infiltration between the Jordanian and Israeli representatives on the Mixed Armistice Commission, but in the last six months and particularly after the appointment in September of Azmi Nashasibi as the chief Jordanian delegate, this diminished and both sides appeared to be using the proceedings on the Mixed Armistice Commission largely for propaganda purposes. Israel action in connexion with Mount Scopus led to three serious disputes during the year; in July, when the Israelis attempted to take a barrel with a false bottom, the contents of which they refused to disclose, on the fortnightly convoy to Mount Scopus; in September when a dispute over an observation hut came to a sudden head; and in December when they apparently attempted to take war material through to the garrison at night, and became involved in a skirmish with Jordanian forces. One unfortunate result of these incidents was that General Riley, the head of the United Nations Truce Organisation, and his deputy, General de Ridder, were bitterly criticised, the former by the Arabs for partiality to Israel, and the latter by the Israelis for partiality to the Arabs. With Syria relations were relatively calm in spite of bellicose statements by Colonel Shishakly.

The drainage by Israel of the Huleh marshes continued under difficulties.

7. The Palestine issue was before the United Nations in January and again at the end of the year. The United Nations resolution at the beginning of the year extending the life of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was condemned in Israel as appeasement of the Arabs and at the end of the year the Israel Government was instrumental in having a resolution introduced which called for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States for the conclusion of a peace treaty. This resolution was passed by the Political Committee with the support of the British, United States and French Delegations but failed to secure a majority in the General Assembly itself. This gave disappointment to the Israelis, but left them, nevertheless, with the feeling that the debate had been a great improvement over those of former years and that the Arab States would be unlikely to try to raise the Palestine issue again in the General Assembly. In October arrangements were made by the Palestine Conciliation Commission for the release by Israel of £1 million of Arab blocked balances held in Israel.

8. The Egyptian Government continued to refuse passage through the Suez Canal of all cargoes destined for Israel listed by them as war material. In July the Israel Government addressed notes to the United States Government and to Her Majesty's Government protesting against Egypt's failure to implement the Security Council resolution calling upon her to open the Canal. The economic blockade of Israel by the Arab States was intensified in the later months of the year. Disappointment at the continued hostility of the Arab States has turned to irritation and feeling inside the country became noticeably sharper towards the end of the year. Israeli disquiet was aggravated by the decision of Her Majesty's Government to supply numbers of operational jet aircraft to the Arab States, an action which Israel felt might encourage the Arabs to build up their forces for an attack on her. The Israel Government considered that modern arms should not be supplied to the Arabs until they agreed to take part in Middle East defence plans and to settle their differences with Israel peacefully, and that any such arms supplied before these conditions have been fulfilled would only lead to an arms race which would be damaging to the economic development of the whole Middle East and might easily bring about the outbreak of hostilities in the area.

Representations on this score were made to Her Majesty's Government and to the United States Government and a campaign directed to public opinion in the West was launched in December.

9. Israel made efforts during 1952 to improve her relations with Asian countries. A legation was opened in Japan and official representatives visited India, Siam and the Philippine Republic.

10. It was announced in May that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be moved to Jerusalem as soon as accommodation was available. In July *démarches* were made by the representatives of the Western Powers suggesting that such a move would be inappropriate. But the Israelis ignored these representations and continued with their plans. The Ministry had not, however, moved by the end of 1952. In September the French Minister and I presented our credentials as ambassadors when the status of our missions was raised from legations to embassies. Relations between the United Kingdom and Israel remained cordial in spite of the disagreement about the supply of jet aircraft to the Arab States and a formal visit by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in July, was extremely successful.

11. In November Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the President of Israel and the only Israeli of international standing, died after a long illness. The Prime Minister subsequently invited Dr. Albert Einstein, of Princeton, to allow his name to be put forward for the Presidency, but he declined; and Mr. Yitzhak Ben Zvi, a respected veteran of Mapai, was elected to the Presidency in December. The Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Finance, Mr. Eliezer Kaplan, died in July, and shortly thereafter the Minister of Communications, Mr. Pinkas.

12. For most of the year the Israel Government continued to be a coalition of Mapai and the religious parties with Mapai leaders occupying the most important posts. In September the extreme orthodox Agudist parties withdrew from the coalition, leaving it in command of no more votes than the Opposition. It was, however, not seriously endangered owing to the divisions among the Opposition, although it could not afford to take unpopular measures. By December the fellow-travelling Mapam Party had been so weakened as a result of the Prague trial that Mr. Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, felt that it could be ignored and that he could safely form a coalition with the Conservative General Zionist Party, which

would enable him to lead a strong and effective Government capable, if necessary, of putting through radical reforms and carrying out unpopular policies. The new Government was duly formed in December and after hesitations the principal religious parties and the small Progressive Party also joined it. Mapai leaders retained the key posts in the new Government.

13. In December, Rav Aluf (General) Yadin, the Chief of Staff (Commander-in-Chief) of the Israel Defence Forces, resigned,

apparently after differences with the Government, and was succeeded by Rav Aluf Makleff, who it is generally thought will be more ready to accept the directives of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence without question. In August the period of compulsory military service was extended from two to two and a half years, a measure necessitated largely by the low levels of literacy and physique of the recent immigrants now supplying a considerable proportion of the recruits.

ER 10338/3

No. 7

REPORT ON A BOMB EXPLOSION OUTSIDE THE SOVIET LEGATION

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received February 17)

(No. 34. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
Sir, *February 14, 1953.*

I have the honour to inform you that on the evening of the 9th February a bomb was exploded outside the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv by unknown persons. The wife of the Minister, Mme. Yershov, was slightly injured and two members of the Legation staff were also hurt, one fairly seriously. Damage to the ground floor of the Legation was extensive. This incident has led to a decision by the Soviet Government, communicated to the Israel Minister in Moscow at 1 a.m. on the 12th February, to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. The Soviet Minister and his staff are now preparing to depart.

2. The police are conducting a thorough investigation, and suspicion though so far unproven has rested on a small organisation known as the Anti-Communist League, eighteen of whose members have been arrested. The league is of no political importance and has a negligible following in the country. It has recently adopted a violently anti-Communist policy and after the Prague Communist purge trials distributed leaflets calling for action against Communist Legations in Israel. Its leaders were associated in the past with the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang. They have in the past two years asked for support from this Embassy and from the American Embassy, but no assistance has been given to them and members of my staff have

declined to have anything to do with them.

3. The Israel Government, concerned for the Jews who live in Communist countries, and also anxious that Israel should be regarded in the eyes of the world as a stable and law abiding State, were deeply disturbed by the news of the outrage. The Government immediately issued a statement describing the crime as a "foul deed" and declaring their "horror and detestation." The following morning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Soviet Legation expressing its deep regret and offering to pay compensation. That afternoon the Prime Minister made a statement in the Knesset, denouncing the outrage in the strongest terms. The incident has, however, given the Soviet Government a convenient pretext for breaking off relations, and in doing so they have accused the Israel Government of provoking the incident and the Israel police of conniving at it.

4. The Israel public has been deeply chagrined by this event and indeed something of the feeling of shame which followed the murder of Count Bernadotte has been apparent. The whole press has been unanimous in condemning the crime. On the 11th February a demonstration was organised by the Communist Party and Dr. Sneh's supporters which concluded with a procession to the Soviet Legation and the reception of a delegation by the Minister. Twenty people were hurt in clashes with the public.

5. It is of course remotely possible that the bomb was exploded by the Legation itself as a pretext for the rupture of relations, and I understand from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it appears to have been carefully placed where it would do damage and to be no haphazard affair. It seems unlikely, however, that the wife of the Soviet Minister would have been endangered simply to add verisimilitude, I think it probable that the incident was the work of Israeli terrorists, who within recent weeks have been responsible for minor incidents of a similar nature including the burning of the Russian bookshop in Jerusalem. The Russians have complained of inadequate police protection but their case is weakened by the fact that when two and a half months ago the Government offered the Legation a police guard in the courtyard, where the bomb exploded, the offer was refused. Two policemen were stationed outside the building but they had no access to the courtyard and even after the explosion it was twenty-four hours before the police were permitted to examine the area for clues to the crime. Since the outrage police guards have been reinforced outside the Missions and Consulates of the Communist countries, and have also been posted outside the United States' Embassy and Her Majesty's Embassy.

6. I wrote to M. Yershov after the incident expressing my sympathy, as did the doyen and most of my other colleagues. He will not be a great loss here nor, I think, will the absence of a Soviet Legation have any great effect locally. M. Yershov has not visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the 31st October last year, and clandestine contacts with local Communists can be carried on through many other channels.

7. Two questions which may be affected by the rupture of relations are trade between Israel and the Soviet Union and the question of Russian Church property in Israel. Israel has this year been shipping citrus fruit to Russia as she did last year under commercial agreements and the s.s. *Kinneret* loaded with 40,000 cases of citrus for Russia is, I understand, at present at Haifa. She is unlikely to sail until the position is clearer. With regard to Russian property (Mr. Chadwick's letter of

30th January to Eastern Department) the property already in the hands of Soviet representatives will presumably be handed over in due course to whichever diplomatic mission assumes care of Soviet interests and negotiations about the remaining properties will now presumably lapse. I have so far heard nothing to suggest that the Russian priests in Israel or the members of the Soviet Palestine Society are to be withdrawn.

8. It is too early for me to attempt to assess the consequences for Israel of these events but there is no doubt that they have greatly increased the sense of insecurity which already weighted heavily on the nation, and to which I referred in my despatch No. 33 of 13th February. The Israelis are deeply worried by what has happened and there is a disposition to blame the Israel Government for their emotional reaction to the accusations made against Jewish doctors in Moscow (my despatch No. 14 of 22nd February) Mrs. Myerson, the Minister of Labour and a former Minister in Moscow has described the 12th February as "a black day for Israel, for the Jewish people, and especially for the Jews of the Soviet Union." In general, the Israelis consider that the rupture of relations is the culmination of the Soviet Government's campaign of hostility to Israel and the Jews, reversing the previous policy which led the Soviet Union to support the partition plan for Palestine in 1947. In their opinion, the Soviet Government have taken this action firstly to get rid of the only foreign mission in Moscow which has some common ground with a section of the Russian population, and may unsettle Russian Jews, and secondly to free their hands to support Arab nationalism and outbid the Western Powers in the Arab world. The Government is to make a statement on the 16th February to the Knesset.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Moscow, Washington, Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut and Damascus, to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

MOVE OF THE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO JERUSALEM: UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIONS

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 96. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
(Telegraphic) *March 2, 1953.*

Agreement having been reached with the United States, French, Turkish, Italian, Belgian and Australian Governments, you should concert action with the representatives of those Governments and make representations to the Israel Government as soon as possible. Since the United States and French Governments insist on

representations being oral, I am prepared to leave the form of your representations to your discretion, but if you decide to make them orally, you should leave an aide-mémoire. Representations should not be made simultaneously, and should, if possible, be made without attracting undue public attention.

See also my immediately following telegram.

MOVE OF THE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO JERUSALEM: TRANSFER PLANNED FOR MAY

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 97. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
(Telegraphic) *March 2, 1953.*

My immediately preceding telegram of 2nd March.

Comay, Deputy Director-General of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Sir J. Bowker to-day that while his Government did not propose to move the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the General Assembly was still in session they intended to do so in May when accommodation would be ready. Jerusalem was now established as the capital of Israel and all Government offices were there except the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel Government thought there should be no objection to the move as successive General Assemblies had failed to deal with the question, the last United Nations resolution on the subject had little relation to existing circumstances, and there was

now little support for the original conception of an internationalised Jerusalem. He hoped there was no truth in rumours he had heard that Her Majesty's Government and other Powers were about to try to dissuade the Israel Government from making the move.

2. Sir J. Bowker told him frankly that we should in fact shortly be making representations on this subject. Her Majesty's Government considered that the moment was most inopportune for a move which would inevitably increase tension between Israel and the Arab States and put us in a difficult position.

3. Comay replied that while his Government would give serious attention to such representations he could not hold out any hope that they would be deterred from proceeding with their plans.

MOVE OF ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO JERUSALEM: UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIONS

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received March 4)

(No. 68. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
(Telegraphic) *March 4, 1953.*

Oral representations accompanied by aide-mémoire were made to-day to the Director-General in the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in terms of Foreign Office telegram to Paris 148, modified as authorised in your telegram under reference.

2. In accepting the representations the Director-General undertook to lay them before his Minister, whose attitude would probably be the same as that adopted towards the American interpretation made yesterday: they would be submitted to the Israeli Government without his recommendation.

3. The Director-General commented that the move which would be completed about the end of May had universal popular approval in Israel and that, in his view, it would be politically impossible to cancel it. Its timing had been decided to avoid reactions in the current session of United Nations. With regard to the terms of our representations, the grounds for our attitude seemed to have shifted from consideration for the sensibilities of the Catholic Group to considerations for the

Arab reactions. The Arabs had no real sentiments about Jerusalem and were merely exploiting the affair; their hostility to Israel was not likely to be abated if move was not made or increased if it was. Finally the move was in part motivated by increasing difficulty of conducting business of Ministry at a distance from other Government departments: that in itself was a sufficient reason for the move, as no doubt we should find in remaining in Tel Aviv.

4. I emphasised that interest of Her Majesty's Government was to avert any [grp. undec. ? severe] increase in tension in this area in which we sought to organise its defence. Therefore attainment of this objective was bound to be retarded by any disturbing action. Though Arab objections to move might appear artificial to Israel they were nevertheless real and it made the solution of the task, from which Israel must benefit, the harder if they were [grps. undec.]. We were concerned also that the attitude of the United Nations on Jerusalem should not be disregarded; finally the physical task of moving to Jerusalem, even if there was no objection in principle, was forbiddingly formidable.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN SIR J. BOWKER AND Mr. COMAY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ISRAEL FOREIGN OFFICE, ON 2nd MARCH, 1953

Israel's Position in Regard to Middle East Defence

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 45. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *11th March, 1953.*

Mr. Comay, Deputy Director of the Israel Foreign Office, called to see Sir J. Bowker on 2nd March accompanied by the Israel Ambassador in order to discuss the question of Israel's position in regard to Middle East defence. The ensuing talk on this subject lasted for more than an hour.

2. Mr. Comay made the following points:—

(a) Re-deployment of British Troops

It was to be assumed that an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on defence would result in the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone and their re-deployment elsewhere. Mr. Comay said that any

such development would have considerable significance for Israel, whose strategic position would be affected both by the withdrawal of British troops from their present position on Israel's southern flank and any re-deployment of them in other Arab States.

(b) Middle East Defence Organisation

Israel would be closely concerned in any agreement about Middle East defence which might be concluded with Egypt and the other Arab States. Any increase in military strength among the Arab States would constitute a threat to the security of Israel, who could not dissociate global from regional aspects of defence. The Israel Government, therefore, hoped that it was not the intention of the United Kingdom or the other Powers concerned to reach an agreement with the Arab States about Middle East defence without connecting such an agreement with a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. They felt strongly that to set up a Middle East Defence Organisation without an Arab-Israel settlement would greatly increase the present tension in the Middle East and produce a situation of grave danger to Israel. They thought that this would be a short-sighted approach to the problem as being psychologically unwise, and at the same time neglecting what would be the most effective means of inducing the Arab States to reach a settlement with Israel. They fully understood the difficulties which the United Kingdom and the United States had to contend with in dealing with the Arab-Israel problem, but they felt that the possibility of setting up a Middle East defence organisation produced a new situation and an opportunity of getting the Arab-Israel issue settled.

(c) Israel's Participation in M.E.D.O.

The Israel Government quite understood the reasons why the Western Powers had found it necessary to pursue the idea of a Middle East Defence Organisation associated in the first place with the Arab States rather than with Israel. They felt, however, that Israel had a vital part to play in the defence of the Middle East and they hoped that nothing would be done to prejudice in advance the eventual participation of Israel in the defence of the area.

(d) Direct Israel-United Kingdom Co-operation

Following on General Robertson's visits to Israel and the messages exchanged between Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Morrison, exploratory staff talks had taken place between a United Kingdom Military Mission and the Israel authorities. In this way

the basis had been laid for direct military co-operation between the two countries. Those talks, were, however, now six months past and nothing yet seemed to have resulted from them. Had the Israel Government taken these developments too seriously? Did Her Majesty's Government agree, in principle, that it was desirable to go ahead on this basis of direct co-operation, or were they intending to mark time in this respect until progress had been made with regional defence planning? Mr. Comay said that the same apparent hesitation to work on a bilateral basis had been shown by the Americans, who had not yet met Israel's application for help under the Mutual Security Act.

(e) Israel's Concern in Middle East Defence

The Israel Government hoped that Her Majesty's Government accepted the fact that Israel had a vital and legitimate concern in any arrangements to be made for Middle East defence, and recognised her legitimate desire to be kept informed about developments which affected Israel's position and her desire to co-operate, and to be given an opportunity of expressing views on them.

After explaining these points, Mr. Comay summarised the state of mind of the Israel Government on this issue as somewhat disquieted and anxious to be reassured.

3. Sir J. Bowker thanked Mr. Comay for giving him this frank and clear summary of the Israel Government's views on this subject, many aspects of which he had had an opportunity from time to time of discussing with the Israel Ambassador. He assured Mr. Comay that Her Majesty's Government fully understood the interest which the Israel Government felt in any developments regarding Middle East defence.

4. The fact that we had told them little about the subject recently was due to the fact that there had not been very much to tell. As regards Egypt, we had not yet started defence negotiations. The Egyptian Government had said they wanted them to start immediately, but the issue raised a number of difficult problems here. Negotiations would probably be started soon. It was obvious that a number of issues were involved: the withdrawal of troops, arrangements for the base, Egyptian participation in Middle East defence, and financial and military assistance. Our view was that all these issues hung together. As regards a future Middle East Defence Organisation, much would depend on how the negotiations with Egypt developed. But we fully

understood that Middle East defence could not be dealt with without any relation to the Arab-Israel dispute and at every stage we were fully conscious of the importance of what we realised was an aspect of the broader problem.

5. The difficulty was to decide in what manner, and at what stage, it would be possible to bring the Arab-Israel issue nearer to a solution. We quite agreed with Mr. Comay that to set up a Middle East Defence Organisation which left Arab-Israel relations in a state of greater tension than they were already, would not be an effective way of providing for the defence of the area. On the other hand, it would obviously be useless, if and when we were to invite the Arab States to join a Middle East Defence Organisation, to tell them that the invitation was conditional on their agreeing to settle their dispute with Israel. Such an approach would defeat its own purpose. Moreover, the Israel Ambassador himself, in conversation with Sir J. Bowker not long ago, had suggested that in the event of our reaching a defence agreement with Egypt, that country might conceivably be

disposed to take a more realistic attitude in regard to Israel and even to encourage the other Arab States to do the same. In general it seemed to us that progress in getting the Arab States to participate in organising the defence of the Middle East would be likely to lessen the present tension in the area.

6. As regards Mr. Comay's fourth point summarised above, Sir J. Bowker said that, while he realised there had been some delay in following up the exploratory staff talks in Israel he thought this was due to the practical difficulty of deciding what points could now be developed further. He could assure Mr. Comay that Her Majesty's Government attached great importance to pursuing the contacts now happily established and were not holding back in this connexion for political or any other reasons.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Ankara, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Paris, Washington and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

ER 1114/2

No. 12

COMMENTS ON THE COMPULSORY LOAN LAW PASSED ON
MARCH 24

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received April 11)

(No. 65 (E). Unclassified) Tel Aviv,
Sir, April 1, 1953.

With my despatch No. 313 (E) of the 14th November, 1952, I forwarded copies of the Exchange of Bank Notes and Compulsory Loan Law, 1952. Under this law 10 per cent. for the compulsory loan, which was for fifteen years and carried interest at 4 per cent. per annum, was deducted from all Israel resident bank accounts of over £1.50 and from all £1.5, £1.10 and £1.50 bank notes which were exchanged for new ones.

2. I now have the honour to inform you that a law imposing a compulsory loan on property was passed by the Knesset on the 24th March. The loan will bear 2½ per cent. interest free of income tax and is repayable between 1957 and 1971 by drawing. It is expected to raise

approximately £1.45 million. The property owner will be required to pay 10 per cent. of the loan by the 30th April, followed by six half-yearly instalments of 15 per cent. Loan certificates will be made out to bearer and will be transferable. Instead of subscribing to the loan, the property owner is given the choice of paying a tax which would be half the amount of the loan.

3. Subscriptions to the loan must be made on the following scale: a sum equal to 4 per cent. of the worth of property held which is valued at up to £1.10,000, 5½ per cent. on property valued at between £1.10,000 and £1.20,000, up to £1.35,000—7 per cent., up to £1.50,000—8 per cent., up to £1.65,000—9 per cent., above £1.65,000—10 per cent. The scale may be revised by the Minister of Finance after the 1st October, 1954, depending on what

progress has been made towards attaining the Government's estimated total of £1.45 million.

4. The first £1.5,000 of property worth up to £1.10,000 will be exempted from the loan and for property valued at between £1.10,000 and £1.20,000 a scale of exemptions will apply beginning at £1.4,000 on a valuation of from £1.10,000 to £1.12,000, diminishing to £1.1,000 on a valuation of from £1.15,000 to £1.16,000. Special provisions regarding exemptions apply to war invalids. Full exemption from the loan is granted to the property of foreign States and their representatives in Israel, the United Nations, the Jewish Agency and certain other public institutions, local authorities, certain religious, charitable, educational and cultural institutions, and foreign investors whose investments are entitled to receive the benefits granted under the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment.

5. "Property" as defined by the law includes (a) buildings, plantations and land;

(b) machinery, tools and equipment whether movable or not except if intended for domestic use; (c) vehicles (except bicycles), ships and aeroplanes; (d) certain animals; (e) raw materials and finished and semi-finished goods.

6. The original Bill, which passed its first reading in December last year, was so framed to collect £1.65 million under the loan. The reduction in the total now expected is the result of a compromise reached between the Mapai Party and the General Zionists; the latter formerly were opposed to a property loan at all. I shall forward the text of the law as soon as this becomes available.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Development Division of the British Middle East Office, Beirut, to the Treasury Representative at Cairo, to Her Majesty's Treasury, and to the Commercial Relations and Exports and Exports Credit Guarantee Departments of the Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

ER 1071/60

No. 13

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S STATEMENTS ON EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Sir E. A. Chapman-Andrews to Sir W. Churchill. (Received May 22)

(No. 90. Confidential) Beirut,
Sir, May 18, 1953.

I have the honour to report that I called upon the new Lebanese Foreign Minister, M. Georges Hakim, this morning at his request. The appointment was originally made for Saturday, the 16th May, but at the hour fixed for it this Embassy was surrounded with troops and student and other demonstrations were taking place in the town in connection with the arrival that day of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Foster Dulles.

2. This morning M. Hakim opened at once by referring to your speech, Sir, during last week's foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons. Speaking with a copy of *The Times* newspaper in his hand, he went over those parts of the speech dealing with Egypt and Israel. He said that, speaking as a friend and without making official representations from the Lebanese

Government on the subject, he thought your assessment of Egypt and the Egyptians was mistaken. He believed that the new army movement was a spontaneous and natural manifestation of patriotism; that there was no equally good alternative and that it would be wiser for British statesmen to show restraint and patience in public references to it. Turning to Palestine, M. Hakim said that no one in the Arab world could understand why you, Sir, in your speech should think it worth while to offend the entire Arab world. If the Israel army was indeed the strongest in the Middle East to-day it could only be because the Western Powers had made it so. He could only assume on reading of the duty of Britain to see that the pledges made to the Zionists were fulfilled and of your prayer that the great Zionist conception of a home for this historic people may eventually receive its full fruition, that

Her Majesty's Government intended to encourage and support the Jews still further in their Palestine ambitions. What about unfulfilled pledges to the Arabs? Did this imply a change of British policy?

3. I heard His Excellency out and then said I was glad he was not making official representations but speaking to me only as a friend. On that same basis I had to point out that Her Majesty's Government had exercised great patience and restraint in Egypt in the face of intolerable provocation in the outpourings of the Egyptian press and the statements by Egyptian leaders, in murderous attacks on members of Her Majesty's forces and, as he would remember, the barbarous murder of many British civilians in Cairo only a year ago. We had right on our side in the Egyptian case but had always been ready, and were still ready, to negotiate a settlement that would meet all the reasonable demands of Egyptian national aspirations. We were not the sort of people to negotiate under threats, or to submit to being kicked out. Nor did we consider that the word negotiation was a euphemism for unconditional surrender to the demands of the other side. The door to negotiation still remained open and the Lebanon and the other Arab States could best serve the cause of a sensible and lasting settlement by addressing their representations to the Egyptian leaders.

4. As for Palestine, it was obvious, from your remarks, that no change of policy was intended. Since laying down the Mandate, we had intervened once, if intervention was the right word, in the Palestine fighting, namely at Christmas 1948, when a strong Jewish armoured force appeared to have almost completed the encirclement of the Egyptian army at Gaza and to be patrolling towards the Egyptian frontier. At the request of the Egyptians we had at that time

carried out unarmed air reconnaissance of the approaches to the Egyptian frontier, and suffered fatal casualties as a result. But also as a result, the Israeli attack was not pressed home and a truce immediately supervened. Our only other intervention, if that was the right word, had been to join with the United States and France in the Tripartite Declaration, a statement of policy that had been welcomed by all Arab States without exception. British policy, in so far as the changing of existing frontiers in the Middle East by force was concerned, remained based on that declaration. It was obvious therefore that your remarks about the future of Israel implied only your hope that a formal peace settlement with the Arab States would succeed, as it was intended to succeed, the existing armistice agreements. Speaking personally and as a friend, I thought the Arabs were making a mistake in not seizing the present propitious moment for sitting down with the Jews around the table to negotiate terms of peace. They might not always find the Jews so ready for peace talks. So far as pledges went, my country had had no responsibility in Palestine after the surrender of the Mandate, a step we had not taken until the Arab States themselves had repeatedly rejected our efforts to find a sensible and lasting solution, including a solution based on partition. If the Lebanese Government desired further information on the subject of your speech they would be better advised to seek it through their Ambassador in London.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Washington and Paris and to the Head of British Middle East Office at Fayid.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

ER 1071/73

No. 14

JORDAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S REFERENCES TO ISRAEL

Mr. Furlonge to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 3)

Enclosure to No. 73.

Amman, May 26, 1953.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan presents its compliments to the British Embassy and has the honour to inform it as follows:—

The Jordan Government was surprised at the recent statement which Sir Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, made in the British House of Commons about the problems of the Middle East—a statement which came as

a disappointment at a time when we were trusting that the Treaty of Alliance between Jordan and the United Kingdom would strengthen mutual confidence and the understanding of the difficulties confronting us.

It is surprising that Sir Winston Churchill should allege that the Jewish army, which he described as the most powerful in the Middle East had driven off the attacks which the combined Arab armies made against it, considering that the Arabs were in fact not aggressors but were defending their unarmed brethren who had found themselves exposed to the hostility of the Jewish terrorist organisations when Britain suddenly relinquished her responsibilities in Palestine.

It is indeed surprising that the Prime Minister should make this and similar incorrect allegations and should confine his statement to painful mis-statements about the Jewish aggressors, as though he had forgotten the crimes which they have

committed and still commit against the peaceful Arabs, and the eviction of a million Arabs from their homes by terrorisation. This is the more surprising in that the contents of this statement must be considered as contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations Organisation and as an encouragement to partisan tendencies and aggressive ideas.

The Jordan Government considers it their duty to declare their regret for and repudiation of this open attack against the just Arab national aspirations, not only in Jordan but in all the countries of the Arab world; and they trust that the general wave of indignation with which this statement has been received will bring about a correction of the unjust tendencies which it reveals, which might otherwise lead to far-reaching consequences to the peace of this sensitive area, and therefore to the peace of the world.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs takes, &c.

ER 1019/3

No. 15

APPRAISAL OF THE WORTH OF ISRAEL

Sir F. Evans to Sir W. Churchill. (Received May 28)

(No. 112. Secret. Guard) Tel Aviv,
Sir, May 26, 1953.

At this moment when great changes may be preparing throughout the Middle East it may be of use to you to have an appraisal of the worth of Israel. I have therefore attempted in this despatch to make some estimate of what one might call the specific gravity of the country, its political and social stability and inclination, its economic and military strength, and the moral fibre of its people.

2. The State of Israel is just over five years old. During that time some 700,000 new immigrants have entered the country, and of these about half have come from North Africa and the Middle East. So far these oriental Jews have played no part in directing the country's political or economic affairs, though they are inevitably having an increasing effect on the characteristics and habits of the nation. Political leadership and power are still principally in the hands of those early immigrants who came to Palestine from Poland and Russia before

and soon after the First World War. They are men whose political ideas were early influenced by the Socialist nature of all political resistance to the Tsarist régime, and the conception of a classless society is fundamental to them. They are not, however, for the most part intellectual Marxists of the type which has so decisively influenced socialism in Western Europe: their political theories have been broadened by long contact with England and America in the Zionist cause, by experience of British administration during our mandate, and by the realities of constructive effort. Their aim, I should say, is to build a Western European State modelled politically on the British system, and socially on the Scandinavian. These leaders, of whom the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion, is the outstanding example, are men dedicated to Zionism with the tinge of fanaticism which attends dedication. They are able and personally incorruptible. They are, however, few, and each bears great burdens of responsibility and decision. Their successors of

the next generation are unlikely to have the same fire, though they may have compensating qualities.

3. Parliamentary democracy has so far flourished surprisingly in Israel. The standard of debate is high, the Speaker's control effective, and the whole atmosphere of the Knesset, which is well attended both by members and the public, is highly serious. So far the electoral system is proportional representation with no constituencies, but I have heard much hope that it will soon be possible to establish the British system, and develop the mutual responsibility between voter and member inherent in the constituency system. Circumstances are, I judge, propitious to the successful progress of the parliamentary system in Israel. The moderate complexion of the principal parties and the weakness of the extreme groups combine to make any violent departure from parliamentary democracy very unlikely.

4. After the foundation of the State there were at first two powerful forces pulling Israel away from intimate connexion with the Western Powers. The most widely-rooted of these derived from concern not to prejudice any possibility of extricating the 2½ million Jews who still live under Soviet domination. The other was compounded of the strong Marxist sympathies of the Left-wing Socialist Party, Mapam, which embraced many of the most constructive and respected elements of the nation, and the anti-capitalist and hence anti-American prejudice of Mapai. The first of these forces, though nearly extinguished by the flare-up of anti-Jewish action in the Communist countries which marked Stalin's last days, has somewhat revived in response to M. Malenkov's new look. It has, however, I judge, been so permanently diminished by scepticism of any serious Soviet benevolence towards the Jews that it is unlikely decisively to influence Israel policy against close collaboration with the West. The second has ebbed with the relative importance of Mapam, and with the growing realisation by Mapai of Israel's economic dependence on the United States, and the military danger of Soviet invasion to which Israel is exposed. The Prime Minister has made it plain that he is willing to pledge Israel to full co-operation with the West. During his talks with General Robertson in the summer of 1950 he proposed that some form of Commonwealth relationship should be developed between Israel and the United

Kingdom.⁽¹⁾ He also agreed to military talks with a British mission, which were duly held in October of last year. Unfortunately, and much to the disappointment of Mr. Ben Gurion, the confused condition of our relations with the Arab States, and the uncertainty of United States policy towards the whole area have so far prevented any pursuit of these military talks. I think it probable, however, that given a clear lead the Israel Government would be ready to enter into full military co-operation with the Western Powers, though always on a basis of equality, and that in so doing they would have the effective support of the great majority of the country.

5. There is no doubt that the majority of those in authority in Israel look to Great Britain with a considerable degree of admiration and affection. These feelings have been surprisingly little marred by memories of the conflict, so often dishonourable on the Jewish side, which stained relations with the British people during the latter years of the mandate. The British system of Government, and the British capacity for continuous social evolution are both much esteemed, and the values which underlie the character of our people are generally preferred to those which inspire the American way of life.

6. The problem of peace with the Arab States over-tops all others confronting those responsible for Israel's foreign policy. This country can never flourish until peace, and commerce with the Arab States, are established. She can, however, unless circumstances greatly alter, continue to exist, probably indefinitely. To secure peace the Israel Government are, I believe, prepared to make minor alterations all along the present frontiers; to come to some arrangement with Egypt for a free corridor across the Negev to Jordan; to turn Haifa into a free port; to agree to international control of the Holy Places in Jerusalem (but not of Jerusalem itself); and to pay compensation to the Arab refugees, possibly admitting into Israel some 100,000 of them. Further than this they will not, I think, go, except possibly under the threat of the severance of all aid from the United States.

7. The social pattern of the nation is moulded by two conflicting forces. On the one hand the principles of organised labour and of the co-operative movement are powerfully entrenched in the agricultural settlements, in the system of close control of labour by the Histadrut, and in the com-

⁽¹⁾ In Tel Aviv telegram No. 175 of June 4, Sir F. Evans points out that this proposal has never been made known to the United States Government.

plex undertakings controlled by that remarkably versatile organisation. On the other hand the long Jewish tradition of individual enterprise, great or small, leads the majority of new immigrants to engage for preference in the familiar but unproductive arts of trading, and militates against the healthy growth of those qualities of self-discipline and citizenship which are so powerful a stay to a nation in time of economic adversity. The present Government is making great efforts by economic pressure by the development of social services and through the system of education, of which compulsory military service is an important instrument, to strengthen the former of these forces at the expense of the latter, and I believe that given a period free from disruption by events outside Israel they will substantially succeed.

8. As political leadership comes from the immigrants from Eastern Europe, so for the most part does the dynamic constructive energy which has performed remarkable achievements in making fertile so much that under the Turk was swamp or desert, and which continues actively to develop grandiose plans for the fertilisation of great areas in the Negev. These plans are widely and understandably adjudged economically unsound. But purely economic judgments have a way of proving false where, as in this case, dedication is an ingredient of the problem under judgment, and I would hesitate to conclude that these great projects will not be realised.

9. The threads that compose the economic fabric of Israel are so many, so varied and so tangled that the whole defies analysis and its strength is hard indeed to estimate. Certainly it has proved more resilient and elastic than academic criticism could have expected. Moreover, it can rely on a steady flow of financial assistance from world Jewry, particularly from the United States. Although this flow has recently shown signs of diminishing, there is no doubt that if the continued existence of Israel were in danger the assistance would be immediately increased. The proper economic development of the country has been frustrated by the decision, mistaken on purely economic grounds, to encourage the mass immigration of oriental Jews between 1949 and 1952. These largely uneducated and unskilled members of the community were more than could be painlessly digested. As a result, and in spite of great and largely successful efforts to increase agricultural production, Israel to-day can only produce some two-thirds of the food she requires,

though the Government believe that in some ten years time the country, with a population which may then be some 2 million, will be nearly self-supporting in food except for grains. I do not think this claim unduly optimistic as there is still much land neglected since the Arab-Jewish war of 1948 which has yet to be brought under cultivation. Had immigration been controlled to keep pace with increased production, the heavy burden of food imports could have been largely avoided. Similarly, industries have sprung up without adequate control, in order to meet the need for employing the increased population, and in response to the diverse and ebullient initiatives of so many individuals. Many of these enterprises are uneconomic, and much money has been wasted in over-capitalisation. However, many of the plants which are to-day uneconomic for lack of raw materials would be of potential economic value in time of war. Moreover, although there may have been a good deal of waste, American assistance and guidance have undoubtedly made possible great technical and industrial progress.

10. If there were peace and commerce between Israel and the Arab world the country could develop a stable mixed economy based primarily on agriculture, particularly the growing of citrus fruit, supported by light industries such as textiles, the products of which would find a natural market in the Arab States, and by an entrepôt trade based on Haifa similar to that now so richly enjoyed by the inhabitants of Beirut. Such an arrangement would contribute greatly to the economic prosperity and indirectly to the social advancement, of the whole Middle East. Those who oppose it, and they are of course the Arabs and their protagonists, argue that under it the Jews would, by their greater energy and experience, penetrate and largely control the economic system and resources of the Arab countries, corrupt the simple virtues of the Moslem way of life, and eventually undermine the political independence of the Arab States. They maintain that comparative poverty and social stagnation are preferable to prosperity and progress at this price.

11. If there is no peace with the Arabs the exuberance of the Israel economy will be diminished by austere planning, the projects for fertilising new areas and developing new industries will be retarded, and the standard of life will be levelled off and stabilised at a fairly low level. I believe that the inhabitants of this country would accept the consequent privations and there is, I think, no

compelling reason why in present circumstances the country should not continue to maintain itself and progress slowly on such a basis, indefinitely if necessary. I do not share the view that economic forces must inexorably drive Israel either to collapse or to adventures of expansion.

12. It is, I think, accepted that Israel disposes of the most effective military forces in the Middle East excepting Turkey. Whether or not they would still be capable, as in 1948, of repelling a combined assault by the armies of the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt is an open question. Both sides have been greatly strengthened in the interval, and the outcome would probably depend on the amount of co-ordination and tenacity displayed by the far larger Arab forces. My Air Attaché is of the opinion that the superior efficiency, skill and organisation of the Israel Air Force might well turn the balance. Certainly the result would not be a foregone conclusion either way.

13. My military attaché's best estimate of the Israel army's strength on full mobilisation to-day is one armoured division and three infantry divisions, all somewhat short of equipment. If equipment were supplied by the Western Powers this strength could in time of war probably be increased by a further two divisions. The army is well trained and officered in the lower echelons, and its greatest weakness is a lack of experienced senior officers in the higher command and on the staff. As the army has expanded to include many of the oriental Jews, so its morale has declined from the high peak reached during the war with the Arabs in 1948. Nevertheless, it could be relied on to fight intelligently and tenaciously in defence of Israel territory, while one or two élite divisions capable of fulfilling any rôle allotted to them in the Middle East, could probably be furnished in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. The organisation and methods of the Israel army are largely based on those of the British army, with which many of the Israel soldiers and officers served during the last war.

14. The strength of the Israel Air Force is, according to my air attaché, three fighter/ground attack squadrons (eighteen aircraft per squadron) equipped with Mustangs and Spitfires; one Mosquito light bomber/ground attack squadron (another is to be formed shortly); one night fighter flight and one transport wing. If further aircraft were supplied, an additional four squadrons could probably be formed within six to nine months. Negotiations are in progress with

the Gloster Company for fifteen jet fighter aircraft which will be used to equip a jet fighter squadron and at the same time to train the maximum number of pilots in the handling of jet aircraft. The system of operations and maintenance (this last, so my air attaché informs me, being excellent by Middle East standards) are closely modelled on the practices of the Royal Air Force, and the Israel Air Force as a whole could immediately operate alongside the Royal Air Force and under its control with very few difficulties. The morale of the air force is high, though in action it is probable, as in the case of the army, that it would be higher in defence than in attack.

15. Strategically Israel appears to the amateur to be well situated both to cover the approaches to Suez, and to serve as a base for operations to the north and east. It is, I imagine, too small ever to provide a great base comparable to the installations at Suez, but it has a good port at Haifa, and a good road system throughout the country north of Beersheba, both capable of considerable improvement, and I should have thought that a substantial base, perhaps complementary to others in Turkey and Cyprus, could if necessary be established here. There would also be the advantage of a friendly population.

16. In the context of this despatch the moral worth of a nation must lie not so much in its contribution to religious and philosophic thinking, as in its capacity for disciplined perseverance in peace or war in the face of hardship or danger. To estimate this quality is especially difficult in the case of Israel since there are no historical precedents to serve as a guide: nor is the tenacity of the Jewish people in preserving their racial and religious particularity in the face of millennial persecution entirely relevant. Opinion can therefore only be speculative. Of the present population of about 1½ million I should say that about one-third, these being for the most part the immigrants before about 1935, have the necessary qualities to about the same degree as the average of the British people, and that from among them there will in time of need be thrown up sufficient leaders of the necessary calibre. The remaining two-thirds of the nation are composed of post-war arrivals, survivors from the Nazi concentration camps, and of oriental immigrants since 1948. The former category have for the most part been too broken by their past experiences to be capable of any positive reaction to circumstances. The attitude of the latter in adversity is more problematical. The oriental

Jews have certainly no previous experience of disciplined self-sacrifice, nor I imagine any inclination towards it: neither have they the same passionate attachment to the soil of Israel which inspires the early settlers and their children. On the other hand their former standard of living was in the majority of cases, though by no means all, lower than it is in Israel, and they are therefore likely to endure without complaint what to a European Jew might seem severe material privation. Both of these classes have in common the knowledge that in coming to Israel they have severed themselves from every other community and that there can be no future for them outside Israel. This knowledge will presumably inspire the fortitude of despair, which should become more powerful the greater the danger.

17. In conclusion I should say that Israel is by Middle East standards a tough, progressive and efficient country, probably more so than any other in the area. As an ally she could offer valuable though limited assistance, and could be relied on, because of her dependence on the Western Powers and of the identity of her interests with theirs, to perform to the best of her ability whatever undertakings she accepted. Certainly Israel cannot offer anything like the advantage in terms of strategic space, and oil, which are at the disposal of the Arab States and if there were a clear choice between the goodwill of either the Arabs or of the Israelis, or even, since each side can to some extent command resources beyond itself, between the numerically powerful Moslem world, and the financial power of world Jewry, self-interest would presumably lead us to prefer the Arab connexion. However, the deceptive simplicity of this choice is marred by many complicating factors. On the one hand the Moslem world is far from

united, and it is by no means plain that the attitude of Pakistan and Indonesia, or even of the Moslem population of North Africa, will be affected by our policy towards the conflict between Israel and the Arab States. Nor is the Palestine issue the only or even perhaps the greatest obstacle to our enjoyment of the willing co-operation of the Arabs. Untimely nationalism seems at least as formidable. On the other hand it is often and cogently argued that Israel, and for that matter world Jewry, are so committed to the Western cause that there is no need to placate them, and that though we cannot favour Israel and also retain even the acquiescence of the Arab States, we can favour the Arabs and Israel will nevertheless be perforce on our side in an emergency. This last is perhaps a tempting argument though one which our past pledges to the Jewish people which you, Sir, recently reaffirmed in the House of Commons, make it hard to accept as a basis of policy. Even if it were possible to do so, the experience of the last war and of more recent years would seem to show that the support of Arab nationalism is at best unreliable. If, in addition, that special relationship with the Arab States which successive British Governments have so long striven to cement is to become, as seems possible, an increasingly tantalising chimera, it may be worth considering whether a modest Israeli bird securely in the hand might not be worth an Arab covey in the bush.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Jedda, to the Head of the British Middle East Office and to Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

ER 1071/70

No. 16

SYRIAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S REFERENCES TO ISRAEL

Mr. Montagu-Pollock to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 3)

(No. 81. Confidential) *Damascus,*
Sir, *May 26, 1953.*

With reference to my telegram No. 101 of May 21, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a note which was handed to me by the Syrian Foreign Minister on May 21 on the subject

of the references to Israel in your speech in the House of Commons on May 11. A summary of this note was subsequently issued to the press.

2. As the note was of considerable length and was in Arabic only I was not able to discuss it in detail with Dr. Rifa'i on that

occasion. However, I was anxious not to leave the field entirely to him and I therefore reminded him that you had repeatedly shown yourself to be a friend of the Arabs in general and of Syria in particular: what better proof could there be than that you had headed the Government which had liberated his country? This did not mean that you were not an equally sincere friend of Israel; and I believed that your frank statement that it was to the interests of both parties to this regrettable and long-drawn out dispute that they should patch up their differences was a proof of deeper friendship than the cautious and evasive remarks characteristic of politicians who were afraid to speak their own minds and who consequently merely kept false hopes alight. I then quoted the following passages from a recent leading article in an enlightened Beirut newspaper on the Arab States' demands of Mr. Dulles: "We invite the United States to force Israel to carry out the decisions of the United Nations, to stop Jewish emigration, to abandon all serious projects for the defence of the Near East, to support Egypt's claims, to supply us with arms free of charge and to grant us unconditionally economic and technical aid. This means that we seek to secure countless contributions from our 'friends,' at the same time warning them that we will turn our backs on them and follow an illusory policy of neutrality." This, I said, appeared to me to be an apt description of the unrealistic policy at present being pursued in this area. I reminded him that, in spite of our sincere efforts to provide Syria with reasonable help in rearming herself and to assist her in obtaining economic and technical aid, I had during my three years in Damascus, never once heard a kindly reference to my Government or my country in a public speech from a member of the Syrian Government, and I pointed out how regularly the Syrian delegate on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations had voted against the policies of Her Majesty's Government. Finally, I showed him an extract from a recent issue of one of the strictly censored Damascus dailies which declared: "Britain has never entered a country without enslaving its people and has never sent an Englishman to a foreign independent country other than for purposes of spying and of preparing plots against its freedom and independence. Why, therefore, do we not purge our country of the English and their plots and expel them so long as they are

more Zionist than the Jews?" What I added, would the Syrian Ambassador in London say if he read an article in the London press attacking his country in such terms?

3. Dr. Rifa'i took these remarks of mine in good part—he is always polite, friendly and helpful—and answered that he was not complaining about any expressions of friendship on your part for the Jews or even for Israel. Such an attitude would have been entirely reasonable. But he insisted that your reference to the "great Zionist conception" eventually receiving "its full fruition" could only be interpreted as meaning that you were hostile to what the Arab people had deepest at heart and as an incitement to the Zionist extremists to adopt a more aggressive policy. Not only were the references to Israel's behaviour full of inaccuracies; the speech did not contain a single reference to Arab sufferings at the hands of the Jews or a word of friendship or of sympathy for the Arab world and its tribulations. Ever since Britain had shown how generous she could be by helping Syria to obtain her independence, her policy had been increasingly a deception. And now your remarks could only be regarded as announcing a reorientation of British policy in the Middle East, which would necessitate a corresponding reorientation of policy by all the Arab States.

4. In reply I assured Dr. Rifa'i that he had read more into your speech than what was meant and that there was no question of Her Majesty's Government defaulting on the Declaration of 1950 under which they and the United States and French Governments guaranteed the Arab States and Israel against aggression. His Excellency appeared little reassured and expressed the earnest hope that you would make a further statement to restore Arab confidence.

5. I also enclose a translation of a statement on this subject which, according to the Damascus daily *El Faiha*, General Shishakli is alleged to have made to Dr. Husni Khalifa, the chief editor of the Egyptian News Agency. I had been considering discussing the matter further with the General, but I have reached the conclusion that no useful purpose would be served by this as I have little to add to the remarks which I have already made to Dr. Rifa'i, and I therefore feel that it would be best, in so far as any action on my part is concerned, to leave the excitement to

calm down by itself. At last Saturday's "Iftar" dinner given by the President to the Heads of Missions, both the President and General Shishakli showed themselves to be extremely friendly to me. The latter appeared not to take your remarks too much to heart though, like Dr. Rifa'i, he said that they would not have caused the offence they did if you had distributed your expressions of good will and sympathy evenly between Arabs and Jews.

6. Indeed, I must confess that my impression is that the Syrian Government have the mass of the politically-minded Syrian people behind them in interpreting your remarks as a deliberate act of unfriendliness, particularly as, in their view, there appeared to be no call for this tribute to the Zionists at the present time. In these circumstances I am doubtful whether the unfavourable reaction which your remarks have had here will die down entirely by themselves, whereas I suggest that a word of understanding and sympathy for some of the more legitimate of the Arab ideals could do much to restore confidence in the goodwill of Her Majesty's Government. Such a statement could be no less firm on the subject of the need for peace between Jews and Arabs, and could be worded in such a way as to avoid raising false hopes that Her Majesty's Government intended to revert to the partition plan.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Bagdad, Amman, Jedda, Beirut and Tel Aviv and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

W. H. MONTAGU-POLLOCK.

Enclosure (1) in No. 16

(Translation)

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
21st May, 1953.*

No. P7(802).

Subject: Statement of the British Premier

The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy and, with reference to the statement made by the Premier in the House of Commons on the 11th May, 1953, in particular that section connected with Israel, have the honour to raise the following points:—

(1) Whereas the Premier does not fail to refer to the terror with which the Jews were

faced in Europe and to the crimes committed against British officers and soldiers—crimes which were committed by the Jews themselves—his statement did not contain—to our great astonishment—any reference to the great massacres and horrible atrocities meted out to the original inhabitants of Palestine at the hands of these intruders, nor to the results which led to the displacement of about 1 million Arabs from their own country. These are now living in tents while Jewish intruders have taken their property, houses and lands. Such is the abnormal state of affairs which created the international problem known as the Arab Palestine Refugee problem which in all its complexity forms the greatest historical crime of the present century.

(2) The statement contained the following passage: "The Jews were fortunate to have the best army in the East and to have succeeded in repulsing the joint attack launched by their neighbours and Egypt four years ago"; the Premier knows full well that there was no attack by the Arab States. But after Britain had given up her responsibilities of keeping order and security without transferring them to any lawful authorities, the Arab States were compelled to defend the unarmed Arab subjects of Palestine who suffered in soul and lost their property and land as a result of brutal foreign invaders who forcefully and callously ejected them from the land of their fathers and disposed of the Arab region as if they were its rightful owners, giving no heed to any of the decisions which emanated from the International Organisations.

Therefore the fact that the Premier says he considers that the Arab States were the attackers may lead to their being considered as aggressors. This is contrary to historical truth.

(3) It is regrettable that the Premier should exploit every occasion to glorify Israel and to exalt her militarily, economically and politically, while he knows that the Arab defence was not halted as a result of the strength of Israel but was stopped by the Arab States themselves in compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council. Thus the Premier ascribes weakness to the Arab States for no reason except that they then assumed all the obligations necessitated by their being members of the United Nations Organisation. They did so despite the fact

that the United States resolutions were not fair to them with regard to the military situation and were not taken except after manoeuvres which are now no longer concealed. It should not be concealed that the adoption of the Premier's view implies an invitation to disobey international resolutions, in particular the resolutions of the Security Council. This would lead to loss of confidence in those resolutions and in international councils. This encouragement contradicts the logic of present international relations which aims at organising relations between nations on the basis of international resolutions, since it gives the Arab States a pretext henceforward to consider such resolutions which are contrary to Arab national rights as a renouncement of those rights. Therefore the Arab States will decide their international attitude in the light of this consideration.

(4) In addition to the foregoing the Premier expressed the following sentiments towards the Jews:—

"I implore the Almighty from the depths of my heart to support this great Zionist aim of establishing a home to embrace this great historic people to live in the land of their fathers, yes, I implore him that this aim may achieve its complete fulfilment."

We maintain that the viewpoint of the Premier in referring to the "land of their fathers" is contrary to historical truth, because he knows that the Bible mentioned the presence of the Arabs in various parts of Palestine before the arrival of the Jews who came from Egypt. Moreover, Palestine has been the true and rightful country of its Arab inhabitants from that time until to-day. This profound historical truth cannot be denied by false words such as are contained in the Balfour Declaration in which the Premier places his trust.

Even while ignoring the fact that the Premier entirely departs from neutrality between the two contending parties, it is still strongly regretted that he should lend his whole support to Zionism with its racial principles such as the Atlantic Charter proclaimed should be the first to be fought.

It is even more regrettable that the Premier should describe the Zionist aim as "great" and to wish it to realise "its complete fulfilment," thereby openly encouraging aggressive ideas and expansionist intentions on which Zionism is based

and which form the first cause of the trouble and confusion in the Middle East at the present time.

On this occasion the Ministry wish to point out that if British policy in the Arab East is henceforward to be inspired by the aims of the expansionist Zionist movement, in accordance with the statement of the Premier and his wishes, it will be difficult not to assume that Great Britain has no longer an independent policy towards the Arab States and countries, owing to her being bound to the aims of a movement which is hostile to the Arab nation and is not responsible in the field of international relations.

Until the lines of a new British policy towards the Arab States and countries have been clarified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are obliged to consider the declarations of the Premier as an unfriendly act which has been regretted by all groups in Syria. Consequently, the Ministry cannot fail to express their regret and protest and note the contrast between the consequences of such a statement and the consolidation of stability in the East and of world peace, as is required by the world situation.

The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs avail themselves of this opportunity to assure the Embassy of their highest consideration.

(stamped)

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Damascus.

Enclosure (2) in No. 16

(Translation)

"El Faiha"—22nd May, 1953

Dr. Husni Khalifa, chief editor of the Egyptian News Agency met General Shishakli who stated to him:—

"Churchill unveiled the true aggressive intentions of his Government towards the Arab countries. I disapprove of collective or individual protests by the Arab Governments against Britain since words do not benefit us. The Arabs must face this new danger, which is represented by Churchill's person and his like among the colonisers who fight the independence and freedom of nations. Nothing is left before us except real action or utter destruction which happened in Palestine."

He added: "Palestine was lost because of Britain who hid her real intentions from the Arabs during World War I. Britain forced a mandate over Palestine from the

League of Nations which was intended to raise the standards of the Arabs in order that they should be able to govern themselves. But what has she done? She handed over Palestine, her evil gain, to the Zionists."

"Churchill to-day announces what he formerly kept secret. He is 'zealously praying' for the destruction of the Arabs and from the bottom of his heart wants their country to become part of a great Israeli Empire. Churchill is the victim of political fever, and it may be because of Egypt's firm and right attitude that he lost his senses and spoke words which have never been said by a responsible man in the history of international politics."

General Shishakli suggested an urgent conference of Arab leaders in order to revise their entire policy towards Britain as she is the Arabs' No. 1 Enemy.

"Churchill's speech and his new policy towards the Arab world urges us, we Arabs

now, rather than at any other time, to hasten to study, implement and strengthen the Collective Security Pact. The difficult time the Arabs are passing through must teach them that men like Churchill do not keep their promises or any agreement unless they are faced with force. We must strengthen ourselves in order to face the world with heads held high."

General Shishakli concluded by generously wishing success to the Egyptian people who are struggling honestly to obtain their natural rights and complete freedom and absolute sovereignty over their country. He praised them for working to raise the economic and social standards which were very low owing to British colonisation and its supporters. General Shishakli asked me to convey his greetings to General Neguib, Major Abdul Nasser and their comrades wishing them every success in their efforts to obtain freedom for Egypt and the Arabs.

ER 1091/184

No. 17

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON MAY 27, 1953

Tension between Israel and Jordan

Sir W. Churchill to Sir F. Evans. (Tel-Aviv)

(No. 83. Confidential) *Foreign Office, May 27, 1953.*

The Israel Ambassador came to see the Minister of State this morning at the latter's request.

2. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd gave him a message from me to the effect that I regretted that I could not, particularly at the present time, undertake to see Ambassadors, and that therefore I would be grateful if the Ambassador would send me privately the message which I understood had been received from Mr. Ben Gurion. The Ambassador expressed his disappointment. He said that my decision might be misunderstood in Israel, where these personal matters were considered of great importance. Mr. Lloyd said that he hoped the Israel Prime Minister would understand.

3. Mr. Lloyd then informed the Ambassador that Her Majesty's Government were most concerned at the growing tension between Israel and Jordan. The Amba-

sador agreed that tension was growing and in rather an alarming fashion. Mr. Lloyd said that our information from all sources had led us to the conclusion that there was some official Israel initiative behind the recent incidents on Jordan territory. He referred to the raids at Falama and Rantis at the end of January; to the firing in Jerusalem on 22nd April, and to the series of raids on Jordan villages between 17th and 24th May, in which Arab women and children had been killed. He said that we had reason to believe that the Israel Government had ordered their troops to engage in a policy of deliberate reprisals. The Ambassador did not dispute this suggestion at all. He said that there were only two choices for the Israel Government. Either better arrangements must be made between the two Governments concerned to keep the peace, or the Arab intruders must be taught a lesson and kept back by force. The first choice was impossible

because the Jordan Government had up to now refused to enter into high-level talks. The second choice was therefore the only one for the Israel Government.

4. Mr. Lloyd said that the second choice was not the only one, for there was a third, that is to say, defence of Israeli territory and Israeli citizens without reprisals across the Jordan frontier. The Ambassador said that the question of tactics was more for soldiers than himself, but he was always led to believe that attack was the best form of defence.

5. The Minister of State said that he thought the Israel Government were playing with fire. Admittedly there was infiltration by Jordanians, no doubt some of it innocent, but some of it also by thugs and robbers; and it might even be possible that the Jordanian Government were not doing everything they could to prevent it. But he did not believe the incursions into Israel territory were by organised Jordanian troops under official orders. It appeared to us that the Israel incursions into Jordan territory were by Israel troops acting under orders, and from the point of view of public opinion in this country and elsewhere, that was a very important distinction.

6. Mr. Lloyd said that he was speaking to the Ambassador in a spirit of friendship. It was not for Her Majesty's Government to seek to dictate what his Government should or should not do. But he felt bound to tender the advice that this policy of calculated reprisals would damage their cause with world opinion.

7. He went on to say that the consequence of this policy was to impair the relations between Jordan and Great Britain. He felt

that a great factor in the security of Israel was the presence of British troops, and a British-trained Arab Legion in Jordan. The Ambassador said he realised that, and his Government did not want to make things more difficult for Her Majesty's Government with Jordan.

8. Mr. Lloyd referred to the local commanders agreement and said that he understood that both Governments were now willing for that to be revived. He had, however, heard that the Israelis were seeking to make some important modifications. He hoped that that was not so. The Ambassador said he had not sufficient definite information to discuss that matter. He said he would take note of what had been said and report to his Government.

9. This conversation was perfectly friendly, and the Minister of State had the impression that Mr. Elath felt he was arguing a weak case with regard to the policy of deliberate reprisals and the killing of Arab women and children, even in revenge for the killing of Jewish women and children. He did not explicitly admit that the reprisals were deliberate, but he did not dispute it, and the whole conversation was carried on on that basis.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut, Paris, Ankara and Washington, the United Kingdom Delegation United Nations at New York, the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid and the Acting Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.

(For Sir W. Churchill)
A. D. M. ROSS.

ER 1015/10

No. 18

MEMORANDUM ON ISRAEL BY THE HON. JOHN WILSON

(Enclosure to letter No. 10117/2/53 of June 5, 1953 (Received June 12) from Sir F. Evans, Tel-Aviv, to Mr. A. D. M. Ross, Foreign Office)

It is often, perhaps too often, said that Israel is unique, but it is true that there is one fundamental difference between Israel and most other countries. This is that her continued existence is still an open question. When I came to say good-bye to the political correspondent of a leading newspaper after

two-and-a-half years in the country, I said something polite to him to the effect that I would like very much to come back in thirty years and see how things had turned out. He looked at me quite seriously and said, "Mr. Wilson, I should like to ask you one question: do you, after your time here,

think that we shall still be here in thirty years?"

To an Israeli, there is of course only one answer to that question, but the fact that it can be asked at all shows how tense, how urgent and how serious the atmosphere in this country is. Every Arab hopes and believes that the answer to it will be "No." I found myself that I answered quite unhesitatingly "Yes." I think that the same answer would be given by most foreigners who have lived in Israel since 1948. It is not really a thought-out answer. If one considers and analyses the prospects of Israel, surrounded by 40 million implacably hostile Arabs; devoid of natural resources, and with only negligible competitive skills; already possessing a semi-oriental population, and utterly dependent on the whims of foreign Governments and the goodwill of Jews abroad, one would feel many doubts. But in the last resort nations either do or do not possess something intangible which enables them to surmount the most formidable obstacles, and Israel undoubtedly does possess this quality. So it is that the foreigner here, a stranger in the land, a Gentile to whom the issues of the Near East can mean little personally, is often touched with the universal spirit of optimism and of faith and comes to feel that the experiment of the Jewish State cannot fail unless it is swept away by the convulsions of a world conflict.

If then, one becomes convinced, more by instinct than by reason, that Israel is likely to survive, it is reasonable to ask what manner of country it is likely to become. It is still too early, when the country is only entering its sixth year of existence as an independent State, to predict the future with any certainty. But something is already apparent. The Israel of the future is clearly going to be much less efficient, much less effective than the leading countries of Europe. Already the standards of efficiency, of culture, of education and technique have fallen sharply, in spite of the great efforts of leading Israelis who are still nearly all Europeans. Already half the population have the Middle East, Arabia and North Africa as their background. In time a generation will grow up which will be cut off from the main stream of Western civilisation by the complexity of their native Hebrew. In a comparatively short time Israel will be a true part of the Near East and no longer an extension of Europe.

There is, however, likely to be a more or less permanent gap between the Israelis and their Arab neighbours. Though the Israelis

of the future may be second or third rate by Western European standards, it will be surprising if they do not remain for a long time incomparably more effective, more determined and more reliable than the Arabs and Persians with whom their lot is now cast. They are likely to be a tough and coherent country, united and militarily strong by local standards. I should think it not unlikely that Israel will eventually emerge as a sort of microcosm of modern Turkey, backward by Western standards but far superior to the Arab countries.

At present, Israel is a curious example of a country of town dwellers earnestly trying to become peasants. The orderly spaced rows or geometrical patterns of identical houses dotted about the country in the co-operative villages look all too obviously like the product of the drawing board and the blueprint and all too little like the homes of real country people. Israelis will conceive agriculture in terms entirely of mechanical equipment, irrigation pipes and laboratory research and they are only slowly learning that the ancient ways of the countryside are not wholly pointless. But in time they will adapt themselves to the conditions they find and will evolve methods to suit them, just as they have already successfully developed the orange and grapefruit groves round Rehovoth and Petah Tiqva.

In time also the fusion of many different types of Jew into the native-born Hebrew-speaking Israeli will produce a new national type, as distinct as the American. It is far too early to say what this type will be like. So far the local-born Israeli "sabras" have shown themselves tough, slow-witted, uncomplicated and extrovert, parochial in outlook, boorish in habit and placid in temperament, though there are of course exceptions. They have shed entirely the complexes, the unease and the timidity of the Jew in the diaspora but they have apparently lost also his brilliance, his subtlety and his burning desire to excel. One quality only they share with him, the dogged persistence that is perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the Jewish people.

It was always the aim of the Zionist movement to establish a national home where Jews could live as normal human beings and in fact "be like other people." This aim has been successful—almost too successful—and it is perhaps fortunate for the world that the greater part of the Jewish people still live outside Israel, in that state of ferment which has been productive of

such astonishing contributions to the progress of the civilised world.

An Englishman who lives for a short period in Israel finds that his feelings about the country and the people are apt to veer about with great rapidity. At times he is in full sympathy with what he sees going on. It is impossible to study the history of the Zionist idea and not to be impressed by its vision, its humanity and its tremendous force. Like all great ideas, it has been abused, but it was and is a fine conception. Its execution in Israel commands respect and at times admiration. Great things have been achieved and formidable obstacles have been overcome. It is hard not to be impressed also by the energy and hard work of the population—or at least the settled half of it—by their serious and constructive efforts in the face of many natural difficulties and by the devotion and idealism of many leading Israelis in all walks of life.

One wishes such people well. No European can easily escape from the memory of what one of the leading nations of the civilised West did so recently to the Jewish people and one feels reluctant to grudge to the few who are left from the slaughter, their barren and sandy corner in the world.

There is of course another side. No one who has not lived in Israel can fully comprehend how irritating Israelis can be. It is not merely that there are in Israel many very unpleasant people—those who ran the Stern Gang and the I.Z.L. and who even now use violence against anyone who disagrees with them—but that many of those who are basically well intentioned seem to be obsessed with their own problems to the exclusion of all else, wholly self-centred and self-absorbed and also unable to rid themselves of a truly formidable disingenuousness, a type of cant from which Dr. Weizmann, alone among his colleagues,

seems to have been wholly free. Years of pleading a case, of seeking sympathy from the world, have produced this disease, which amounts almost to a national characteristic. Ministers and senior officials seem always to prefer ingenuity and a smoke-screen of words to frankness and seem incapable of realising the advantages of candour and straightforwardness. Every fact must be coloured and presented in a favourable light. The Zionist movement, and in its turn, the Hebrew press, have built up a sickening jargon to describe every phrase of the country's life and such phrases as "the ingathering of the exiles," "the upbuilding of the State," "the liquidation of the diaspora," "the redemption of the land" and "tracks led to the border" occur with gloomy frequency along with overworked biblical tags like "the desert shall blossom as the rose" and "if I forget thee, O Jerusalem." The air is thick with propaganda and while on one side misleading stories and press campaigns are worked up with misplaced energy, a censorship stifles the dissemination of honest news.

To a large extent, Israelis often become the victims of their own propaganda, and are genuinely hurt and surprised when their birds come home to roost. Much of this, however, can be put down to inexperience and more still to over-anxiety, due to the constant threat of attack or economic crisis and to the tiny extent of the country.

The leadership in Israel is not, as one might expect after knowing Jews in the diaspora, brilliant, ingenious and clever, but on the contrary is not skilful or subtle but lumbering, honest and well-intentioned. The Government are not very good at dealing with their manifold problems, but they are reliable and well disposed and they have the country behind them and that is perhaps more important.

ER 1071/72

No. 19

IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S REFERENCES TO ISRAEL

Sir J. Troutbeck to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 8)

(No. 33. Saving) *Bagdad,*
(Telegraphic) *June 5, 1953.*

My telegram No. 322: Israel.

Following is translation of Iraq Government's protest.

"Your Excellency has no doubt realised from the reports of Her Majesty's Ambassadors in the Arab countries that the speech delivered by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953,

46777

D*

created a bad impression on Arab public opinion. In this speech he spoke of Israel in terms of praise and encouragement and wished its people well in their life in their fatherland in spite of Israel's evident hostile intentions and continued aggression which the United Nations, with Great Britain in the forefront, have been unable to check.

2. At a time when the Arab Governments were looking to the British Government earnestly to take decisive steps to end this aggression and solve the problem of the Arab refugees, the original owners of the country, who were dispersed by the Zionist gangs and driven out of their country, and at a time when Sir Winston Churchill calls upon the Arab States in their wisdom to seek a rapprochement with the Western Allies to whom they are bound by many ties of common interest, they have received with the most bitter disappointment his latest statement which shows a clear bias towards Israel which has been proved to be the aggressor.

3. The attention of the Arab Governments has been drawn to the fact that these statements extol the work done by Israel in building up a nation and reclaiming the desert to take half a million refugees from Europe alone. This is contrary to the facts and an attack on the rights of the Arabs of Palestine who were driven from their country to make room for half a million alleged refugees and other strange Jews referred to in the speech in question. It would have been very fitting and just if Mr. Churchill [*sic*] had shown sympathy for the plight of the displaced Arabs and the hunger and want they suffer in the camps in the arid valleys of Jordan, at a time when hundreds of millions of dollars are being poured upon the Jews who have settled down and are living in ease and luxury in a country which does not belong to them.

4. A point which must be answered is Sir Churchill's [*sic*] statement that "Nothing that we shall do in the supply of aircraft to this part of the world will be allowed to place Israel at an unfair advantage." Does this mean that Her Britannic Majesty's Government intend to adopt a policy which conflicts with her obligations concerning the supply of arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and aircraft of the most modern type available, to the forces of certain Arab countries which are bound to the British Government by treaties of alliance? Iraq would be glad to receive from Her Britannic

Majesty's Government an explanation of this.

5. Her Majesty's Government will no doubt remember that in July 1940, after the fall of France in the Second World War, Iraq offered to place half her forces under the command of General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. Iraq asked for no compensation from the British Government for this offer other than that the British Government would implement the White Paper on Palestine. When the Iraqi Government received no answer to this offer, Iraq and the remaining Arab countries began to doubt the goodwill of the British Government in regard to the implementation of the White Paper, which had been supported by a majority of the British House of Commons. Mr. Churchill [*sic*] was at that time among the minority which opposed this policy. This had an adverse effect on the relations between Britain and Iraq in particular, and the Arabs in general. Later, certain incidents took place in Iraq which were detrimental to the interests of both parties and effected the good relations which should have prevailed between Iraq and Britain in those critical days.

6. The Iraqi Government, which completely fulfilled its obligations to her ally, Great Britain, by standing by her side in the fight against aggression in the Second World War, by offering every facility for the passage of British troops through Iraq, the stationing of British troops in Iraq and the use by them of Iraqi roads, railways, waterways, ports and airfields, and by giving her economic help and Iraqi produce in spite of the austere life then being experienced by the Iraqis, is much grieved to find Sir Winston say in his speech that Israel had formed the best army in the Levant and that it had been able to repulse the combined attack which was made upon it by its neighbours and Egypt. He thus supports the Jews in accusing the Arabs of being aggressors, whereas the Arabs were hastening to the rescue of their brethren, the Arabs of Palestine, when Britain had abandoned her obligations in a manner incompatible with her position as a mandatory State and had left the sacred Arab country to be looted by Jewish gangs. The Iraqi Government wishes to know how Israel was able to build up her army which continues to commit aggression on the Arabs and whether this was effected without the support and assistance of the major Powers. There is no doubt that the praise

of the strength of the Israel army has astonished the Iraqi Government and has reminded it of the reluctant patience with which it has endured the rejection, in spite of the previous undertaking given by Her Britannic Majesty's Government to meet these requests in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance of 1930, of her requests for the supply to the Iraqi army of the arms and ammunition which it requires to defend the sovereignty of Iraq and maintain peace in this vital area. The responsible British authorities no doubt remember that Iraq, in the common struggle against Nazism during the Second World War, willingly gave up to His Britannic Majesty's Government, as a temporary measure, some of the Iraq army's factories, in spite of the Iraq army's need for them.

7. The best service which the British Government can render to deal with this [*sic*] situation and to remove the evil effects which have resulted from it is to take definite steps to induce Israel to accept and carry out the Resolutions of the United Nations, in the drawing up and preparation of which Great Britain took part, so that the honour and prestige of the United Nations and the friendship existing between the Arab States and their Western friends may be maintained. Such action by the British Government would undoubtedly serve to mitigate the wrongs suffered by the Arabs of Palestine as a result of the policy of establishing a national home for the Jews at the expense of the Arabs. There is no doubt that the activities of the Jews

and of those who supported them in fulfilling their aims constitute a grave assault on the rights of the Arabs of Palestine.

8. The Iraqi Government, which is most eager to maintain good relations with her ally, Great Britain, finds it difficult to understand the purpose of this statement at the present moment when unrest and insecurity disturb the international situation. The Iraqi Government can only find it a plain contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. The Iraqi Government may not be anticipating events in concluding that the speech would "encourage those elements who, when they review many aspects of the present situation, consider that the existing relationship between the two parties serves the interests of Britain only." This would hinder the efforts of the men of responsibility and vision and confuse them in their task of directing the common affairs of the two countries along their proper path and of avoiding stresses and troubles.

In conveying to you the expression of my highest consideration and esteem, I hope that the British Government will respond to the wishes of the friendly Arab peoples who stood by its side and made heavy sacrifices in the great hardships which Great Britain and the free nations endured in the past."

I am telegraphing my comments separately.

ER 1071/76

No. 20

SAUDI REACTION TO SIR W. CHURCHILL'S REFERENCES TO ISRAEL

The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Ambassador (Jedda)

Jedda,
(No. 76) June 15, 1953.

The Saudi Arabian Government have now seen the text of Sir Winston Churchill's recent speech in the House of Commons about the problems of some of the Arab States, and about Israel in particular. The Prime Minister's speech, in its references to some Arab countries, and in its support of Israel, was received in this kingdom with

great dissatisfaction and strong disapproval. Sir Winston Churchill, in his capacity as Prime Minister, has supported the hopes of the Jews and their designs on Arab countries, which means expansion at the expense of the Arabs, trespassing on their frontiers, and the death of Arab hopes. This is considered a violation of all the pledges given by Britain in the past, and it widens the gap between Britain and the

Arabs. Therefore the Saudi Arabian Government cannot but disapprove of this challenge to Arab aspirations, which is at the same time an incitement to Israel to open and provocative trespass on Arab countries. There can be no doubt that this

policy can never lead to stability in this part of the East, but will provoke enmity and trouble and is inconsistent with what Sir Winston Churchill himself urges—namely, the need to establish peace in the world.

ER 1091/225

No. 21

**CONVERSATION BETWEEN SIR JAMES BOWKER, ASSISTANT
UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR,
ON JUNE 15, 1953**

Situation on the Israel-Jordan Frontier

Sir W. Churchill to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 91. Confidential) *Foreign Office,
June 15, 1953.*
Sir,

The Israel Ambassador called this morning on Sir James Bowker to make an urgent communication about the situation on the Israel-Jordan frontier.

2. He recalled that on the 8th of June an agreement had been renewed between the local commanders. The Israel Government had hoped for an agreement at a higher level but had nevertheless welcomed the local commanders' agreement in the hope that it would result in an improvement of the situation. Nevertheless, on the three following nights, attacks had been made on the Israel side of the border in which lives had been lost, children injured and buildings destroyed. The Ambassador handed over a list of these incidents. He said that they did not come under the category of ordinary infiltration, but showed evidence of guerrilla organisation and also showed that the agreement recently reached had been quite ineffectual. The Jordan Government could not be ignorant of the position and it could only be inferred that they were too weak to take steps to deal with it. The Israel Government were most anxious to see that the situation was settled peacefully and had exercised great restraint. They must, however, now hold the Jordan Government responsible for a situation which had manifestly got out of hand and they did not know how long the present position could be held. They therefore looked to Her Majesty's Government, who had previously intervened with Israel, now to impress on the Jordan Government the gravity of the situation and the urgent need for them to take the

necessary steps to rectify it. The Ambassador added that when Mr. Adlai Stevenson was in Israel recently he told Mr. Ben Gurion that, in conversation with General Glubb, the latter had expressed his desire to meet an Israeli representative in order to discuss the frontier situation. Mr. Ben Gurion had told Mr. Stevenson that the Israel Government were very ready to agree to General Glubb's suggestion, and wished Her Majesty's Government to know this.

3. Sir James Bowker told the Ambassador that he took note of his representations. At the same time, he was obliged to say that they caused him some surprise. The incidents which the Ambassador had brought to his notice, two of which consisted of the throwing of a hand grenade were, no doubt, regrettable, but he could not feel that they justified representations of such urgency or the conclusion that the recent agreement had broken down. It seemed only reasonable that a little time should be given for the recent agreement to show results. Sir James Bowker understood that in the case of three recent incidents of which the Israelis had complained—he did not know whether they were the incidents which the Ambassador had now brought to his notice—the mixed Armistice Commission had in one case decided against Jordan, but in the other two cases refused to vote owing to insufficient evidence. Sir James Bowker had, too, seen a Jordan complaint that in one incident information from the Israel local commander had been communicated twelve hours after it was said to have taken place. Moreover, it happened that only this

morning a letter from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Amman had been received, in which he reported that the Jordan Government were taking systematic measures to control infiltration. It seemed inappropriate that every incident should be the subject of diplomatic representations.

4. The Ambassador, showing some indignation, said that he was not discussing the legal aspects of the matter, but representing the present gravity of the situation, which was causing mounting tension in Israel. He asked what reply he could make to his Government. Sir James Bowker said he could tell his Government that he had taken note of his representations and would see that they were given careful

consideration. The Ambassador said he would report accordingly. He thought that no doubt a similar communication was being made to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tel Aviv.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut, Paris, Ankara and Washington, the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York, the Head of British Middle East Office at Fayid and the Acting Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.

(For Sir Winston Churchill)

A. D. M. ROSS.

ER 1103/7

No. 22

ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF MONETARY DEFLATION

Sir F. Evans to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 18)

(No. 124 E. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,
June 16, 1953.*
Sir,

In my despatch No. 8E. of the 21st of January about Israel's economic situation, I referred to some of the consequences of the Israel Government's policy of monetary deflation while allowing prices and wages to continue to rise.

2. This policy, which was begun in February, 1952, when the Government devalued the Israel pound, tightened credit controls, and ceased printing more paper money, has now run for sixteen months. The changes in internal economic conditions which it has caused have been more far-reaching than the Government could have expected when their new policy was announced. I have already described the shortage of cash which is being increasingly felt not only by the Treasury but also by business and industry. The wage earner too has suffered in spite of the fact that his wages are linked to the official cost-of-living index, and this has caused a considerable drop in local demand for all classes of goods except the barest essentials.

3. This decline in demand has in turn caused industrial production, already low because of the shortage of raw materials, to decline still further and unemployment has correspondingly increased. In fact demand

has been so far reduced that what supplies of raw materials are available, which less than a year ago would have been considered totally inadequate, are now in many branches of industry sufficient for current needs. The shortage of working capital, which was frequently felt by Israeli concerns in the early days of the new monetary policy and which was caused by rising prices and wages, has also now been overshadowed by the lack of demand and the consequent contraction in capital requirements, even though many manufacturers who last year sold for cash are now having to take six, twelve or even eighteen months' bills for their goods.

4. Local industry is, however, not the only sufferer from the reduced demand; housing development has slowed down considerably. Real estate prices (though not rents) have dropped by roughly 25 per cent. compared with a year ago. Most building materials are now easy to obtain. Israel's biggest glass factory has had to cut back production. Cement, which was in extremely short supply, is now freely available and some is being exported, while two new cement works are due to go into operation in some months' time.

5. The increased unemployment resulting from the decline in building and industrial

output has caused the Government not a little concern, as is evidenced by the bill for an £1.15 million unemployment relief loan (under which payments will be considered as an advance on income tax contributions) which has recently been passed by the Knesset. The number of registered unemployed is now about 3.6 per cent., though the real figures are probably nearer 6 per cent., admittedly not large percentages, but enough to shock many Israelis used to three years of full employment. The effect on labour has been salutary, but there is room for further improvement. Some exceptional cases have been heard of factory workers, who a year ago earned from £1.5 to £1.6 per day, offering their services at £1.1 per day, without of course the knowledge of the General Federation of Jewish Labour (Histadrut). Again, the supply of labour to the citrus groves this season was a great improvement over recent years, a factor which contributed to the better export performance of the citrus growers.

6. Not only citrus but all branches of agriculture have done better this year than last, and increased agricultural output has to some extent counter-balanced the decline in industrial production. While the farmers too have their money difficulties, they are not affected to the same extent as are the industrialists and the merchants. However, of late there have been second thoughts in Israel as to the rightness of the policy which is being followed for agriculture. An influential body of opinion feels that Israel's agriculture is a rich man's agriculture; that it should be more broadly based, increasing production both of industrial crops and of crops for direct human consumption, and at the same time reducing the more expensive kinds of animal products, and fodder. There may indeed be some room for change in this direction, but perhaps not to the extent which some local proponents of autarky, who in their desire to save foreign exchange disregard the question of internal costs, think necessary. Israel cannot in the foreseeable future grow bread grains economically, nor cotton for that matter.

7. Too many people in Israel still show too little appreciation of local production costs. When the early Zionist pioneers began in Turkish days to settle the wastelands of the coastal plain, the question of costs rightly took second place to the determination to succeed and this attitude persisted through the years of the mandate. For instance, the amount of capital which has been sunk in Jewish agriculture could

have been much less had it been possible to establish the early settlements in the most suitable agricultural areas and not, as was often the case, primarily strategically. Even now it is only by partial disregard of economic facts that the Israelis have made the remarkable progress that they have; and such an attitude is a big asset in tackling the formidable problem of the development of the Negev. Yet it is also a handicap in a country which needs to lessen its dependence on the outside world at the earliest possible moment. The importance of too many capital projects tends to be judged locally by the amount of money spent on them, rather than by the contribution they will make towards Israel's viability.

8. Israel's two biggest internal economic problems to-day are perhaps increasing costs and decreasing production, and the two are of course inter-connected. Each rise in costs causes a further falling-off in demand, reduced output and, consequently, higher costs, and Israel's prospects of being able to export competitively at least in the industrial field are thus again weakened. Costs of production have not always risen as rapidly as might have been expected because the prices of some raw materials have declined as a result of the reduced demand. For example, steel sheets which a year ago sold at £1.1,200 a ton on the free market are now offered at £1.700. Nevertheless, since most raw materials are imported there is a limit to the price reductions which can be made.

9. The Government have so far taken little direct action to solve these two problems. However, through their extension of a special premium over the official rate of exchange to exporters of some industrial commodities, they hope to keep down export prices and so encourage external demand. By the granting of similar premiums to certain invisible exports they are trying to increase the inflow of private capital and thereby improve internal demand. Yet even if industrial exports were doubled, they would not represent more than some 6 per cent. of Israel's total industrial production. Moreover, any increase in private capital inflow as a result of better exchange rates cannot be large. The biggest part of the problems will remain.

10. It is difficult to see how demand can be greatly stimulated without some careful relaxation in the Government's monetary controls; and if production is to be substantially increased the need for more working

capital will become urgent. In addition, shortages of raw materials will again be felt unless the Government is prepared to allocate more foreign exchange for their purchase. Since these purchases can probably be made only at the expense of imports of capital goods, this in turn presages another reduction in the rate of development.

11. Some relaxation of the restrictions on bank credits may in any case become necessary when the reparations goods from Western Germany begin to arrive; there seems little doubt that the internal financing of these goods will be difficult unless special measures are taken. The German reparations may also, if wisely chosen, serve in some measure to prime the pump of Israel's economy. They will, however, be no panacea and it will probably prove necessary to relax controls still further.

12. It is unlikely that the Government will make changes in their present monetary policy without the most careful consideration. The results they have obtained from it have in many ways been highly satisfactory. The sharp decline in the value of the Israel pound in terms of foreign exchange which had been continuing for some years

has been arrested, while in the eyes of the average Israeli his pound is now once more worth having. Through the decline in local demand, many of the unessential and weaker enterprises have been shown up and a healthier economic state of affairs has in general been created. The Government have in fact shown much courage in maintaining their policy in the face of increased unemployment and they will not relax the controls they have instituted unless they are certain that to do so will bring real advantages. This is, indeed, praiseworthy. Yet it would seem that the time is approaching when some more positive steps must be taken if Israel is to maintain its progress along the long and difficult road towards viability.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid, to the Development Division at Beirut, to Her Majesty's Treasury, to the Commercial Relations and Export Credits Guarantee Departments of the Board of Trade, and to the Ministry of Labour.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador)

A. R. MOORE.

ER 1018/33

No. 23

MOVE OF THE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO JERUSALEM: TRANSFER PLANNED FOR JULY 12

Sir F. Evans to Sir W. Churchill. (Received July 10)

(No. 222. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
(Telegraphic) *July 10, 1953.*

Heads of all diplomatic missions this morning received a Note from Director-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing them that the Ministry will move to Jerusalem on July 12. A liaison office will remain in Tel Aviv.

2. The Note expresses the hope that diplomatic missions will follow in due course. I propose to reply reaffirming Her Majesty's Government's attitude as communicated last March (see my telegram No. 68, March 4).

ISRAEL AND JORDAN RELATIONS WITH THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION

Mr. Walmsley to Lord Salisbury. (Received July 21)

(No. 27. Confidential) *Jerusalem,*
My Lord Marquess, *July 15, 1953.*

Your telegram No. 119, sent also as No. 306 to Tel Aviv, of the 13th of July, and also to Amman, to which I now have the honour to reply, calls for a survey of Israel and Jordan relations with the Truce Supervision Organisation in terms which entail the taking of a wide view. The various incidents and developments around which Israel and Jordan relations with the Truce Supervision Organisation have crystallised have been reported in detail as they occurred. In this despatch, therefore, I shall endeavour, instead of repeating a chronological record, to set these indications in perspective, largely as seen through the eyes of the principal members of the Organisation. This cannot, however, be done without making certain generalisations which trench upon the field of affairs for which Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Amman are responsible and for which I trust therefore that indulgence will be extended.

2. The term "co-operation with the Truce Supervision Organisation" may be interpreted in different ways, and opinions will differ in particular according to the view taken of the duties of the Organisation itself. Jordan, it seems safe to say, has never agreed with the interpretation of his duties held by General Riley, the late Chief of Staff. General Riley made no secret of his view that the General Armistice Agreements were inadequate and should be succeeded by agreements looking to a general peace settlement. There is no doubt that he tended to prize most highly "co-operation" directed to this end, and that he considered technical breaches of the Armistice Agreement to be less serious than actions which in his view rendered a general settlement more remote. Israel tended to find more favour than Jordan in General Riley's eyes because the sincerity of Israel's desire for a settlement, whether only temporary or not, was considered genuine and because, on the contrary, the Arab States have never ceased to proclaim their opposition to any settlement confirming Israel's gains.

3. It is important to give due weight to this aspect of Israel relations with the Organisation. It is only in this respect that the Jordan record can be thought to compare unfavourably with that of Israel, or indeed be considered unsatisfactory at all. Any survey of Israel or Jordan relations with the Truce Supervision Organisation, not only since the beginning of this year but over at least the past three years, shows Israel far more frequently at fault than Jordan. It is only by referring to the consideration described above that Israel's record can be regarded with anything but disquiet.

4. The history of the "high-level talks" on infiltration proposed by Israel on the 26th January this year illustrates this point. Infiltration is a subject which, unless organised by either party, does not clearly fall within the terms of the Armistice Agreement and has in practice been treated as if it does not do so. None the less the Local Commanders' Agreement signed on the 13th of May, 1952, and revised on the 1st of December and the 29th of December, 1952, had been operating to control infiltration as well as other misdemeanours, and in the opinion of M. Vigier, the impartial and experienced Political Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation, it had been doing so with success. Giving a reason described to me by M. Vigier as inadequate, the Israel authorities informed the Truce Supervision Organisation that they regarded the agreement as having lapsed on the 21st of January. The Israel delegate informed M. Vigier that this decision was irrevocable. Many evils followed from this event, not least of which was the clogging of the Mixed Armistice Machinery with complaints which during the existence of the Local Commanders' Agreement had been stifled at birth. For present purposes, however, it is necessary to concentrate on the effects which occurred on infiltration. According to Israeli figures, infiltration increased. Jordan denied that this was so. Whatever the truth of the matter, however, infiltration now became a focus of interest and one which both parties considered to

fall outside the province of the normal Armistice Supervision machinery.

5. On the 26th of January, then, Israel first proposed "high-level talks" to handle infiltration. The first such meeting did not take place till the 11th of March and nearly foundered owing to unnecessary recriminations by the Jordan delegate, Azmi Nashashibi, who in many ways was unfitted for his post. At a second meeting on the 19th of March the Jordan delegate asked for Israel proposals. At a third meeting on the 25th of March the Israel delegate handed over a memorandum of proposals for action which might be taken by Jordan to control infiltration. On the 13th of April I informed Mr. Furlonge of M. Vigier's anxiety that Jordan might ignore these proposals and not even give the appearance of being interested in the subject. Meanwhile Sir James Bowker had written to Mr. Furlonge, on the 16th of March (ER 1091/69), stressing the importance of securing co-operation with Israel for preventing infiltration. Despite Mr. Furlonge's pressure, no action seems to have been taken by the Jordan Government towards resuming discussion with Israel before the serious Israel border aggression in Jerusalem on the 22nd of April rendered the atmosphere unfavourable to discussion of any kind. Following upon this incident General Riley announced that Israel had agreed to a high-level meeting and that he hoped Jordan would also agree. After the excitement had somewhat subsided Mr. Furlonge once more repeatedly pressed the Jordan authorities to agree. Perhaps owing to the imminent change of Government in Jordan no action was taken, even after the Jordan Prime Minister had assured Mr. Furlonge on the 27th of April that he had given the necessary instructions. In the event, General Riley was not informed of Jordan agreement to a high-level meeting until the 25th of May. Thereupon General Riley appears to have engaged in discussion with the Jordan Government about the composition of delegations. General Riley received final Jordan agreement through General Glubb on or about the 13th of June, but did not, owing to a misunderstanding or for other reasons, so inform the Israelis before he left Jerusalem on the 26th of June.

6. Thus, between the 25th of March and the 13th of June, a period of two and a half months was allowed to interrupt negotiations on a point to which both the Israel and the British Governments attached

considerable importance. Contributory reasons for this delay were no doubt the provocation given by Israel in launching the border reprisals of the 22nd of April and thereafter, the impending change in the Jordan Government and the suspicion that if Israel were sincere she would not have denounced the Local Commanders' Agreement on the 21st of January. With all allowance made for these three factors however, the delay, it seems, might have been avoided if the Jordan Government in March had taken the same attitude towards infiltration as it takes to-day. The Jordan authorities, without having—as Israel maintains—accepted responsibility for stopping infiltration, are now making substantial efforts which they apparently considered last March to be uncalled for or unnecessary.

7. I am not qualified to judge whether the Jordan Government are now conscious of having made a decision in principle to negotiate on subjects, which, like infiltration, do not clearly fall within the Armistice Agreement. Nor can I comment on whether it is justifiable to expect the Jordan Government to negotiate on lines which tend towards a more permanent settlement than the Armistice itself. The recent history of the attempt to control infiltration does, however, suggest that problems may arise which cannot be settled by reference solely to the Armistice Agreement but which, unless settled by other means, endanger the Armistice Agreement itself. Mount Scopus may be a case in point. The problem of the refugees may one day prove to be another, if the present unexampled docility of the multitudinous refugees in Jordan should yield to counsels of despair. The frontier villages separated from their lands may be a third. Problems of this type are liable to arise at any future meeting of the Special Committee which was envisaged in Article VIII of the Armistice Agreement but whose operation Jordan obstructs because the wording of that Article is unfavourable to her. It might be that in future cases of this kind the attitude of Israel rather than of Jordan would prove to be the stumbling-block. Here it is only necessary to suggest that if such problems arise their solution will depend on "co-operation" of both parties in the wide sense described in paragraph 2 above.

8. In turning to the remainder of the field of "co-operation," it is necessary to distinguish between the action taken to initiate incidents and the attitude shown by

the parties during subsequent discussion and investigation.

9. The records of the Mixed Armistice Commission are denied to outside parties, but the chairman has informed me that there is only one case this year in which Arab Legion personnel have been involved in an incident for which Jordan has been condemned. It is safe to say, however, that this incident, and every incident involving reprehensible action by National Guardsmen or private Jordanians, occurred against the orders and wishes of the Jordan authorities. I cannot find any case in our own recent records where the Jordan authorities have instigated a breach of the Armistice Agreement, nor can I recollect any such case, certainly no important case, during the period of nearly three years since I arrived at this post. If the Armistice Agreement is taken to include the Mount Scopus Agreement, Jordan appears hardly less blameless, for the long-standing utilisation of the Augusta Victoria Hospital for refugees is at least as much an action of the International Red Cross and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency as of Jordan, and the increase in the population of Issawiya village cannot with certainty be considered a breach.

10. Israel's record of responsibility for disturbances is unfortunately black. These incidents fall into two classes. The first category includes actions undertaken directly by the Israel armed forces, or at their instigation or with their encouragement, with the apparent object of inducing desirable action unobtainable by other means. These may be called reprisals, except by those who see in them a more long-term and sinister purpose. They include the raids on Falama village on the 23rd-24th of January and the 28th-29th of January, the raid on Rantis village on the 28th-29th of January, and the series of attacks on houses and villages in Jordan territory on five consecutive nights beginning on the 20th of May. These can all, but only at best, be considered as attempts to induce either the Jordan authorities or Jordanian border dwellers themselves to restrain infiltrators who had been committing thefts and probably in some cases murder inside Israel territory. In the same class also falls the serious incident of the 22nd and 23rd of April in Jerusalem, when concerted fire was opened along a considerable front at civilian targets in the Jordanian sector, causing ten Arab deaths. On Israel's own admission, according to Sir Francis Evans'

telegram No. 126 of the 25th of April, this action was undertaken as a reprisal for Jordan shots at frontier dwellers in the Jerusalem area, who, however, were regarded by Arab sentries as trespassers in No-Man's-Land. If it be granted—as few will agree that it should—that Israel was justified on the 21st of January in denouncing the Local Commanders' Agreement, which had proved itself capable of at least keeping infiltration within bounds, then it is possible to argue that some of the subsequent Israel reprisals may have been justified on either practical or moral grounds. By no stretch of charity or imagination, however, can all the reprisals in question be justified on these grounds. On practical grounds, as Mr. Furlonge stated in his letter of the 9th of June (1031/292/53), the Israel policy of reprisals had made it more difficult for the Jordan Government to engage in the desired collaboration. As for other grounds, it seems unnecessary to add to the condemnation already everywhere uttered of the Israel reprisal in Jerusalem on the 22nd and 23rd of April.

11. If Israel cannot be acquitted on the score of the type of incident described above she might, at least to some small extent, benefit from the plea of extenuating circumstances. Grave though this class of incident, at best, remains, it is overshadowed by others of a more serious kind.

12. On the night of the 6th-7th of February the Arab College in the demilitarised zone under United Nations control was occupied by armed Israelis. There is little doubt that the operation was officially organised, and no doubt that it was illegal. Whether or not it had been organised it was exploited as if it were. The Israel authorities refused to evacuate the building. At first they would agree to evacuate only on condition that the Augusta Victoria Hospital on Mount Scopus was evacuated and that Issawiya village was reduced to a population of 150. Only after unyielding demands by the Truce Supervision Organisation did Israel agree to leave the building.

13. A number of previous incidents, occurring during the past year, conform to the same pattern. On the night of the 12th of December, 1952, two successive Israel patrols had been surprised by the Arab Legion, inside Jordan territory, carrying packs of arms and ammunition on a route leading to the Israel garrison on Mount Scopus. Early in June of the same year Israel had dug a trench and had

erected outside the area of her Mount Scopus enclave an observation hut which she was repeatedly ordered by the United Nations to take down. Israel refused to comply with these orders. Not until the 20th of October was she brought to agree, and then only as a result of strong representations made by the British and the United States Representatives in Tel Aviv. Thirdly, in June 1952, Israel had been caught attempting to run contraband to Mount Scopus in a barrel on the fortnightly convoy. After protracted negotiations it was decided by the Truce Supervision Organisation that the barrel must be opened. Israel thereupon occupied by force the United Nations office in which the barrel was kept under guard, and she prevented by force any execution of the United Nations decision until an unsatisfactory form of compromise was found by the late Chief of Staff. I have recounted this series of incidents from a point earlier than you, my Lord Marquess, request, because it was the "barrel dispute" of June 1952 which ushered in a fresh and critical stage of Israel-Jordan relations.

14. It is common to the incidents described in the two preceding paragraphs that they cannot like the previous class of incident be explained as attempts to achieve possibly legitimate ends by technically illegitimate but in perhaps some slight degree excusable means. The latest incident, that of the Arab College, might at best be regarded as an attempt to put pressure by force on the United Nations to resolve in Israel's favour a dispute existing on the interpretation of the Mount Scopus Agreement. But whether this or a more unfavourable explanation is accepted, this incident takes its place in a series which can only raise doubts of Israel's good faith.

15. Turning to the question of investigation, we could not, as Sir Francis Evans in his telegram No. 231 points out, reasonably expect either the Israel or the Jordan Government to co-operate satisfactorily in investigating incidents which they had inspired. No such incidents of course, in the strict sense, have been attributed to Jordan. However, at the time when the Jordan Government, supported by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, regarded infiltrators as an internal concern of the Israel authorities, the Jordan delegate refused to agree that alleged crimes by infiltrators should be investigated by United Nations observers on Jordan soil, or even that such crimes should be

discussed in the Mixed Armistice Commission. This attitude changed completely with the resumption of the Local Commanders' Agreement on the 8th of June, and there can be no complaint of Jordan co-operation in this respect since then.

16. On the Israel side, the extent and form of "co-operation" subsequent to the event has varied according to the type of incident concerned. In the less serious of the two types of incident described above, Israel has obstructed investigation on one pretext or another as long as possible and has endeavoured, when resistance began to seem unwise, to secure conditions which would render an unambiguous condemnation unlikely. This pattern was particularly clear in the treatment of the Jerusalem incident of the 22nd and 23rd of April. In the more serious type of incident described in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, Israel's attitude has varied from obstruction and denial of competence, in the case of the ammunition-running of the 12th of December, 1952, to different degrees of open defiance in the other cases listed. To apply the term "co-operation" in such cases, whether in their initiation or in their subsequent handling, would be a misuse of language.

17. In a different field also it is disagreeable to record that Israel "co-operation" with the Truce Supervision Organisation has been defective. Co-operation must be taken to include the presentation of news about the Organisation and its activities in a reasonably truthful form. The Israel press, however, compelled to rely upon the "army spokesman" for its facts and largely upon military guidance for its views, has consistently presented a picture of the border situation which approximates to the reverse of the truth. This point has been dealt with at more length in Mr. Furlonge's letter of the 6th of June (1031/293/53) and in my letter of the 8th of June (1062/199/53), not copied to all recipients of this despatch. Apart from continuous and slanderous attacks on General de Ridder, Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, based often on hardly recognisable distortions of the truth, it cannot be said that the Israel press has directly denigrated the Truce Supervision Organisation as such. By stressing, however, the incapacity of the Organisation to enforce the protection to which, under the Armistice Agreement, Israel is entitled, the press has sometimes created the impression that

Israel would be justified in taking the law into her own hands. Such was the case immediately before the Israel reprisal taken on the 22nd and 23rd of April. The Jordan press, on the other hand, has presented a reasonably accurate picture of the border position, barring infiltration. It is true that the Arabic press, by its intemperate attacks on General Riley personally, on Israel and on anyone who can be blamed for Arab misfortunes, tends to discourage any general settlement of Israel-Jordan affairs. This, however, is but one aspect of the problem discussed in paragraphs 3-7 above.

18. Looking not at the past but at the evidence of willingness to co-operate revealed during the past week or two, M. Vigier is satisfied with the attitude of Jordan but is unwilling to say more of Israel than that the test has yet to come.

19. Finally, I cannot omit to mention one further aspect of Israel's attitude which may not reflect deliberate policy but which is bound to affect relations with the United Nations staff. I believe it is true to say that new members of the Organisation arrive in Palestine with no prejudices, or if anything with some prepossession in favour of Israel. Unfortunately it requires but little contact with Israel officers and officials to convert this neutral or friendly frame of mind into a marked distrust. Israelis with whom the staff is brought in contact succeed in producing the impression that they are hostile to the United Nations as an organisation, unless indeed it gives them everything they want, and that they resent the presence of the members of the Organisation personally. Not infrequent discourtesy, a hectoring attitude, and an assumption of superiority, are qualities which arouse distaste but which might fail of their effect if more serious indications of hostility were lacking. It is perhaps not even so important that all reported cases of firing at the United Nations observers on the Israel-Jordan frontier are attributable to Israel. It is rather the incidents of the type described in paragraphs 12 and 13 above which create an atmosphere in which relatively small frictions can produce a disproportionately serious effect.

20. The less agreeable manifestations of Israeli behaviour described above would come as no surprise to British administrators with memories of the Mandatory régime. This is mentioned not in order to illustrate a doubtful continuity but because

it suggests that the difficulty may be one with deep roots. While it would of course be folly to believe that the virtues and the defects of the Palestine Jewish community are merely reincarnated in the State of Israel it would no doubt be equally rash to expect their early demise.

21. I have referred in this despatch only little or not at all to a number of factors which are important in their own right, such as the attitude of Israel and Jordan respectively to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and to the late Chief of Staff, or the details of Israel and Jordan behaviour before the denunciation of the Local Commanders' Agreement on the 21st of January and before the conclusion of a new agreement on the 8th of June. Also I have passed over the treatment of daily minor complaints made by either side, such as the overflying of Jordan territory by Israel aircraft, or the use by Jordan villagers of land beyond the frontier. These questions appear to throw no different light on the general problems which emerge from the record set out above.

22. One of these general problems is the nature of Israeli policy discernible behind Israel's actions. I should perhaps record that the question causes deep concern to M. Vigier who, needless to say, fully appreciates also the seriousness of the Arab refusal to negotiate any settlement acceptable to Israel. In M. Vigier's view the natural interpretation of Israel's behaviour is that Israel desires to prove that the General Armistice Agreements have broken down and that the only possible solution is for Israel to settle matters in her own way direct with the Arab States and without the intervention of the United Nations or anyone else. M. Vigier is reluctant to believe that this explanation is true. Yet the fact that such an interpretation is seriously considered by so highly qualified and impartial an observer, despite his realisation that Israel in following such a policy would risk intervention by the Great Powers, may indicate the extent of the reputation for intractability and defiance which Israel has won for herself.

I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Tel Aviv, Amman, Washington and the United Kingdom Delegation in New York, and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

R. A. WALMSLEY.

RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE SOVIET UNION

Sir F. Evans to Lord Salisbury. (Received July 23)

(No. 160. Confidential) *Tel Aviv, July 21, 1953.*
My Lord,

In my despatch No. 34 of the 14th of February to Mr. Eden I referred to the rupture of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel. I now have the honour to inform you that the Israel Government announced last night the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union after a break of five months. This announcement was made simultaneously in Jerusalem and Moscow. At the same time an exchange of notes between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries was published. I enclose copies of the full texts of these notes.

2. The announcement by the Israel Government states that preliminary discussions were opened in Sofia in April between the Soviet Ambassador and the Israel Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Gershon Avnon. The fact that it has taken three months to reach agreement on the resumption of relations suggests that some difficulty may have been experienced in devising a formula acceptable to both parties. It would appear that the main point at issue has been the desire of the Soviet Union to secure a reaffirmation of Israel's position regarding her participation in multi-national alliances or pacts. The text eventually agreed upon, whereby Israel declares that she "will not be a party to any alliances or pact aimed at aggression against the Soviet Union," goes further than the statement, included in a note from the Israel Government to the Soviet Foreign Minister of the 8th of December, 1951, and quoted in the present note to the effect "that Israel has never agreed and will not agree to support the execution or the preparation of acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R. or any other peace-loving State." The new formula is, nevertheless, worded in general terms and does not preclude Israel from entering into defensive pacts or alliances. There is no mention in either of the notes of the Soviet Government's attitude towards the emigration of Jews from behind the Iron Curtain. It will certainly, however, be the Israel Government's constant preoccupation to persuade the Soviet Government to allow Jews to come to Israel and they are unlikely to

embark lightly on any policies which would make this less probable.

3. The Soviet note reveals that some concession has been made to the Israeli interpretation of the bomb incident of the 9th of February. Whereas the Soviet note breaking off relations with the Israel Government claimed that the bombing of their Legation took place "with the obvious connivance of the police" the present note refers merely to "a bomb set off by evil-doers."

4. Although the extreme Nationalist daily *Herut* has condemned, perhaps with some truth, the Israel note as abject, and the Russian note indeed, is flavoured with more than a hint of condescension, the two documents appear to have been worded to save the faces of both Governments and prepare the way once again for the normal exchange of diplomatic representatives. There is, however, no mention of when the respective Legations in the Soviet Union and Israel are to be reopened, nor is there any indication whether the Soviet Legation, when reopened, will be established in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem.

5. In concluding their announcement, the Israel Government express their deep gratitude to the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for having so readily undertaken to protect the interests of Israel in the Soviet Union for the duration of the severance of relations.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Moscow, Washington, Sofia, Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and The Hague, to the Head of the B.M.E.O., and to the Acting Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

Enclosure in No. 25

Exchange of Notes between the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the Soviet Union

Letter from the Foreign Minister of Israel to the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., dated July 6.

"1. The Government of Israel has of late been aware of a noticeable improvement in the atmosphere surrounding international affairs and of the renewed widespread desire to arrive at peaceful and constructive solutions of the major international issues still pending. In pursuance of its consistent policy to seek the friendship of all peace-loving nations and to contribute to the measure of its ability to the establishment of normal and harmonious relations between all peoples, the Government of Israel wishes at this juncture to raise the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Israel.

2. The Government of the Soviet Union severed its diplomatic relations with Israel after the explosion at the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv of a bomb placed there by unknown criminals and the damage to person and property caused thereby. The Government of Israel recalls that in its note of February 10, 1953, to the U.S.S.R. Legation in Tel Aviv it expressed its profound regret at the crime committed against the Legation and offered its apologies for it as well as full compensation for the injuries and material losses which the Legation and its personnel had sustained. The Israel police has made every effort to detect the criminals and bring them to justice. It will be recalled that for reasons beyond the control of the Israel police the investigation of clues on the actual scene of the outrage could commence only fifteen hours after its occurrence. Extensive searches were conducted in the offices of certain organisations as well as in private houses, and scores of persons suspected of possible complicity were detained for interrogation.

The investigation has unfortunately yielded no tangible results so far, but the issue is by no means dormant and the quest for clues is continuing with full vigour in the hope that the apprehension and trial of the criminals and the infliction upon them of condign punishment may yet prove possible.

3. The Government of Israel takes opportunity of recalling its reply of December 8, 1951, to the note of the Soviet Foreign Minister of November 21, 1951, in which it declared: 'Israel has never agreed and will not agree to support the execution or the preparation of acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R. or any other peace-loving State.' This policy remains unchanged. Having no hostile feelings

towards the U.S.S.R., but on the contrary being anxious to establish and maintain relations of friendship and amity with it, Israel will not be a party to any alliance or pact aiming at aggression against the Soviet Union.

4. The Government of Israel formally proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the normal diplomatic relations which were interrupted on February 12, 1953, be now re-established, in a spirit of true international friendship."

Letter from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union to the Foreign Minister of Israel, dated July 15.

"It will be recalled that on February 9 a bomb was set off by evil-doers on the territory of the Soviet Legation in Israel, as a result of which an officer of the Legation and members of families of some other officers were seriously injured. Consequently, the Soviet Government recalled its Minister as well as the personnel of its mission in Israel and severed its diplomatic relations with the Government of Israel.

On May 28 the Government of Israel addressed to the Soviet Government a proposal to re-establish diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union.

In considering this proposal the Soviet Government bore in mind that the Government of Israel had expressed its deep regret and offered its apologies for the crime committed against the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv and that although the search for the guilty persons had yielded no positive results, the Government of Israel, according to its statement, has continued its efforts to detect the criminals with a view to their arrest and trial.

The Soviet Government also bore in mind the declaration of the Government of Israel to the effect that it would be party to no alliance or pact pursuing aggressive designs against the Soviet Union.

Taking into account these assurances of the Government of Israel as well as the expression of its anxiety to re-establish relations of friendship with the Soviet Union, and following its policy of maintaining normal relations with other countries and of strengthening the collaboration between peoples, the Soviet Government for its own part also declares its desire to have friendly relations with Israel and considers it possible to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Government of Israel."

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON JULY 22, 1953

Renewal of Relations between Israel and the Soviet Union

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 122. Secret) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *July 24, 1953.*

The Israel Ambassador came to see Sir William Strang on July 22 to give in confidence and on instructions, an account of the transactions leading up to the renewal of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. Similar communications were being made in Washington and Paris.

2. The earlier part of his telegram was somewhat corrupt and he was not quite sure of the accuracy of the earlier part of his story.

3. During the month of April an approach was made to the Israel Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia by the Polish Minister, who intimated that if the Israel Government would request the re-establishment of relations, there would be a favourable response from the Soviet Government. The Israel Government replied that, before proceeding, they would like to have rather more definite confirmation of the Soviet intention. The Polish Minister then brought back a reply from M. Molotov, which included a proposal that the Israel Government should put their request in writing. Negotiations then started between the Israel Chargé d'Affaires and the Soviet representative in Sofia. The Soviet Government made two conditions. The first was that the Israel Government should apologise for the bomb incident in Tel Aviv and pay compensation. This the Israel Government agreed to do. The second was that the Israel Government should undertake not to enter into any treaty or agreement directed against the Soviet Government. The Israel Government refused to give an assurance in this form. It was next suggested that the words "unfriendly to" should be substituted for the words "directed against." This also the Israel Government were unable to accept. In their turn, they suggested that the formula should reproduce a general statement made by the Israel Government towards the end of 1951. The undertaking would then be

to the effect that the Israel Government would not enter into any treaty or engagement inspired by aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union. This proposal was accepted by the Soviet Government.

4. The Ambassador emphasised that the giving of this assurance constituted no change of policy on the part of the Israel Government. It did no more than reproduce words which had been used by the Israel Government on earlier occasions.

5. The Ambassador said that the Israel Government attached great importance to this re-establishment of relations with the Soviet Union: first, because it would strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* the Arab States; secondly, because it would strengthen their position in the United Nations; thirdly, and this was not for quotation, because it would help to strengthen the morale of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union; fourthly, because it would strengthen the internal position of the Israel Government against attack from the Left wing.

6. The Ambassador said that the Israel Government would shortly be asking for the *agrément* for an Ambassador in Moscow. They intended somewhat to strengthen the staff of their Mission and would try to send Russian speakers.

7. Sir William Strang thanked the Ambassador for this communication. When he had seen press reports about the assurance given to the Soviet Government by the Israel Government, a question had arisen in his mind whether this was or was not a new departure of policy. He was glad to know that no change of policy was involved.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Moscow, Sofia and the Head of British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

(For the Acting Secretary of State),
A. D. M. ROSS.

UNITED STATES' REFUSAL OF A LOAN FOR ISRAEL

Sir F. Evans to Lord Salisbury. (Received August 6)

(No. 168. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
My Lord, *August 4, 1953.*

I have the honour to report that, on the 26th of July, the United States Chargé d'Affaires informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the United States Government were unable to accede to Israel's request for a consolidated loan of \$75 million to enable Israel to pay off a number of small short-term obligations. The refusal of the United States Government to grant this loan has come as a disappointment but not as a surprise in Government circles since the Mutual Security Administrator, Mr. Stassen, during his recent visit to Israel with Mr. Dulles informed the Minister of Finance that the American decision, when taken, was unlikely to be a favourable one.

2. The reason that has been given for the refusal is that no United States governmental agency is empowered to grant a loan of this nature without the express approval of Congress. This reason is, however, regarded in many quarters merely as a convenient constitutional cloak for the real reason underlying the United States decision. It is pointed out that the previous Administration did not treat Congressional instructions with such reverence and that it managed, when political interests demanded, to find a loop-hole in the law enabling it to execute its plans.

3. There has, consequently, been considerable speculation as to the possible motives for the rejection of the Israel request. The most generally accepted theory is that this decision is the latest manifestation of the new American

approach to Middle East affairs. Coming so soon after the announcement by Mr. Byroade that the United States intend to increase arms supplies to the Arab States, it confirms the feeling in Israel that the attitude of the present United States Government towards this country is much less warm than that of the Truman Administration.

4. I have little doubt that this explanation is broadly correct. The United States Government are undoubtedly considerably irritated with the Israel Government at the moment largely on account of the move of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem. Moreover the United States Chargé d'Affaires recently told me that some time ago, when American officials visited Israel to discuss the country's finances with the Minister of Finance with a view to considering the Israel request for a loan, they were unfavourably impressed by the reception accorded to them. I gather that Mr. Eshkol treated them to a tirade against reliance on statistics and figures, and expounded his opinion that it should be sufficient for the United States Government that the Government of Israel had faith and belief in Israel's future and ultimate success. I imagine that this incident was not without its influence on the United States Government's decision.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representative at Washington, and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1953*The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)*

(No. 153. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *September 21, 1953.*

I received the Israel Ambassador at his request on the 18th of September.

2. The ambassador spoke first of Israel's interest in the progress of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. He referred to the

assurances which Sir Winston Churchill had given the Israel Government early this year and expressed particular concern—

(a) that the negotiations should not result in any weakening of Israel's security, and

(b) that Her Majesty's Government would do whatever was possible to safeguard the principle of free transit through the Suez Canal which had been violated by the Egyptians.

3. On the first point I said that while progress had been made in the negotiations with the Egyptians, agreement had not yet been reached even on basic principles. Even when that had been done, and the further negotiations over details had been completed, our troops would be remaining in Egypt for some eighteen months and British technicians for some considerable time after that. In any case, Her Majesty's Government had the problem of Middle Eastern security very much in mind and their policy would continue to be governed by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which was designed to give security to the States of the Middle East. As regards the Canal, I pointed out that this was also a major Commonwealth interest, and assured the ambassador that we would bear Israel's concern in mind.

4. The ambassador then turned to the subject of arms deliveries to Middle Eastern countries. He said that as far as he could gather from reports received from his Government, the Americans had expressed apprehension at the possibility of unduly large deliveries to the Arabs. I replied that the ideal situation was a balance of strength such that no-one was tempted to disturb the peace. It was, naturally, for the Powers supplying arms to use their judgment as to how that situation could be maintained. The ambassador expressed appreciation of this answer and went on to mention requests for arms and equipment which his Government

had made to Her Majesty's Government. He asked particularly that there should be an early decision about Centurion tanks and that, if possible, credit terms should be granted for the surplus British equipment requested by Israel.

5. I replied that no decision had yet been taken about the Centurions. As regards other equipment recently ordered by Israel, I understood that the release of several items had been approved and that the Israel military attaché would shortly be informed of details. As to credit, I recalled that Mr. Eden had not been able to accede to Mr. Sharett's request on this subject last year. The position was still difficult, as we did not grant credit terms to Israel's neighbours and could hardly make a special exception in her case. The ambassador appeared to accept this.

6. The ambassador also mentioned the difficulty which arose from the lack of contact between Her Majesty's Embassy at Tel Aviv and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Jerusalem. He expressed the hope that even if we did not move our embassy to Jerusalem, its official contacts would not be restricted to the Ministry's Liaison Office at Tel Aviv. I undertook to look into this point.

7. In conclusion I thanked the ambassador for his call and promised to inform Mr. Eden of his representations.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Paris, Washington and to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid.

I am, &c.

SALISBURY.

ORTHODOX JEWISH OPPOSITION TO THE PASSAGE OF A BILL FOR
THE NATIONAL SERVICE OF WOMEN*Sir F. Evans to Lord Salisbury. (Received September 24)*

(No. 204. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
My Lord Marquess, *September 22, 1953.*

On the 26th of August, after several months of debate, which at times became heated, the Knesset passed a Bill providing for the national service of women. I have the honour to enclose a translation⁽¹⁾ of the

new law (National Service Law 1953) as published in the Government Gazette (Laws), Issue No. 134.

2. The problem of legislating for conscientious objection to military service, always a thorny one, was in this case complicated by the fact that resistance to

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

the Government's proposals sprang not only from the moral scruples of isolated individuals, but from the organised ranks of Orthodox religion. As soon as the Government's intention to introduce this Bill was known, it became clear that the Orthodox community would oppose it bitterly. During the committee stage, the Government introduced extensive amendments to meet their objections, and under the terms of the law as passed women with religious objections are called on for nothing more distasteful than work in a religious agricultural settlement, or welfare service among the children of religious families.

3. The Government had hoped by their modifications of the draft to persuade the Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi, Rabbi Herzog, whose mind has not always been closed to compromise on problems affecting the conflicting requirements of religion and the State, to support their Bill. Their concessions, however, were unavailing, except to illuminate the intransigent extremism of the religious leaders. Rabbi Herzog joined with the Chief Sephardic Rabbi, whose views as leader of the conservative Asian and African communities were never in doubt, and with the Council of Sages, a self-appointed, but nevertheless much revered, body generally accepted as authoritative on questions of religious truth, in condemning the Government's proposals as incompatible with Jewish teaching. The interpretation of Jewish law has for so many centuries been the preoccupation of so many diamond-pointed minds that a dogmatic ruling can generally be cited for any situation. These interpretations, however, are often removed from the scriptures, and even from the Talmud, by so long a chain of other interpretations that often no text can be found to sustain them. Thus in this case no religious leader was able to meet the challenge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, himself no mean student of the scriptures, to produce one convincing text indicating that Jewish women should not be drafted into national service.

4. Owing to the smallness of the religious bloc, the Government's ability to secure the passage of the Bill through the Knesset was never in doubt. The Orthodox therefore devoted themselves to creating as much disturbance as possible in the country. The lack of doctrinal support for their arguments in no way decreased the hold of the Rabbis over their flock, nor did they hesitate to preach to the faithful that the performance of national service by their

daughters would be little better than a career of prostitution. The arguments which had been framed to resist military service were unblushingly served up as objections against a simple requirement to engage in welfare work among children of their own religious persuasion. As commonly occurs when religious convictions become entwined with political action, the Orthodox campaign against the Government's Bill owed more to malicious misrepresentation and the manipulation of emotions, than to conscientious objection or religious faith. During the first reading of the Bill, the Rabbis marshalled several hundred wailing and hysterical mothers into an assault upon the Knesset, from which they were only deflected by the ungallant exertions of the fire brigade. When the Bill had been passed, a procession several thousand strong, marched through the streets of Jerusalem, carrying banners of protest, and wailing lamentations.

5. The fanaticism with which the campaign against the Bill was conducted suggests that the driving force of the Orthodox opposition came not from the concern of responsible religious leaders to safeguard the faith, or even the morals, of the daughters of Zion, but from the burning fanaticism of the ultra-Orthodox group, the *Naturai Karta*, which repudiates the State of Israel, and all its works, as an impious anticipation of the functions of the Messiah.

6. Though the main strength of the opposition was furnished by the Orthodox parties, the other opposition parties provided routine political resistance to the Bill. The Communists objected on the grounds that it was a militaristic and anti-popular measure, and the Left-wing Socialists, Mapam (who in the event abstained from voting), because the Government, by compromising with the theocratic Fascist forces, had, they claimed, created a privileged minority of religious women.

7. The religious extremists received little sympathy from the press, though the largest and most influential daily paper, the independent *Ha'aretz*, criticised the Government on the grounds of expediency for their handling of the question. The paper repeatedly advised the Government to appease the ultra-Orthodox, not because there was any virtue in their case, but on the grounds that stronger Governments than that of Israel had failed in attempts to use strong methods in dealing with small religious minorities. The enforcement of the law, the paper warned, would cause

more damage than the release of religious women from all national service. There are signs that the warnings of *Ha'aretz* were justified, for the Agudat Israel, the political party of the strictly Orthodox, has announced that it will seek by all lawful means the quashing of this offensive law; and the leaders of Mizrahi, the moderate religious party, which, as a member of the Coalition Government, supported the Bill after much wavering, has announced rather ominously that in religious matters Mizrahi will follow the ruling of the Chief Rabbi. It remains to be seen whether the Rabbis will call upon the religious women to resist the application of the law; if so, the Government will be faced with the prospect of providing them simultaneously with a martyr's crown and a prison cell, and may regret ever having set their hand to this thorny problem.

8. The Government's handling of the question is of interest not only in itself, but because the issue is only one facet of the wider problem of the adjustment of the traditional theocratic Jewish societies which existed in the Diaspora to the circumstances and responsibilities established by the creation of the State of Israel. During the centuries in which the Jews were dispersed throughout the world, the Jewish law, as expounded by the Rabbis and enforced by their moral authority, was principally responsible for the preservation of the vitality and endurance of the Jews as a distinct people. Throughout this period, the Jewish communities, while bowing to whatever changing civil authorities enforced their obedience, were organised in all matters affecting their Jewishness as pure theocracies, and there did not develop any manifestation of national integrity outside their religion. So long as the Jews carried no responsibility for maintaining the framework of society, and lived (to use the term in no pejorative sense) as parasites within the bodies politic of other peoples, they could continue to obey without adaptation a code of behaviour designed for conditions which for many centuries have ceased to exist.

9. Many of the requirements of the Jewish law are incompatible with the organisation of a modern State such as Israel aspires to be; one might cite such

an exaggerated interpretation as the refusal even to turn on an electric switch on the Sabbath Day, which is still maintained by some. Even the normal obedience to the Sabbath rule, as accepted by all practising Jews, would make impossible the efficient functioning of a transport system, the operation of a modern port, or the maintenance of a blast furnace. Similarly, the elaborate regulations governing the types of permissible food, the method of its preparation and, in the case of animals, of their slaughter, are not conducive either to the economic provisioning of the country, or the encouragement of a prosperous tourist trade, and indeed have already operated to the detriment of both in Israel.

10. The problem is not one of religious tolerance, since not only faith but also the conduct of daily life is involved. The Orthodox are not satisfied merely themselves to live according to their antique observances, but wish to insist that these be recognised as the law of the land, binding on all citizens of Israel. The great majority of Israelis, though they do not practise the Jewish religion in its details, hesitate openly to resist the imposition of at any rate its principal demands. Many of them fear that it would be unwise to sacrifice the practice of the Jewish way of life which has proved so effective a preservative of the Jewish race, to the material exigencies of the newborn State of Israel, whose permanent existence they may secretly regard as problematic. There is, therefore, more tolerance in Israel than might be expected of the intransigence, and of what appear to the Gentile, the absurdities of the Orthodox minority.

11. The adjustment of ancient and rigid custom to the elastic and changing demands of a modern society cannot be effected by logic; only time, tolerance and education can assist the process, and it seems questionable whether the Government's recent attempt to deal with one facet of it by legislation has been wise.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington and to the Acting Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

JORDAN WATERS: WORK IN THE DEMILITARISED ZONE: SYRIAN ALLEGATIONS OF A BREACH OF THE ARMISTICE PROVISIONS

Mr. Walmsley to Lord Salisbury. (Received September 25)

(No. 179) *Jerusalem,*
(Telegraphic) *September 25, 1953.*

In view of my telegram No. 178 you should have following summary of Bennike's request of 23rd to Israel, now published.

2. Memorandum recalls responsibilities of chairman of Mixed Armistice Commission and observers under Article 5, paragraph (c) of Armistice. He has been called upon to decide as chairman whether, as alleged by Syria, works subsequently detailed were contrary to provisions of armistice on demilitarised zone.

3. Memorandum describes works and refers to Article 5, paragraph 2.

4. Bennike had considered—

(a) Whether works performed so far had interfered with normal civilian life referred to in above paragraph "and in the acting mediator's statement agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment."

(b) Whether the proposed canal was likely to interfere with normal civilian life in the demilitarised zone.

(c) Whether diversion of a considerable amount of water would affect the separating of the armed forces, &c., described in Article 5, paragraph 2.

5. After visiting both banks and hearing views of both parties he decided:—

(a) It is disputed whether certain lands on which work has started, and the island in the river, are Arab-owned. If investigation of titles and land-register should prove Arab ownership, work started without consent would contravene armistice.

(b) He had seen two Arab mills and an Arab area which had been deprived of water. He was not present when supply ceased, but after rapid investigation he accepted as plausible explanation that this resulted from Israel action.

(c) The lowering of river waters "will affect the Arab villagers depending on the river" and particularly nine mills now in use.

(d) The rich lands on Buteiha farm in Syria wholly depend on irrigation. Although Israel has guaranteed maintenance of present flow, Syria objects to depending on Israel goodwill. Irrespective of this point, present project would leave "very little if any water" in Jordan during dry season in default of special arrangements.

(e) The river is a serious military obstacle. Any party which could control or dry up the flow could alter at will the value to the other party of the demilitarised zone.

6. In view of above, Bennike does not consider that a party should "in the absence of agreement carry out in the demilitarised zone, work prejudicing the objects of the zone as stated in Article 5, paragraph 2." Acting under Article 5, the only provision which as chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, I am called to consider in this case, Bennike requests the Israel Government to ensure stoppage of work "so long as an agreement is not arranged."

End of summary.

7. Israel broadcast has just announced that work continues without interference in the zone.

UNEASINESS AMONG THE MORE THOUGHTFUL ISRAELIS ABOUT THEIR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL

Sir F. Evans to Lord Salisbury. (Received October 5)

(No. 214. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
My Lord Marquess, *September 29, 1953*

As I explained in my despatch No. 173 of the 11th of August, there has for some time been a good deal of uneasiness among the more thoughtful Israelis about the Government's policy towards the Arab minority in Israel. The Government's actions since I wrote have done nothing to allay this uneasiness—rather the reverse.

2. The Tira incident, which I reported in my despatch under reference, has been followed by a number of other searches of Arab villages. The Israel army, in conducting these, do not appear to have been as destructive as at Tira, though there have been complaints of unnecessary roughness. Much more questionable action, however, was taken recently following on an explosion near the Arab village of Abu Ghosh, in the Jerusalem corridor, from which eight of the elders of the village were deported to Nazareth for periods varying from three to six months. From what information is available, it does not seem that the complicity of the eight elders has been established. A much respected French priest, who has lived in Abu Ghosh for nearly fifty years, gave it as his opinion that the whole incident had been staged by the Israel authorities in order to intimidate the inhabitants of the village into leaving the area, which the Israel authorities regard as dangerously close to the frontier, and as a warning to them to refrain from contact with the Jordanian Arabs across the border. Similar deportations, though on a smaller scale, have been ordered from Jaffa.

3. There has always been a difference of opinion among the responsible Israel officials about policy towards the Arabs. Some have consistently advocated the progressive removal of the regulations which at present discriminate against the Arabs. Those who hold this view argue that only when the Arab in Israel enjoys equal rights with the Jew can his loyalty to the State be expected. At present the difference of status is marked: the Government continue to postpone the holding of municipal elections in the principal Arab towns such as Nazareth; Arabs living in districts near

the frontier, as most of them do, are unable to travel even between neighbouring villages except with a permit; and the sale of Arab lands under the Absentees' Property Law continues.

4. The advocates of a more liberal policy believe that, given encouragement and incentive, the Arabs in Israel would co-operate loyally with the Government, since a comparison of their own economic situation and prospects, as citizens of a progressive State, with the poverty of the great majority of the Arabs in the neighbouring countries, would convincingly demonstrate to them on which side their bread was buttered. They argue further that the maintenance of discriminatory measures against the Arab minority provides the surrounding Arab States with a plausible excuse for their obstinate refusal to discuss peace with Israel and with a grievance which they can exploit to the detriment of Israel's reputation abroad. To these arguments of expediency is added the moral one that Jews, more than any other people, should, because of their own past sufferings, recoil from measures of oppression against a minority.

5. These enlightened views have always been opposed by powerful influences, particularly among the military, who insist that considerations of security are paramount, and that until a peace is established between Israel and the Arab States any relaxation of the regulations by which the Arabs are at present controlled would be dangerous. They regard the Arab minority as a fifth column which would lend powerful aid to the Arab armies in the war for the destruction of Israel, for which the Arab leaders so openly proclaim their eagerness.

6. In the first years after the establishment of the State, the policy of the Israel Government seems to have been more or less genuinely based on the first of these two schools of thought, and it was their avowed intention gradually to integrate the Arabs into the life of the State on a basis of equality with the Jews. So much emerges from the two Government publications on the subject, copies of which were transmitted with my despatch No. 162 of the

21st of May, 1952, and Sir Knox Helm's No. 310 of the 11th of August, 1951. These and other despatches from this post, notably Sir Knox Helm's despatch No. 5 of the 5th of January, 1951, covering a memorandum by Mr. David Balfour on the situation of the Arabs in Israel, have described the Israel Government's official policy as one of despotic paternalism. It seemed that the Israel authorities recognised their responsibilities to ensure the fair treatment of the Arab minority and to raise, by a process of education and economic advancement, their conditions of life to the level of the Jewish majority. Mr. Balfour, in his memorandum, drew attention to the wide difference between these good intentions and the practices of the Israel Administration as they affected the daily life of the Arabs. Even at their best, the Israel plans for the Arabs showed little interest in their especial requirements, and seem to have envisaged treating them in the same way as new Jewish immigrants. They were to be settled, or resettled, not on their ancestral lands but on whatever land could be allotted to them without interference with the strategic requirements of the military, or with the predetermined plans for the establishment of Jewish agricultural settlements; and, provided they displayed a readiness to fall in with Jewish methods, they would, at least in theory, be given the same type of material assistance as the pioneers of Jewish agriculture.

7. The events of the last three or four years have, however, increasingly diluted what idealism there was in official Government policy. The Arabs' natural disposition to cling to their traditional methods and their particular patches of land has made them unready to take advantage of such opportunities as the Israel Government offered. For example, they have in many cases refused to accept alternative land in compensation for their own, to which they are not allowed to return, and have preferred to persist in reaffirming their claims. The obstinate and active hostility maintained by the Arab States towards Israel and the ceaseless record of incursions by marauders from across the Jordan border have also contributed to a hardening of the official attitude towards the Arab minority. This is to some extent understandable, since there is inevitably a good deal of collusion

between the Arabs in Israel and infiltrators from Jordan: also, so long as the Arab Governments refuse to consider peace with Israel, and even announce their intention of destroying her at the first opportunity, it is natural that the Arabs in Israel should withhold their loyalty to the Israel Government. This is due partly to their natural hope for the eventual establishment of an Arab régime, and partly to fear of being accused of collaboration with the Jews if such a régime were ever established. There is, therefore, now a greater tendency in Israel to regard the Arab minority as a permanently malignant growth, requiring, if not excision, at least constant surveillance. I do not believe that the authorities contemplate any active campaign to drive the Arab minority out of Israel, but suspect that they hope that within a generation the most active of them will decide to emigrate and that this process, combined with the sustained immigration of Jews, on which they continue to count, will reduce the importance of the Arab minority to insignificant proportions. This hope, no doubt, leads them to the conclusion that the discriminatory regulations are useful not only for their security value, but as an incentive to the Arabs to emigrate.

8. This does not mean all attempts to integrate the Arabs are being abandoned. On the contrary, many of the Israel Government's schemes for improving the economic position of the Arabs, and for providing them with better education and health services, are now bearing fruit. The recent decision to allow Arabs to become full members of the Histadrut will, for example, be of great benefit to them. There has always been a duality in the practice of the Government's policy towards the Arabs. This will, no doubt, continue, but it does seem that so far as those in authority are concerned the arguments in favour of a liberal policy are now being advanced with diminishing force and listened to with increasing scepticism.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Cairo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jedda, and to the head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

ER 1115/11

No. 32

REPORT ON A NEW FOREIGN EXCHANGE BUDGET FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1953, TO MARCH 31, 1954

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received October 15)

(No. 224 E. Confidential) Tel Aviv,
Sir, October 13, 1953.

With reference to my despatch No. 303E of the 28th of October, 1952, I have the honour to inform you that a new Foreign Exchange Budget, to cover the period from the 1st of July, 1953, to the 31st of March, 1954, was approved by the Israel Cabinet on the 21st of September. It will shortly be submitted to the Knesset Finance Committee. The period of this budget has been confined to nine months so that it shall terminate at the end of the fiscal year.

2. No detailed balance sheet has been published as in the case of the Ordinary and Development Budgets, but reports in the Hebrew press agree on the sums that have been allocated under the main headings as regards both revenue and expenditure and these are set out in the Annex to this despatch. The budget totals \$233 million (£83 million) exceeding by \$13 million the sum appearing in the original draft on the recommendation of the Ministers of Finance and Commerce in anticipation of a cut in Grant-in-Aid. It is also reported that an alternative budget, still larger by \$11 million, has been drawn up to take into account any extra income which may accrue from contributions by Jewish communities outside Israel and from invisible exports. A breakdown of the \$233 million shows the principal items on the expenditure side to be:—

Foodstuffs, and raw materials for its production	41.6
Fuel	28.1
Services and essential imports for industry and agriculture	68.0
Raw material for export production	21.5
Investments in agriculture, electrical power, communications and construction	36.8
Debt payments	37.0

3. The expenditure of \$41.6 million on foodstuffs represents a cut of \$2 million as compared with actual outlay during a similar period covered by the last Foreign Exchange Budget and is made possible by lower world prices, cheaper freight rates

and the increased local production of staples formerly imported. The allocation for fuel remains steady at \$28 million for the nine months. It is believed that the large section of the budget allocated to "services" includes the secret Defence Budget and interest on loans. The allocation for investment as a whole shows a rise of \$10 million compared with last year's actual expenditure; the increase is divided between investments in electric power plants industry and agriculture, which latter has been allotted \$16.5 million compared with \$11 million. The \$37 million earmarked for debt settlement is an innovation and may be taken as evidence of the Government's good intentions.

4. The revenue estimates are based on the assumption that American Grant-in-Aid will amount to \$50 million for the nine months (this is an optimistic figure according to the latest information) and that German reparations will account for \$57.8 million worth of goods. Apart from Grant-in-Aid funds, dollar receipts total \$84.9 million, of which the proceeds of Independence Bonds and Jewish appeals account for \$65 million and only about \$17 million represent exports and invisibles. Sterling income is estimated at the equivalent of \$23.2 million, including \$16.4 million from direct exports, mainly citrus, while income from exports under specific trade agreements with other countries amounts to \$13.4 million.

5. The new Foreign Exchange Budget has been hailed with scepticism in the independent liberal press on the grounds that it is even less realistic than its predecessor and that it reflects only Israel's "appetite for expenditure." The income anticipated from the bond drive and direct exports is thought to be exaggerated. Criticism is also directed at the relatively high proportion of expenditure which is devoted to consumer goods as compared with the sums allotted to investment. Indeed, while it is satisfactory that the Israel Government appear now to have realised the need for systematic annual scrutiny of Israel's foreign exchange resources, it is disturbing to note the precarious basis on which the country's

economy is set. In a critical analysis of the general position entitled "Our Artificial Economy," Mr. Keren, formerly Counsellor in the Israel Embassies in Washington and London, frankly states his conviction that despite self-imposed austerity and restrictions Israel cannot afford the economic and cultural level which befits a modern society; that the productive capacity of the country lags too far behind the standard of living which is desirable and which has been realisable hitherto only through gifts and loans received in various forms and unprecedented amounts; and that the cutting off of foreign aid would bring with it a sharp and immediate reduction in the present living standards.

6. In Mr. Keren's view a Foreign Exchange Budget running at an annual rate of approximately \$275 million represents an uneasy compromise between Israel's insatiable appetite for imports—if free to do so she could easily absorb \$400 million worth—and a realistic estimate of the revenue the greater part of which depends on external factors over which she has no control. On the assumption that this budget is not exceeded it means that four-fifths of Israel's expenditure of foreign exchange will be paid for from the proceeds of foreign aid and German reparations. This, declares the writer, makes economic nonsense. Provided no serious increase in the population takes place in the immediate future the following unpalatable facts must, Mr. Keren believes, be accepted:—

- (a) Many of the sources which financed imports in the past have now dried up—sterling balances, loans obtained at low interest rates, &c.
- (b) Public opinion in the United States under the present Administration is known to be hostile in principle to foreign aid, and the likelihood of continuing receipts of large sums from the United States Government is thereby diminished. The rejection

of the recent appeal for a \$75 million Consolidation Loan is indicative of this mood.

- (c) There is a certain risk that a change in the political situation in Germany at some future date might jeopardise the full implementation of the Reparations Agreement, which is helping temporarily to jack up Israel's economy.
- (d) While the possibility of the discovery of oil in Israel remains undeniable, such an event would be in the nature of a miracle, and no economic policy can be based on its exploitation.

7. The new Foreign Exchange Budget reveals only too clearly the artificial basis of Israel's economy to-day. Mr. Keren's conclusion, that a lowering in present living standards, at any rate for a considerable time, may be the only solution is, I fear, depressingly correct. To make the budget a more realistic exercise Israel would be obliged to find over the next year or two new sources of income of the order of \$100 million annually; or else to cut imports to the same amount. The only certain factor in the budgetary situation is that during this period any increase in local production and exports, on which much hope is set, will go only a relatively little way towards filling the gap between the country's real income and her present rate of expenditure.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador, Washington, the Head of British Middle East Office, Fayid, the Development Division of the British Middle East Office, Beirut, Her Majesty's Treasury Representative, Cairo, Her Majesty's Treasury, the Commercial Relations and Exports Department and the Export Credits Guarantee Department of the Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

Annex

Foreign Exchange Budget

Estimated Expenditure

\$ million

Services	36.0
Fuel	28.1
Maintenance and repairs	7.8
Health and education	3.2
Foodstuffs and raw materials for its production	41.6
Agricultural production (excluding citrus)	9.0
Raw materials for industry—local consumption	12.0
Raw materials for re-export	21.5
									159.2

Investments in—

Agriculture and irrigation	16.55
Electricity, power and industry	11.5
Communications	2.6
Building, including second stage of popular housing scheme	6.0
Commerce, services and miscellaneous	0.15
									36.8
Payment of debts	37.0
									37.0

233.0

Estimated Revenue

Revenue in Dollars—

Exports of goods	13.7
Invisible exports and services	3.2
Personal transfers	1.7
Jewish appeals	33.0
Independence loan	32.0
Miscellaneous	1.3
									84.9

Revenue in Sterling (calculated in dollars)—

Exports of goods	16.4
Invisible exports and services	2.2
Personal transfers	1.0
Jewish appeals	2.1
Miscellaneous	1.5
									23.2

Income from Goods Imported under Trade Agreements—

Exports of goods	11.6
Transfers and services including those of Jewish bodies	1.8
									13.4

Other Sources of Income—

American Grant-in-Aid in form of goods	50.0
Reparations	57.8
Income from goods purchased by Jewish bodies	3.7
									111.5
									233.0

ER 1081/127

No. 33

JORDAN WATERS: WORK IN THE DEMILITARISED ZONE: REQUEST TO ISRAELIS TO CEASE WORK

Mr. Monypenny to Mr. Eden. (Received October 15)

(No. 206. Confidential) Jerusalem,
(Telegraphic) October 15, 1953.

Bennike met Israel Foreign Minister to-day. He made final request to cease work. Sharett finally refused. Israeli attitude was wholly uncompromising. Bennike is now reporting to the Secretary-

General for the Security Council. Any Government member of the United Nations is entitled to request discussion in the Security Council.

2. Vigier says that Israelis have recently been working 24 hours a day in the zone.

CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FOR ATTACKS ON JORDAN

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 429)
(Telegraphic)

*Foreign Office,
October 16, 1953.*

Following is text of statement by Foreign Office spokesman this morning.

Her Majesty's Government take a most serious view of the recent incident in which Israel forces have attacked three villages in Jordan, inflicting considerable casualties. In Her Majesty's Government's view there is no possible justification for the action of the Israel armed forces, which has been condemned by the Mixed Armistice

Commission. This attack constitutes the gravest violation so far of the terms of the Armistice Agreement and will only endanger peace in the area. Her Majesty's Ambassador in Tel Aviv has been instructed to express to the Israel Government the horror of Her Majesty's Government at this apparently calculated attack. Her Majesty's Government expects the Israel Government to bring to justice those who are responsible and to take measures to compensate the victims.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 16, 1953

Israel Attack upon the Jordanian Village of Qibya

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 168. Confidential) *Foreign Office,
Sir, October 16, 1953.*

The Israel Ambassador came to see the Minister of State at the latter's request this afternoon.

2. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that I was not able to see him owing to my preoccupation with the Tripartite Talks but that I had asked him to express the horror of Her Majesty's Government at the news which we had received of the attack on the village of Qibya. Mr. Lloyd said that according to our information there had been a co-ordinated attack by large Israel forces upon this village. Troops had advanced behind a 2-inch mortar barrage, had prevented women and children escaping from the houses and had then systematically destroyed much of the village, killing over forty people in the course of the operations.

3. Mr. Lloyd said that we were aware of the incident in Israel which resulted in the death of a woman and two children but we understood that the Israeli and Jordan police had been co-operating for once satisfactorily in an attempt to track down these criminals. It was impossible to justify

a calculated reprisal of this nature. Mr. Lloyd had spoken to the Ambassador previously in May about other raids on Jordanian villages which appeared to us to have been calculated reprisals. That was after the shooting in Jerusalem for which the blame was laid by the Truce Supervision Organisation upon Israel. Since then there had also been an incident in the Gaza Strip on the 28th of August when some twenty Arabs including women and children had been killed. The Minister of State warned the Ambassador that this policy of calculated and deliberate reprisals would only make matters worse. Mr. Lloyd said that he hoped that the Israel Government would take the initiative by instituting an immediate investigation into this latest incident with a view to punishing those responsible. In Her Majesty's Government's view the Israel Government should announce their readiness to make compensation for the loss of life and damage to property.

4. Mr. Lloyd went on to say that we were seriously concerned at the present position in the area. The Israel armed

forces were, we understood, mobilised in the area for autumn manœuvres, and an Arab Legion division had been moved into position on the Jordan frontier. This was an exceedingly dangerous situation with the two armies facing one another. We hoped again that the Israel Government would take the initiative by ordering the forces mobilised for the autumn manœuvres to move back some distance from the frontier. Meanwhile we had counselled as strongly as we could moderation and restraint on the part of the Jordan forces.

5. Mr. Lloyd said that the Israelis would also give an indication of their desire to reduce tension if they were to demonstrate their co-operation with the United Nations by complying with General Bennike's request to cease work in the demilitarised zone between Lake Tiberias and Lake Huleh and by granting his request for facilities to search the demilitarised zone on Mount Scopus.

6. Mr. Lloyd pointed out that this sort of incident put in jeopardy the good relations between our two Governments. We were bound by Treaty obligations to Jordan. We had to defend her if she were attacked. This was an attack upon a Jordanian village by well-organised forces and it might well be that the Government of Jordan were entitled to invoke our Treaty with them and to ask us to come to their assistance. That would put us in a very unhappy position *vis-à-vis* Israel. Unless the Israel Government could reassure us with regard to their frontier policy it would be very difficult for us to continue the export of arms to them. They were doing great damage to their cause in all Western countries by this kind of action.

7. The Ambassador said that he was not in a position to discuss the facts of this incident. He wished however to recall that between December 1952 and June 1953

there had been 153 cases of penetration by Arabs into Israel and only 40 cases of penetration by Israelis into Arab territory. The attack resulting in the death of a woman and two children had taken place 7-8 miles inside Israel territory. He wished us to remember the feeling of fear that pervaded that area of Israel. No-one ever knew when he or she was about to be attacked. The Ambassador said that he felt that the Jordan Government were not doing all they could to stop incidents and that the Jordan police, were not co-operating in any measure to stop infiltration.

8. Mr. Lloyd replied that no doubt there had been a great number of incidents but it was impossible to compare cases of isolated terrorists penetrating Israel territory with a case such as this when there had been a massacre of a whole village after a well-planned military operation. So far as the actions of the Jordan Government were concerned, we had good reason to believe that in fact they were doing what they could to improve their frontier control and to stop this sort of incident occurring. But all our efforts to preach restraint to them and to get them to tighten up their frontier control would be brought to nought by a happening such as that that had occurred at Qibya.

9. The Ambassador took careful notes and said that he would communicate at once with his Government.

10. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and Jedda, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation at New York, and the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to Her Majesty's Consul General at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

UNITED STATES AID TO ISRAEL

Sir R. Makins to Mr. Eden. (Received October 22)

(No. 2253)
(Telegraphic)

*Washington,
October 21, 1953.*

At press conference to-day Mr. Dulles, in reply to a question, said that Technical Co-operation Administration assistance to Israel was being continued, but that no

Mutual Security Programme funds for the current fiscal year had been allocated to Israel. He commented that allocation had been deferred because of the problems existing between the United Nations and Israel, and added that the decision had been

taken at the time of General Bennike's request to Israel in connection with their activities on the Jordan river.

2. In response to a question whether the Israel Government had been informed of this decision, he replied "they know they haven't got it."

3. When asked why allocation had been deferred, he replied "because it seemed to the United States that Israel should respect General Bennike's decision, and that the United States should not make an allocation as long as Israel is acting in defiance of the United Nations' request."

ER 1091/439

No. 37

**CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY
OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 28, 1953,
CONCERNING THE QIBYA INCIDENT**

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 176. Confidential) *Foreign Office,
Sir, October 28, 1953.*

The Israel Ambassador asked to see me to-day. As I was occupied with the Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Commons, Sir William Strang received the Ambassador.

2. Mr. Elath said that he had been instructed to make some points supplementary to the reply which the Israel Government had sent to your Excellency's note of the 16th of October about the Qibya incident. Some of these points arose out of the Ambassador's talk with the Minister of State reported in my despatch No. 168 of the 16th of October.

3. The Ambassador said that the Israel Government had taken note, with satisfaction, of the peaceful intentions of the Jordan Government. It was to the interest of Israel, no less than to the other States concerned and indeed of Her Majesty's Government, that there should be no hostilities, and all should contribute to that end. One suggestion which the Israel Government had made, but which the Jordan Government had not accepted, was that there should be talks between the two Governments at a high level. So long as King Abdullah was alive this had been possible; but now there was nothing more than contacts between local commanders which, though useful, were not sufficient. The Israel Government very much hoped that the Jordan Government could be persuaded to agree to high-level contacts. The Israel Government were well pleased that the question of frontier incidents had been taken to the United Nations. The fact that Her Majesty's Government had placed responsibility for the Qibya incident firmly

upon Israel, and unfairly in the view of the Israel Government, made it all the more incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government to use their influence with the Jordan Government to secure an improvement of the local situation.

4. The Ambassador then said that even since the institution of proceedings in New York there had been further incidents. He instanced the derailing of a train.

5. The Ambassador's third point was that the Israel Government accepted in principle that compensation should be paid to the victims of the Qibya incident, but the principle should be reciprocal and compensation should also be paid for the attacks made by Jordan infiltrators.

6. His fourth point arose out of the Minister of State's suggestion that the two sides should withdraw their troops. Mr. Lloyd had made this remark with special reference to the Israel manœuvres then going on. The Ambassador said that these manœuvres were now finished and that the disposition of Israel forces remained within the framework of the armistice agreement.

7. Sir William Strang said that we had been disturbed by the concentration of forces on the two sides of the frontier and he had been intending to raise this point with the Ambassador. The Ambassador said that, so far as Israel was concerned, there was no concentration. In reply to a question, he said that there might well be additional forces; but these were, as he had said, within the framework of the armistice agreement. He asked what the position was on the Jordan side of the frontier. Sir William Strang said that he could not give details, but there were undoubtedly more

Jordan forces up forward than there had been before. The Ambassador said that, provided these forces had no offensive intention, the Israel Government thought it was all to the good that the forward area should be well-manned: it would be easier then for the Jordan Government to prevent infiltration.

8. As his fifth point, the Ambassador said that what the Israel Government objected to in the British statement about the Qibya incident, which had been made public, was that it not only firmly put the responsibility on Israel but also failed to place the incident in its context of repeated incidents from the Jordan side, of which there had been many Israel victims. He was instructed to say that, notwithstanding this episode, the Israel Government attached great importance to good understanding with the United Kingdom. They fully understood that Her Majesty's Government had treaties with certain Arab States; but they hoped that Her Majesty's Government would still continue to pursue their policy of maintaining close relations with Israel.

9. Sir William Strang told the Ambassador that it would be a mistake to underestimate the effect in this country of what he called the "episode" at Qibya. The use of the word "horror" in your Excellency's note had well represented the reaction of this country. Nobody had denied that there had been infiltration from the Jordan side; but these isolated individual acts were quite a different thing from the well-organised, heavily armed attack by several hundred men that had taken place at Qibya which had caused widespread death and destruction. The Ambassador would have noted General Bennike's conclusion, conveyed to the Security Council, that there was convincing evidence that Israel military forces had planned and carried out this attack. We were glad that the Israel Government recognised the peaceful intentions of the Jordan Government. Sir William Strang could confirm that this was their attitude, and we were of course using all our influence in Amman in favour of moderation. We had also continuously encouraged the Jordan Government to take all possible measures to control infiltration. We did not believe that the Jordan Government connived at or encouraged such infiltration. Since the beginning of 1952 the Jordan courts had convicted 3,524 persons on charges of infiltration and had acquitted only 621 of those charged. The nature of the terrain and the artificial borderline, which separated villagers from their land

and divided families, would present great difficulties to any Government. Much could be done to capture and punish infiltrators by local co-operation between the security forces on either side, and such co-operation had, we thought, been successfully achieved under the local commander's agreement. As regards the effect of the Qibya incident upon Anglo-Israel relations, Sir William Strang said that it still remained the policy of Her Majesty's Government to maintain and develop good relations with Israel, but that did not dispense us from speaking our minds, as we had done on this occasion, if plain speaking seemed to us to be called for.

10. Sir William Strang said that he would note what the Ambassador had said about compensation, about the disposition of Israel forces and about the desire of the Israel Government for high-level contacts with Jordan.

11. The Ambassador said that he did not deny that the Qibya incident had been a deplorable thing, but it was an act of self-defence by a small country which had been the victim of continued infiltration attacks and was surrounded by hostile States who were trying to ruin it. People lived in a continuous state of tension and it was not surprising that there were occasional outbreaks of violence. What had hurt the Israel Government was that Her Majesty's Government had, in their communication, not taken account of the context in which the incident had taken place; what the Israel Government begged Her Majesty's Government to do, and he was glad to hear that they were doing it, was to use their influence with Jordan. Her Majesty's Government's treaty with Jordan placed a responsibility upon them. Finally, he emphasised the desire of the Israel Government for high-level talks with Jordan.

12. Before taking his leave, the Ambassador recalled that after his last talk with the Minister of State, the Foreign Office had put out a statement saying that the Ambassador had been summoned and had given the gist of the Minister of State's representation. The Israel Government would have been entitled to make a similar statement about the present interview, but they did not propose to do so. It was agreed that if there were any press enquiries, it should be said that he had paid a routine call.

13. Before the Ambassador left, Sir William Strang said that the agreement of the Israel Government to suspend operations in the demilitarised zone, pending consideration of the Israel-Syrian dispute

by the Security Council, was a step in the right direction, so far as it went.

14. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and Jedda, to the

Permanent Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, the Head of the British Middle East Office and Her Majesty's Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

ER 1071/95

No. 38

COMMENTS ON THE RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ON OCTOBER 23

Mr. Furlonge to Mr. Eden. (Received October 31)

(No. 178. Secret)
Sir,

Amman,
October 28, 1953.

With reference to my telegram No. 562 of the 27th of October, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the resolutions passed by the Political Committee of the Arab League at their final meeting in Amman on the 23rd of October. The main lines of most of these resolutions have already appeared in the local press, but not their actual terms; and, as stated in my telegram under reference, the Jordan Prime Minister, in lending me privately his copy of them, particularly requested that we would regard them as a secret document.

2. In general, the resolutions contain no striking new departure in Arab League policy, but rather a crystallisation of the attitude which the Arab States have long adopted in regard to the Palestine question, together with an intensification of the policy of giving aid to Jordan against Israel which was first laid down at the Cairo meeting last September. The main practical result is the addition of a further £2 million to the £500,000 voted at the Cairo meeting. It is, of course, uncertain how much of this will actually be subscribed, especially if no further act of aggression by Israel occurs to provide the necessary impulse, and the Jordan Government do not appear to be making any special preparations to spend it until the prospects become clearer.

3. The recommendations in regard to the line to be followed by the Arab delegations at the United Nations are much as was to be expected. It is, however, encouraging that the fifth of these should recommend acceptance of any proposal to strengthen

the Truce Supervision Organisation. The Jordan Government undoubtedly feel that they have everything to gain by this, as they claim already to be fully co-operating with the organisation and no doubt hope that an increase in its effectiveness would lessen the chances of Israel being able to stage a further Qibya without prompt condemnation, which in turn would improve the chances of action by the United Nations against Israel.

4. The seventh of the main resolutions, which relates to the Jordan waters and the T.V.A. Scheme, has been dealt with in my telegram No. 560 of the 26th of October and in my letter No. 1421/156/53 of the 26th of October to Mr. Roger Allen. As explained therein, it was only by an unfortunate chance that this matter came before the Political Committee at all.

5. The "arms left over from the Palestine campaign" referred to in the fifth of the main resolutions are, according to the Jordan Prime Minister, a stock of arms amassed by the Arab League in 1948 for the purpose of the hostilities then proceeding against Israel, which he understands are held somewhere in Egypt. He clearly does not expect either their quantity or their quality to be impressive.

6. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris, to the Head of the British Middle East Office in Fayid and to the United Kingdom Representative to the Security Council in New York.

I have, &c.

G. FURLONGE.

Enclosure in No. 38

Recommendations made by the Political Committee in Amman on the 21st-23rd October, 1953

Resolution 1

The Political Committee recommends the Arab States neighbouring on Israel, and having common frontiers with her, to hasten the re-inforcement of their military forces on the frontiers with reserves sufficient to meet emergencies.

Resolution 2

The Political Committee has studied the draft resolution introduced by the Lebanese delegation, concerning the establishment of a defence fund and the committee while it approves the proposal in principle has decided to refer it to the Council of Joint Defence for study by the Military Advisory Board and the Economic Council.

Resolution 3

The Political Committee recommends that the Governments of the Member States which have not paid their share of the sum of £500,000 which the Political Committee recommended at their meeting in Cairo, should hasten the payment of their above-mentioned share for the re-inforcement of the defence of the frontier villages.

Resolution 4

The sister Arab States which have no common frontier with Israel are requested to mobilise reserve military forces, including air support, and to station them in positions from which movement will be easy for the relief of any aggression that may be made upon the territory of any Arab State, in accordance with military requirements.

Resolution 5

The Political Committee authorises the Secretary-General of the Arab League to take the necessary measures to hand over to the Jordan Government the arms and military stores which are left over from the Palestine campaign for the re-inforcement of the National Guard.

Resolution 6

The Political Committee recommends that the Secretary-General of the Arab League should pay to the Jordan Government the sum of £E.100,000 as a contribution towards the reinforcement of the National Guard from the balance of the funds entrusted to the financial experts.

Resolution 7

The Political Committee recommends that the three sister Arab States who have

common interests in the waters of the Jordan basin (its sources and tributaries) should refuse to discuss any plan for the joint exploitation of the waters of this river with the enemy Israel and that this resolution should be made quite clear to the Western States concerned.

Resolution 8

The Political Committee recommends that the Arab States members of the Arab League, collectively and singly, should henceforth refuse to accept any resolution which the Security Council or the General Assembly may pass, calling upon them to enter into negotiations, whether direct or indirect, with Israel with a view to the conclusion of a peace, and should re-affirm their view that there can be no peace in the Middle East before the implementation of the resolutions already passed by the United Nations.

Resolution 9

The Political Committee recommends that the Arab States members of the Arab League should participate in the re-building of martyred Qibya village.

Resolution 10

The Political Committee deposes Sayyid Ahmad Shukeiry, Assistant General Secretary of the Arab League, to go immediately to the United Nations to represent to the Arab delegations the views of the Political Committee on the subjects before the Security Council and United Nations, and to participate with these delegations in presenting the Arab viewpoint.

Resolution 11

The Political Committee recommends that the Governments of Member States, as their contribution to the expenses of public security, should pay to the Jordan Government the sum of £2 million, to enable it to put into effect the plan which it had presented for the enlargement of the National Guard and the development of the frontier villages. The Committee also recommends that payments should be made from the joint defence fund, to provide necessary financial assistance to any Member State, should the need for this appear.

The Political Committee has studied the official telegrams that have been received about the Security Council proceedings on the Israeli aggression, and after reviewing the position, considers that the Arab

Governments should be requested to send the following guidance to their delegations to the United Nations.

1. To continue efforts to limit the discussion to attacks on Jordan, with the knowledge that the broadening of its scope to include a proposal for the replacement of the Armistice Agreements by a Peace Treaty will not lead to a practical result, since the Arab States will refuse to discuss it, in view of the refusal of Israel to implement the United Nations resolutions of the Lausanne Protocol, and the committee considers such a proposal an unfriendly act which will have a continuing effect on future relations with the Arab States.

2. To request the Security Council to declare Israel aggression under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter referring to the fact that the three Powers, who brought the matter before the Security Council, have already in their letter accepted the fact of an aggression.

3. To request the Security Council to impose sanctions upon Israel under Article 41 of the Charter and in particular:—

- (a) Economic sanctions including the stoppage of financial aid of various kinds to Israel.
- (b) Prohibition of the supply of arms to Israel and of any military aid.
- (c) The stopping of immigration into Israel.

4. To oppose any draft resolution proposing negotiations either direct or indirect, and in particular, if it is not based upon the prior implementation of the United Nations resolutions and the Lausanne Protocol.

5. To accept any proposal to increase the strength of the international supervision of the truce lines.

6. To reject any plan which will lead to the establishment of a neutral zone, if the demarcation of the zone is done at the expense of the Arab side.

ER 1072/80

No. 39

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 2, 1953

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 182. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *November 2, 1953.*

The Israeli Ambassador came to see me this evening and said that he wished to explain the Israeli attitude to the discussions which are due to take place at U.N.O. on Wednesday, November 4.

2. His Excellency began by saying that he deeply deplored the events at Qibya. Quite apart from the deed itself, he well understood the harm that had been done to Israel's name and the shock the event had caused to many of her closest friends. At the same time, it was, he thought, of the greatest importance that U.N.O. should concern itself not only with the event but with its deeper causes. He said this not in order to escape responsibility for Qibya, but because all of those who wanted peace must want to support any effort by U.N.O. to bring about a real improvement of rela-

tions between Israel and Arab States. His Excellency added that he had come to see me because of reports which had reached him that while the French and Americans shared this view we did not entirely do so. Mr. Elath also said that steps should be taken to strengthen the numbers carrying out the supervision on the frontiers, and a fresh attempt should be made to renew technical contact at a high level between Israel and Arab forces for the observance of the Armistice. This, he said, had been proposed by Israel some time ago, but refused by Jordan.

3. I said that there was no dispute as to the desire of all of us to try to bring about some relaxation of tension on the Arab/Israel borders. I had been deeply concerned by the position there and it was still, I feared, very dangerous. At the same time I was far from sure that His Excellency's

programme, as he had detailed it, would prove acceptable to all concerned. It would be necessary first of all to pronounce upon Qibya itself. I hoped that it would also be possible to increase the effectiveness of United Nations supervision under the Armistice terms. I also thought it would be good if U.N.O. were to ask both sides to exercise the maximum restraint over the next few weeks and months when tension was still high. As to His Excellency's references to the policies of the French and United States Governments I had no information to show that the latter at least had made up its mind in the sense he suggested. The difficulty about any attempt to get the Arab States and Israel directly into contact now was, I thought, that feelings ran so high in the Arab States over Qibya, that the attempt might easily fail. If so, the situation might become even more dangerous. I was only giving His Excellency my personal thought. I was, however, in favour of the course which I had suggested, namely, improved supervision and an appeal to both sides for restraint. After that, and I hoped in a less tense atmosphere, we and the United States and French Governments might be able to work for an improvement of relations between Arab and Jewish States. This would be difficult enough, but I thought it was our best chance, rather than calling on both sides to come together now.

4. His Excellency did not seem to like this programme very much and seemed anxious to couple condemnation of Qibya with an

appeal to negotiate. He said that the intention behind this was not to avoid responsibility for Qibya. I said that, however that might be, I feared that the Arab States would not take that view. His Excellency then said that Israel had been enduring a great deal; that the Armistice terms had originally been intended only as a prelude to peace; that peace had not come about owing to the attitude of the Arab States. As a result it was inevitable that many in Israel were asking themselves how long that was to continue, especially since Arab States were trying to carry out what was virtually an economic blockade of Israel. I said that these were matters which certainly could be discussed, but His Excellency must remember that the present tense situation had its origin in Qibya. However much both sides were to blame for earlier incidents, this tragic event was the cause of our present anxiety.

5. The Ambassador thanked me for speaking to him so frankly and undertook to respect my confidence. At my request, he said he would send me a personal note on his own views on the situation and the possibility of U.N.O. action.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid, Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and Washington, and to the United Kingdom Delegation at New York.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

ER 1071/100

No. 40

CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. ANTHONY NUTTING, PARLIA- MENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 17, 1953

The Israel-Jordan Frontier Question

Mr. Eden to Sir F. Evans (Tel Aviv)

(No. 200. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *November 17, 1953.*

The Israel Ambassador called on Mr. Nutting and Mr. Dodds-Parker on November 17 to make representations on behalf of his Government, which were also being made in Washington and Paris, in

support of the Israel proposal for direct talks upon the Israel-Jordan frontier question between senior officials of both sides. This proposal had been rebuffed by Jordan, no doubt because she felt that any direct conversations would be regarded by the Arab League as a breach of the Arab front

46777

F*

in its stand against any peace negotiations. But Israel was not asking for a negotiation for a peace settlement, though she had not abandoned hope of this. She realised that this was out of the question for the moment, but she was concerned that steps should be taken to bring about closer co-operation between the two sides as the only way of reducing the number of border incidents and so contribute to a relaxation of tension. Direct conversations seemed the only way to get such co-operation.

2. Mr. Nutting told the Ambassador that while he fully understood the Israel desire for these talks he doubted the wisdom of his Government's proposal at the present juncture. Surely it would be better to use, and if necessary to strengthen, the existing machinery. The Mixed Armistice Commission consisted, after all, of Israel and Jordan representatives who surely provided ready-made machinery for discussing any proposals which Israel or, for that matter, Jordan might have for reducing tension on the frontier. Then there was the Truce Supervision Organisation. This very probably needed strengthening in numbers and Her Majesty's Government were sympathetic to this need. The Ambassador must understand that in the present charged and heated atmosphere resulting from the Qibya incident it might well do more harm than good to try to put Jordan on the spot with a demand that she should take part in direct talks outside the existing machinery. In saying this he did not want the Ambassador to get the idea that we were not anxious to further any proposal which was likely to lead to peace in this area. But, as his Excellency knew, the border question was not the only difficulty in the way of a peace settlement. The Arab refugees question, for instance, would clearly have to be got out of the way before a final solution of Arab-Israel relations could be found.

3. The Ambassador said he would convey what Mr. Nutting had said to his Government. He was bound to say that they would be disappointed. They realised our difficulties, but they hoped to have our support in preventing Jordan from relating the Security Council resolution solely to the

Qibya incident. Qibya was merely the culmination of a long series of infiltrations which clearly showed that Jordan was either unable or unwilling to command respect for the Armistice arrangements. It was in an effort to bring about co-operation which would lead to these arrangements being respected by both sides that Israel had put forward her proposal for direct conversations.

4. Mr. Nutting said that while he could not anticipate the Security Council resolution, he did not think the Israel Government need be too disappointed by the terms in which it would be presented by the three Powers. As to the history leading up to Qibya, he could not allow these strictures on Jordan to go unchallenged. The Jordan Government had taken strenuous action in its own courts to deal with infiltrators, the majority of whom were, he believed, purely innocent Arabs seeking to graze their flocks on territory of which they had been dispossessed. Summing up, Mr. Nutting said it seemed that the difference between us was not one of principle but one of tactics and timing.

5. Mr. Nutting was left with a strong feeling that the Israelis, having been put firmly in the wrong over Qibya, were now trying to put themselves in the right and Jordan in the wrong by proposing direct talks, knowing perfectly well that whether they were on the limited question of the border or the broader question of a peace settlement, no Arab State in the present tension could accept the offer. The Ambassador had no answer when asked why the existing machinery could not be used to further the object of direct conversations about the border.

6. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Amman, Cairo, Bagdad, Berne, Damascus, and Jedda, the Head of the Permanent United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, the Head of the British Middle East Office and Her Majesty's Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

THE EFFECT OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POLICY REGARDING ARAB-ISRAEL TENSION ON ANGLO-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden.

(Received November 26)

(No. 251. Confidential and Guard)

Tel Aviv,

November 24, 1953.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the current discussions in the United Nations Security Council on Arab-Israel tension, and the prominent part played in these discussions by the United Kingdom representative, have focused attention in Israel upon relations with the United Kingdom.

2. It is generally assumed that the strong terms employed in the draft resolution on the Qibya incident submitted by the three Western Powers, and the absence from that resolution of any call upon Israel and the Arab States to hold peace talks, is due principally to the initiative of Her Majesty's Government. This has caused some distress to those who remain genuine Anglophiles and has aroused the anger of the more extreme elements at both ends of the political scale. Most of the press has been quick to find disreputable motives for our allegedly anti-Israel stand. The suspension of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, the recent criticism in Jordan of General Glubb and the British officers serving with the Arab Legion, and growing nationalism in the Middle East, are all regarded as signs that the British position in the Arab States is steadily deteriorating. Her Majesty's Government have consequently been compelled, so the argument runs, to seize the opportunity to bolster up their "tottering position" in the Arab world by tabling in the Security Council a resolution voicing the strongest censure of Israel. The more malicious correspondents have gone so far as to suggest that the entire discussion in the Security Council was staged by Her Majesty's Government in order to maintain tension in the area and thereby facilitate the acceptance by the Jordan Government of the stationing in Jordan of additional British troops, should withdrawal from the Canal Zone eventually take place.

3. Comment of this nature, interspersed with phrases such as "British passion to find favour in the eyes of the Arab," "imperialist hypocrisy" and "haters of Israel," together with tendentious comparisons between the

Qibya incident and British action in Malaya and Kenya, led the Jerusalem correspondent of *The Times* to report, on the 17th of November, that a substantial anti-British wave was sweeping the country. The tone of a broadcast by the Prime Minister on the 22nd of November (a copy⁽¹⁾ of the text as reported in the *Jerusalem Post* is enclosed), in which he strongly criticised Her Majesty's Government for appeasement of Jordan, and sought to place on them direct responsibility for Jordan's failure to control infiltration, may be said to lend weight to this view.

4. In his desire to justify the actions of the Israel Government over the Qibya incident and in order to find a scapegoat for the embarrassing position in which Israel finds herself, Mr. Ben Gurion evidently found it necessary to play up the alleged anti-British feeling reported by *The Times*. I am satisfied, however, that this feeling is neither deep nor general. Certainly there is disappointment, mingled, in more cases than the Israel press would lead one to suppose, with a sense of shame, that Israel should have been so unequivocally branded in the eyes of the world for her callous attack on Qibya. There is also much real resentment that the highest international tribunal for political disputes has been unwilling to take more effective cognisance of Israel's case about the frontier problem generally, or to call for peace negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbours. It is also true that the United Kingdom, which, apart from Israel and the Arab States, is by virtue of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty the country most intimately concerned in the present situation, has borne the brunt of the ill-feeling engendered by this disappointment and resentment. I do not believe, however, that there is any real depth to this feeling.

5. I am confirmed in this view by a recent editorial in the independent daily paper *Ha'aretz* which, commenting on *The Times* article, stated that everyone who had a sound knowledge of public opinion in this country would find it difficult to discover such an anti-British wave. The feeling of sympathy and friendship which prevailed among the public towards Britain had not

(¹) Not printed.

changed. There were undoubtedly differences between the two countries and it was particularly regrettable that Her Majesty's Government had not felt able to support the proposal for direct talks between Israel and Jordan. "In these days in particular," the article concludes, "it is important not to allow differences of opinion to influence the friendly relations which constitute one of the foundations of our foreign policy." This, I feel sure, is a far more accurate expression of the feeling in the country than that given by *The Times* correspondent.

6. I do not fear, therefore, that our firm stand in the Security Council will have any lasting effect on our relations with Israel or that it will weaken our position here as compared with that of the United States, which are generally believed to have favoured a milder resolution. On the contrary, I feel that our immediate expression of moral indignation at the Qibya attack has won us a certain respect in responsible circles in Israel. This consistency has compared well with the policy of the United States Government, which has vacillated in response to the pressures of internal politics. Even though the vacillations of United States policy have in this instance been to Israel's advantage, many Israelis have drawn from this comparison the conclusion that greater

reliance can be placed upon the United Kingdom than on other Powers, and that consequently Israel's true interest lies in maintaining and consolidating the friendship between our two countries. Indeed, it is surprising how often in recent weeks I and members of my staff have heard repeated the regrets which are regularly voiced in Anglophile circles that the State of Israel was not born within the Commonwealth. I must, however, add that the general respect for our country, and the wish to retain and strengthen friendship between it and Israel, are tinged by a nagging suspicion that British interests, or what is here regarded as Her Majesty's Government's mistaken interpretation of British interests, may permanently influence Her Majesty's Government to display, if not to feel, greater sympathy for the Arab case than for the Israeli.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Cairo, the United Kingdom Delegate to the United Nations, New York, the head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid, and to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Jerusalem and Haifa.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

ER 1024/3

No. 42

REPORT ON THE KNESSET DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received December 3)

(No. 256. Confidential) Tel Aviv,
Sir, December 1, 1953.

I have the honour to report that the Knesset yesterday opened a two-day debate on foreign affairs. As was to be expected, the debate was centred almost entirely on the recent meetings of the Security Council and on Israel's relations with the neighbouring Arab States, in particular Jordan and Syria.

2. In his opening speech, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharett, attacked the Security Council resolution on the Kibya incident as detrimental to the cause of peace in the Middle East. Following the lead given by the Prime Minister in his recent broadcasts, and by Mr. Eban in the Security Council,

Mr. Sharett sought to show that the present tension between Israel and her neighbours was the result of five years' constant friction, and that transition from the Armistice Agreement to a final comprehensive peace settlement had been frustrated by the Arab States.

3. With regard to the Kibya incident, Mr. Sharett stated that he could add nothing to the two statements made by the Prime Minister, in which he (Mr. Ben Gurion) had set forth its background and expressed regret on behalf of the Government at the loss of innocent lives in that as in all other incidents. Mr. Sharett also quoted from the speech made by Mr. Eban before the Security Council on Novem-

ber 12, in which the latter stated that the Government of Israel regarded the loss of innocent life at Kibya with profound and unreserved regret. Mr. Sharett nevertheless expressed disappointment that the feelings of genuine moral revulsion that the attack on Kibya had aroused had been exploited for political purposes. Interests other than those of the peace of the region had clearly determined the approach of the Three Powers. Britain had probably aimed at strengthening her uneasy position in the Kingdom of Jordan; the United States had apparently sought to improve her relations with the Arab world; France, although with little enthusiasm, had adapted herself to the line taken by the two other Powers.

4. After a tribute to the work of the Israel delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Sharett turned to the proposals that had been made by Israel for direct negotiations with Jordan with a view to the conclusion of a final peace settlement. The invocation of Article 12 of the Armistice Agreement would, he claimed, provide Israel with an opportunity to review the entire process of the implementation of that agreement. Jordan had until now chosen to acknowledge only those paragraphs of the agreement whose implementation she considered to be in her interests. In view of the renewed sanction of the integrity of the Armistice Agreement implicit in the Security Council resolution, it would be appropriate for Israel to expose before the United Nations and world opinion Jordan's failure to fulfil her obligations.

5. Mr. Sharett continued by stating that before Israel reached the point of considering whether the Armistice Agreement should be given up as futile, it behoved the State to explore every possibility of retrieving its validity. This is the first indication I have seen that Israel is even contemplating abandoning the Armistice Agreement and is a threat which should not, I suggest, be taken too seriously as yet. Nevertheless, the fact that Mr. Sharett has felt obliged to say this is an indication of one direction in which the Government's mind is tending in the search for a means of resolving the present deadlock with the Arab States. Mr. Sharett, as Prime Minister designate, no doubt finds it necessary to attempt to appease elements of the Knesset, and indeed within Mapai, who demand a more vigorous and forthright foreign policy, and to counter attacks

upon a Government for whose policy he will shortly be more directly responsible. Certain elements may derive satisfaction from the thought of a denunciation by Israel of the, to them, ineffective Armistice Agreements. Mr. Sharett, however, is certainly fully aware of the damaging effect that such a unilateral decision would have upon Israel and cannot be considering it as an immediate step.

6. In the debate that followed the Foreign Minister's speech, Mr. Landau, a member of the extreme Nationalist Party, Herut, strongly criticised the United Nations and claimed that a stable peace could be achieved only when Israel reached her historical boundaries. His "cheap criticism" of the United Nations was condemned by Mr. Aranne (Mapai), the prospective Minister without Portfolio in the new Coalition, who nevertheless regretted that Her Majesty's Government had exploited the Kibya incident to "stab Israel in the back diplomatically." Similar disappointment at the attitude of Her Majesty's Government was voiced by Mr. Ariav (General Zionist) who, whilst expressing a desire for good relations with the United Kingdom, regretted that Her Majesty's Government had sought to appease the Arab States at Israel's expense.

7. Taken as a whole, the Foreign Minister's speech and the subsequent debate contained little that was new. The desire of all parties to find some justification for the Kibya attack, or alternatively to divert attention from it by concentrating on the alleged Machiavellian tactics of the Three Powers in the Security Council, reveals that many consciences are still troubled by the incident. The main interest, however, is now focused on the proposed Israel-Jordan talks, upon which there is no doubt that the Government and the people set considerable hopes. There will be genuine disappointment and disillusionment if these hopes are not at least partially fulfilled.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Jedda, Cairo, Washington, Paris and to the Head of the B.M.E.O., and to the Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

PROPOSED ISRAEL-JORDAN CONFERENCE

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received December 6)

(No. 684. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
(Telegraphic) *December 6, 1953.*

I spoke to the Iraqi Prime Minister last night as instructed, but found him quite intransigent. He said he had already told the Jordan Government that he concurred in their proposed action. If only because of public feeling here he was not prepared to send them a further message on the lines which you suggested. The Arab world would believe Qibya incident had ended in a moral gain for Israel if, as a result of it, Jordan Government were to sit down to a conference with the Israelis after obtaining so little advantage from the Security Council. I used all arguments in your telegram under reference and in United

Kingdom Delegation, New York, telegram No. 1246, but to no effect. It merely led to a bitter tirade against [grp. undec.] United Nations and the Western Powers in Palestine.

2. Eventually I suggested that Jordanians might turn the conference to good effect by putting forward desiderata of their own. Dr. Jamali replied that if we and the United States Government would undertake to support in the Security Council Jordanian proposals for the return to Jordan of lands belonging to frontier villages, he would immediately telephone Jordanian Prime Minister advising him to agree to the conference.

THE PROBLEM OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

Israel's increasing favour of a more aggressive policy

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received December 10)

(No. 260. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
Sir, *December 8, 1953.*

Correspondence between the Foreign Office and Her Majesty's Missions in the Middle East over recent years has plainly revealed the intractability of the problem of relations between Israel and the Arab States.

2. The passive policy which the irreconcilable factors involved have hitherto obliged Her Majesty's Government to adopt, and the reasons for this policy, are perhaps most clearly set out in Sir J. Bowker's letter to Sir T. Rapp No. EE 1073/90 of the 21st of November, 1952. As I understand it, the basis of this policy is that the Arab States dispose of two assets, space and oil, which are considered vital to our strategic and economic interests; that any attempt to press the Arab Powers to accept what we regard as a practical settlement, for example along the lines set out in the enclosure to Mr. Ross's letter to Mr. Burrows, E 1056/83 of the 29th of July, 1952,

would so damage our standing in the Arab States as to prejudice our access to these assets, and that therefore to embark on the attempt would be more dangerous to British interests than is the continuance of the present deadlock between Israel and the Arab States. Faced with this dilemma, we have felt that a positive policy is impossible, and that all we can do is to wait for some new turn in events, which is perhaps most likely to come from Egypt, and meanwhile to work through the United Nations machinery and by exercising pressure on Israel and Jordan in an attempt to minimise friction between those two countries. Mr. Furlonge's letter to Mr. Allen, No. 1075/63/53 of the 18th of November is convincing evidence that the difficulties in the way of a positive policy show no signs of diminishing.

3. The policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East must take account of so many and varied considerations,

moral, military and economic, that no balanced judgment on it can be formed except at the centre. Nevertheless, and without in any way underestimating the difficulties attending a positive policy, I feel bound to submit for your examination the proposition that the cogent arguments against an attempt to settle the Arab-Israel dispute by compulsion may not long remain as decisive as they were when Sir J. Bowker wrote to Sir T. Rapp last year.

4. So long as we are reasonably confident that Israel will not resume hostilities, and so long as we remain convinced, both that the assets in Arab hands are absolutely vital to us, and that an attempt to force the Arabs to a settlement with Israel would dash them from our grasp, then I agree that to risk an active policy would be imprudent. I am not, however, satisfied that the first of these conditions will long obtain.

5. The sense of frustration which has for long existed in Israel is rapidly growing more acute as it becomes apparent that the prospect of peace with the Arab States is receding rather than approaching. Along with this frustration, runs a growing conviction that neither the Western Powers nor the United Nations are willing to intervene effectively to ensure a peace, and that therefore Israel must rely on her own resources to settle accounts with the Arabs.

6. It is in this frame of mind that an increasing number of Israelis are taking stock of their position *vis-à-vis* the Arabs. They see themselves surrounded by hostile Governments, many of whose leaders openly call for the annihilation of their country, and whose avowed and collective policy it is to take no single step towards negotiations with Israel, nor to countenance any plan for settling the Palestine refugees other than by depriving Israel of the land on which to settle them. They see these Powers taking increasingly effective measures against Israel by their economic boycott, and in the case of Egypt successfully flouting the Security Council's call to allow free passage through the Suez Canal. They are painfully aware that the refusal of the Arab States to discuss plans for the common development of water resources and their intention to invoke the Armistice Agreement to frustrate unilateral action by Israel strikes at the root of the country's agricultural and economic plans. The Israelis note that the Western Powers, because of their preoccupation with defence against the Soviet Union, are obliged to seek the goodwill of the Arab States, and that to that end they are steadily supplying them with arms at

a rate which affords the Arab States, together, four or five times as many supplies as Israel receives. They are aware that the Arab States, with the moral and in some cases financial, support of the Western Powers, are strengthening their internal régimes, and greatly improving the efficiency of their armies. It is therefore not surprising that, appreciating these factors, they should conclude that a resumption of the war of 1948 is inevitable, and that as the balance of power is shifting steadily away from Israel, it would be to her advantage to reopen hostilities sooner rather than later.

7. The principal deterrent to such a course is fear of the reaction of the Western Powers, either under the Tripartite Declaration or, in the case of Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. At present this deterrent is probably decisive, but if there is no improvement in the situation it will become less so. Already, there are many Israelis in responsible positions, particularly among army leaders, who argue that just as it was a mistake for Israel to stop the war in 1948, in the moment of victory, for fear of what the United Nations would do, so now it would be a mistake to hold back from a logical policy of force for the same reason. Those army officers and politicians who advocate an aggressive policy believe that even if the Western Powers were willing to use force on behalf of the Arab States, Israel would occupy Amman and Damascus before the Powers had passed from talk to action, and could then declare her readiness to negotiate from strength.

8. Mr. Sharett's imminent assumption of the office of Prime Minister should ensure that for a time at any rate the Israel Government will seek peace through negotiation and the good offices of the Western Powers, rather than by aggression. We can hope for no more favourable influence than his. If, however, he can win no success within the next year or so, and if relations with the Arab States continue to deteriorate, and I fear that they will automatically get worse if they do not improve, then he will probably be unable to retain his control over the Government and be forced from office. Setting aside the alarming possibility of Mr. Ben Gurion returning from his desert retreat to complete the warlike mission which he began in 1948, any successor Government would almost certainly be far more aggressive than Mr. Sharett's. In these circumstances which could, I fear, easily obtain within a year, it would be rash to discount the possibility of a more or less open

Israeli attack on Jordan and Syria, and possibly the Lebanon, though this attack would, no doubt, be staged to appear as reaction to provocation.

9. It may seem illogical that Israel, dependent as she is on Western and particularly United States support, should even contemplate the hazards of war in the face of what would probably be the united opposition of the Western Powers. Logical argument can demonstrate that the Arab States, divided and militarily incompetent as they are, constitute no real threat to Israel, and that since one tank or aircraft in Israeli hands is as effective as four or five in those of the Arabs, the supply of arms by the Western Powers to the Arab States need not be feared. It can be shown that for all Israel's complaints the effect of infiltration is not so serious as she would have us believe (in fact, Israel's own complaints to the M.A.C. show that between June 1949 and October 1953 only eighty-nine Israelis were killed as a result of infiltration across the Jordan-Israel frontier, where the great majority of incidents occur), and that these losses are not, after all an unreasonable price to pay for carving out a new State from territory previously occupied by a hostile people. Israel can be reminded that her integrity is assured by the Tripartite Declaration, and counselled in all wisdom and sincerity to reject, in her own interests, the risks of war, and to exercise patience and restraint in the expectation that the situation will gradually improve.

10. These arguments, which to a detached observer must appear convincing, are, I fear, less so to the Israelis who, it must not be forgotten, are not only dynamic and in a large part efficient and courageous—though in many cases timorous—but also emotional, unstable, impatient and often only less blind than the Arabs to what appears to us their own best interests.

11. It must be remembered that Israel is a small and infant State, and that her elongated geography brings large centres of population very close to the frontier—Tel Aviv is only 15 miles from Kibya. As an infant State, she must, so Israelis believe, either thrive or perish: at present she is bottle-fed, but this cannot continue indefinitely. If she is to thrive she must develop her resources to the full. For this peace with the Arabs is necessary. Without peace, Israel is deprived of many of her natural markets and sources of supply. Without peace the seed of Haifa's entrepôt trade must remain unfertilised, and Israel's commerce with the outside world, even, is

hampered by the economic boycott. Without peace, there can be no fulfilment of the country's plans for irrigation, on which depend the development of her agriculture and the possibilities of settling more Jews from behind the Iron Curtain, if these ever escape. There cannot even be a full exploitation of the agricultural possibilities at present existing, since effects of infiltration, in deterring people from settlement on the land, are out of proportion to its actual incidence. The atmosphere of the border settlements, where nightly patrols must be kept, houses steel-shuttered, children put to bed in miniature air-raid shelters and all stock, implements, and even irrigation pipes brought in under guard, is not such as to encourage a move to the land. Indeed, I understand that strong pressure is often necessary to keep the inhabitants of the border settlements at their posts. I am aware that a similar, and even more justifiably fearful, atmosphere must prevail on the Jordan side of the frontier, but that does not affect my argument. So small, or rather so narrow, is this country that the effect of infiltration is far more disturbing than it would be in a State whose borders were extended. The same reason prevents Israelis from assessing at their true value the sabre-rattling of such Arab leaders as Shishakly and Azmi Nashashibi. So long as there is no peace with the Arabs, Israel will never rest, and no assurances or guarantees by the Western Powers will satisfy her.

12. It may be that Her Majesty's Government could regard, if not with equanimity, at least without alarm, a renewal of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. It is perhaps arguable that they would be able to lead world opinion to take forceful action against Israel so as to compel her withdrawal behind her present frontiers, incidentally giving the Arab States satisfaction, and consolidating Britain's own position in the Middle East. This possibility, however, is, I should say, very uncertain, given the vacillations of United States policy and the political influence of world Jewry, and if Israel aggression proved for one reason or another to pay off, our standing in the Arab States would be far lower than it is at present.

13. There is another reason which I suggest must lead us to wish for peace between Israel and the Arab States. The internal political pattern and the political prejudices of Israel have not yet hardened. If we accept the fact that Israel will be a permanent, important, and probably for some time a troublesome factor in the

Middle East, and I think anyone who has visited this country, and sensed the energy of its people, must do so, we must recognise that it is to our interest that Israel should develop as much as possible into a democratic, peaceful country, with a respect for international order, and that she should be ready to ally her considerable resources to those of the Western Powers. There are many influences in Israel which tend towards these desirable ends. The impact of the British Mandate has proved surprisingly durable, and there is a widespread disposition to admire and imitate British ways, as exemplified since the last war. There is also, except among the extreme Left wing, a general acceptance that Israel's future is bound up with the West. There is as yet little feeling of hate in Israel for the Arabs, and indeed until recently many of the leaders, particularly among the Socialist parties, had serious hopes that they would be able to establish fraternal relations with the Arab workers, and that Israel would become a powerful influence in raising the standard of living in the Arab States. This is perhaps one of the consequences of peace with Israel which the present Arab régimes most fear. Another is, no doubt, the less altruistic intentions of Israeli business men and bankers to establish commercial enterprises in the Arab States.

14. Though these laudable aspirations towards sound development are still well rooted in Israel, they are not unchallenged and, in my opinion, the challenge is likely to grow rapidly stronger. A growing sourness is noticeable in the atmosphere; the steadying influence of the British Mandate is growing weaker, and a young generation without personal experience of it is now coming to maturity. If the present state of lukewarm war cannot be brought to an end, this new generation will, I fear, be less likely than its elders to accept the aims of Western democracy. The effect of the armed forces on the life of the nation is far stronger than is desirable, and the powerful influence on almost all children and adolescents exercised by the various highly-organised youth movements, though not as yet militaristic, could readily become so. It would therefore not be surprising if under the stress of a permanent state of emergency the Israeli people embraced the *Führerprinzip*. Unfortunately, their choice to-day might be less divinely guided than was that of their

ancestors, when they in their time of trial sought leadership.

15. In paragraph 4 of this despatch, I suggested that if Her Majesty's Government were to alter their appreciation of any of the factors on which our present policy is based, there might be a case for attempting to impose a settlement of the problem. The purpose of this despatch has been to show that we cannot long count on one of the factors, namely, the comparative passivity of Israel. The other factors involved are outside my province, if the development of the atom and hydrogen bombs, and the attractions of peripheral strategy, were to indicate that the military importance of the wide areas under Arab control in the Middle East, and the chances of exploiting its oil in time of war, were declining, the case for a positive policy would be even stronger. The problem would then be one, hitherto pronounced insoluble by Her Majesty's representatives in the Arab capitals, of persuading the Arab States to accept a solution along the lines sketched out in the enclosure to Mr. Ross's letter to Mr. Burrows, No. E 1056/89 of the 29th of July, 1952. If Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government were to make it plain that these conditions were the best that the Arabs could hope for; that if they were accepted the frontiers of the Arab States with Israel would be permanently and irrevocably guaranteed, but that otherwise the Tripartite Declaration would be withdrawn, and the Arabs left face to face with Israel; if the conditions, by careful presentation, could be made to appear as embodying substantial concessions by Israel, and in particular if compensation to the refugees could be on a most generous scale, then one might expect that commonsense and the normal rules of bargaining would lead the Arab States, after suitable manœuvring, to accept. Israel could almost certainly be compelled to do so if the United States Government were determined. I freely admit, however, that commonsense and normal rules are untrustworthy guides in the quicksands of Middle East politics.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Bagdad, Jedda, to the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

JORDAN WATERS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION*Sir G. Jebb to Mr. Eden. (Received December 10)*

(No. 1292. Confidential) *New York,*
(Telegraphic) *December 10, 1953.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of draft resolution.

Begins:

The Security Council,

1. Recalling its previous resolutions on the Palestine question;

2. Taking into consideration the statements of the representatives of Syria and Israel and the reports of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation on the Syrian complaint (S/3108/Rev. 1);

3. Notes that the Chief of Staff requested the Government of Israel on 23rd September, 1953, "to ensure that the authority which started work in the demilitarised zone on 2nd September, 1953, is instructed to cease working in the zone so long as an agreement is not arranged";

4. Endorses this action of the Chief of Staff;

5. Recalls its resolution of 27th October, 1953, taking note of the statement by the representative of the Government of Israel that the work started by Israel in the demilitarised zone would be suspended pending urgent examination of the question by the Council;

6. Declares that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the General Armistice Agreement of 20th July, 1949, between Syria and Israel be strictly and faithfully observed by the parties;

7. Remind the parties that under Article 7, paragraph 8 of the Armistice Agreement where the interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of the agreement other than the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 is at issue, the Mixed

Armistice Commission's interpretation shall prevail;

8. Notes that Article 5 of the General Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel gives to the Chief of Staff, as chairman of the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission responsibility for the general supervision of the demilitarised zone;

9. Calls upon the Chief of Staff to ensure the demilitarised character of the zone;

10. Calls upon the parties to comply with all his decisions and requests, in the exercise of his authority under the Armistice Agreement;

11. Requests and authorises the Chief of Staff to explore possibilities of reconciling the interests involved in this dispute including rights in the demilitarised zone and full satisfaction of existing irrigation rights, at all seasons and to take such steps as he may deem appropriate to effect a reconciliation, having in view the development of the natural resources of the area in a just and orderly manner for the general welfare;

12. Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to co-operate with the Chief of Staff to these ends and to refrain from any unilateral action which would prejudice them;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to place at the disposal of the Chief of Staff a sufficient number of experts, in particular hydraulic engineers, to supply him on the technical level with the necessary data for a complete appreciation of the general long-term effect of the project in question and of its effect upon the demilitarised zone;

14. Directs the Chief of Staff to report to the Security Council within ninety days on the effect given to this resolution.

Ends.

JORDAN WATERS: COMMENTS ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION*Sir G. Jebb to Mr. Eden. (Received December 11)*

(No. 1293. Confidential) *New York,*
(Telegraphic) *December 11, 1953.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following are my comments on the new draft.

2. *Paragraph 1.*—United States Delegation wanted to spell out that, in its resolution of August 11, 1949, the Council considered the truce as superseded by the armistice. I objected to this as too obvious an endorsement of the Israeli argument about military advantage in the demilitarised zone, and it was agreed to leave out all references to individual Council resolutions.

3. *Paragraph 3.*—While accepting the addition proposed in my telegram No. 1252, United States Delegation attach some importance to insertion of quotation marks. The purpose of this is I think, to avoid identifying the Council with General Bennike's request.

4. *Paragraph 4.*—Similar comment applies.

5. *Paragraph 6.*—This new paragraph has been taken from a text shown to us by the Syrian Delegation.

6. *Paragraph 9.*—This new paragraph has, I think, been added at the request of the Israel Delegation who argue that the demilitarised character of the zone is maintained so long as there are no troops there. I understand that the Syrians, who hold, of course, a quite different view, might also like the text as enabling them to argue that

General Bennike should remove Israel police from the zone, &c. These ambiguities seem to me dangerous. Personally I do not think that scheme should be held up on military grounds, but this point is to some extent covered in paragraph 14 of the draft (see paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 1252).

7. *Paragraph 10.*—Lodge does not like either of the alternatives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of my telegram No. 1252, but agreed to drop the words "past and future" from the earlier United States draft. The Syrians will no doubt dislike the absence of a specific summons to Israel, but the proposed wording seems to me clear enough in its context.

8. *Paragraphs 11 and 13.*—The new texts are intended to give General Bennike clear guidance as to the objectives he should pursue. They seem to me drafted in as fair and uncontentious a way as is possible in the circumstances.

9. *Paragraph 12.*—The United States text produced yesterday was as follows:—

"Considers that neither party has the right of veto over such reconciliation or development."

Lodge claimed that this was directed at Israel as much as against Syria, but though we are all agreed that Syria has no right of veto over the canal scheme it seemed to Hoppenot and me that use of that phrase would be undesirable.

JORDAN WATERS: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING*Sir G. Jebb to Mr. Eden. (Received December 13)*

(No. 302. Saving) *New York,*
(Telegraphic) *December 12, 1953.*

Malik (Lebanon) took up the whole meeting of the Security Council on December 11 with a speech which covered old ground. He sought to lay before the

Council four "demonstrable truths." The first was that to allow work on the Canal project to be resumed without mutual agreement between Israel and Syria would be to give *de facto* recognition to the annexation of the zone by Israel: he

showed from statements by Riley and Bennike and from Israeli activity in all the demilitarised zones how the status of these zones had been prejudiced; to permit the Canal project would be to encourage this policy of "unending encroachment." *Second*, he claimed that the resumption of work upon a prior agreement between Israel and Syria would not be inconsistent with the past jurisdiction of the Council in Huleh case. Lake Huleh and the surrounding marshes were outside the demilitarised zone. The Council's jurisdiction in that case had upheld four principles: the workability of the Armistice Agreement, the priority of the provisions of that agreement over the alleged advantage of economic development, a condemnation of unilateral acts committed in the demilitarised zone and the restricted restoration of civilian activity in the zone. *Third*, to allow work to be resumed without the consent of the two parties to the Armistice Agreement would be to condone the expansionist ambitions of Israel to the waters of the area

and thereby to undermine any possibility of regional co-operation for exploiting these waters; the Canal project was a step towards the implementation of the Israel plan for developing the waters of the Jordan. *Fourth*, to allow the work to be unilaterally resumed would be to play into the hands of those who advanced the doctrine of "progress at any price" even if that price were human rights, &c.

2. Finally, Malik said that amongst the conditions for a final settlement were the observance of the Armistice Agreement and United Nations resolutions, the end of Israel's migration policy, a solution to the problem of Arab refugees and a just policy by the Western Powers.

3. *The President* (Kyrou, Greece), then suggested, and it was agreed, that the next meeting on this matter should be on Wednesday, December 16, and that meetings should be held on the two following days if necessary in order to finish the proceedings by the end of the week.

ER 1072/235

No. 48

JORDAN WATERS: UNITED KINGDOM RESOLUTION

Sir G. Jebb to Mr. Eden. (Received December 17)

(No. 1316) *New York,*
(Telegraphic) *December 16, 1953.*

Following are four extracts from my speech in the Security Council to-day introducing the draft resolution tabled by France, United States and United Kingdom:—

"Now, whatever can be said for the point of view of the Government of Israel in this matter, my colleagues will, I am sure, agree with me in this: that if the Government of Israel had followed an orderly course—if they had complied with the request of General Bennike—the question would not have come before the Security Council in its present form. Whether or not the Government of Israel could reach agreement with General Bennike on the completion of the work is one matter. Whether or not they could carry out the work without his agreement,

is quite another. From their own point of view—and I shall speak very frankly—it seems to me unfortunate that they should have seen fit to ignore his request. As things are—and I can only regret that this is so—the Security Council is faced, not with the question whether the canal is in itself a good and useful project, but solely with the question of the failure by one party of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement to comply with a request on the part of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission—the only authority, in the circumstances unhappily still prevailing in this area, which stands for some sort of order: and indeed the only barrier to complete chaos. This was therefore a very serious action; and those of us who have at heart the promotion of conditions which would lead to a more permanent settlement of the differences in the area cannot have

failed to be distressed by the action of the Government of Israel. In these circumstances it seems to me perfectly natural that the Government of Syria should have brought the matter to the Security Council. For, regardless of the rights and wrongs of the project in question, the problem inevitably arises, whether or not a request made in all formality by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission could be ignored in this way."

"It is my Government's view that General Bennike was fully entitled under the Armistice Agreement to make the request that he did to the Government of Israel. It is therefore my Government's view that the Security Council is justified in expecting that the Government of Israel will not start work again on the Canal without General Bennike's authorisation. The terms of the Armistice Agreement—and the most relevant of these are quoted in the draft resolution which I have joined in the submitting to the Council—seem to me quite clear on this point. General Bennike has very serious duties under the Armistice Agreement. Among other things he is made responsible for ensuring that full effect is given to Article 5 of that agreement, which deals with the demilitarised zone. When confronted with a project like the present one it seems to me absolutely right that he should ask that the work should be held up until he is satisfied that it could properly be allowed to proceed. When I say this I mean, of course, allowed by General Bennike. I have listened with the greatest attention to the arguments which sought to show that the work could not proceed without the consent of the Government of Syria. But I must confess that I have not been convinced by them. It is admitted that an alteration of the armistice terms could only be allowed by an agreement between the signatories. But here, as it seems to me, the question is not whether the armistice terms should be amended to admit of a certain work, which certainly could only be done by an agreement between the parties, but whether that work is admissible under the armistice terms as they stand. Under the clauses of the Armistice Agreement that

is a question for General Bennike to interpret."

"The representative of Israel has told us more than once that his Government feel confident of being able to meet General Bennike's objections to the scheme. It will undoubtedly put these points to him direct as soon as our deliberations here in the Council have been completed. From what I have already said it will be clear that in my Government's view the problem is primarily one with which General Bennike should deal. But since the Council has been seized of the matter we should play our part with a full sense of responsibility. It would be easy for us to say that because some objection is taken to a development plan which has been started, this ought to be held up indefinitely so as to avoid further trouble in an already troubled area. This easy course does not seem to me good enough. I would certainly agree that neither party to the Armistice Agreement could carry out any work, however beneficial they thought it to be, which was contrary to the terms of the armistice. But it seems to me that although this is undeniable a determined effort should be made to reconcile conflicting interests whenever this can be done without infringing the terms of the armistice. Indeed as a general proposition I would say that the longer the temporary armistice arrangements continue, the more desirable it is that some way be found which would allow constructive projects in the area to be undertaken provided it can be demonstrated that no interests would suffer thereby."

"I would not venture to claim that these proposals will be acceptable in their entirety to the Governments of Syria and Israel. Indeed I must admit that so far as I understand, this is not the case. It would be much happier for all of us if the Security Council could find some course which would satisfy both Governments. But where this is not possible it is surely our task to seek a solution along the lines that seem right to us here in the Council. That is what my delegation has tried to do and that is why I recommend the draft resolution to the earnest consideration of my colleagues in the Council."

JORDAN WATERS: SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION

Sir G. Jebb to Mr. Eden. (Received December 17)

(No. 304. Saving) *New York,*
(Telegraphic) *December 17, 1953.*

Lodge (United States) opened the Security Council discussion on December 16 by introducing the French-United Kingdom-United States draft resolution. He said that his Government had come to the conclusion that strict compliance with the Armistice Agreement was vital to peace in the area, that the upholding of the Armistice Agreement was the primary responsibility of the Security Council (their agent being the Chief of Staff) and that development projects should be encouraged to the extent compatible with the interests of the parties. All decisions of the Chief of Staff were subject to these considerations and he was the proper authority to determine whether projects were justifiable. Any unilateral action contrary to a decision of the Chief of Staff was contrary to the Armistice Agreement and no Government should exercise a veto power to the demilitarised zone. He hoped that the parties would co-operate with General Bennike to these ends.

2. After rehearsing the circumstances in which the dispute had come to the Council I pointed out that the Council was faced not with the question whether the canal was a useful project, but with the question of the failure by one party of the Armistice Agreement to comply with a request by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It was natural that the Government of Syria should bring this matter to the Security Council. The resolution of October 27 was important in that it re-asserted the doctrine that in matters affecting the demilitarised zone, the authority of the Chief of Staff as Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission must be upheld, but that resolution did not deal with the future. We were justified in expecting that Israel would not start work again without General Bennike's authorisation and it was right that the General should ask for work to be held up until he was satisfied that it could properly be allowed to proceed. But I had not been

convinced by arguments seeking to show that work could not proceed without the consent of the Government of Syria. Alteration of the armistice terms could only be allowed by agreement between the signatories, but the issue here was whether the work was admissible under the armistice terms; this was a matter for General Bennike to interpret. It was true that neither party should carry out any work, however beneficial, which was contrary to the terms of the armistice, but I believed that a determined effort should be made to reconcile conflicting interests within those terms. The longer the armistice arrangements continued, the more desirable it was to find some way which would allow constructive projects in the area to be undertaken, provided that no interests suffered thereby. General Bennike should be given all possible help in forming a definitive opinion on whether the present project would contribute to the orderly development of the natural resources affected and should be authorised to explore the possibility of reconciling the interests involved. These proposals were not entirely acceptable either to Syria or to Israel, but it was our task to seek a solution on the lines that seemed right to us in the Council.

3. *Hoppenot* (France) spoke briefly, emphasising the need to support the authority of the Chief of Staff. The Council were concerned with this rather than the issue of substance. It was, however, desirable that the Jordan waters should be properly used and a harmonious settlement should be sought. Paragraph 13 of the draft resolution placed at the disposal of General Bennike experts to assist him in his task. *Hoppenot* was not impressed with the arguments about military advantage in the zone and thought that in general such concepts should be subordinated to constructive plans for peaceful development.

4. Neither *Eban* (Israel) nor *Zeineddine* (Syria) were prepared to speak and the Council adjourned until the following day.

WITHDRAWAL OF MR. BEN GURION TO THE SOUTHERN DESERT

Mr. Moore to Mr. Eden. (Received December 29)

(No. 270. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
Sir, *December 22, 1953.*

In his despatch No. 263 of December 8, Sir F. Evans reported that Mr. Ben Gurion had submitted to the President his resignation as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

2. I now have the honour to report that Mr. Ben Gurion has fulfilled his much-publicised intention of withdrawing to the southern desert, and has established his home, together with Mrs. Ben Gurion, at Sde Boker, a small and new agricultural settlement in the Negev, some 20 miles south of Beersheba. I have not myself visited Sde Boker—it is in a military area and a special permit would be required—but from reports and photographs it is a desolate spot. The community consists of some twenty families, each housed in a small two-roomed hut. The Ben Gurions, however, have the additional luxury of a third room, which will serve the former Prime Minister as a library. The social structure of this small community does not fit into either of the two main types of Israeli agricultural settlement, the Kibbutzim, where life and work are in theory entirely communal, or the Moshavim, in which each family lives separately, cultivating its own plot against a background of co-operative marketing and agricultural machinery. Sde Boker belongs to none of the political or social associations of agricultural settlements and appears to be an idealistic attempt by its founders to escape from the compulsion of party politics so omnipresent in Israel, and to experiment in new forms, both of agriculture and society. It was presumably these unique characteristics which attracted the Prime Minister's choice. He has announced that he intends to do four hours a day manual work, and to devote the rest of his time to study and writing. How Mrs. Ben Gurion will spend her time is less clear. As an American-trained nurse, her services will be available to the community in an emergency, but it is common knowledge that she regards with apprehension the exchange of the busy social life and gossip of Tel Aviv, where she has continued to live, for the solitude and endeavour of existence in the desert.

3. Mr. Ben Gurion's decision voluntarily to relinquish the authority and trappings of virtually unchallenged political power must have very few precedents. He gave as his reason for so doing extreme fatigue. Psychologists and advertisements have of recent years taught us that fatigue is of various kinds. Of common physical fatigue Mr. Ben Gurion has certainly given no signs. He wears his 67 years lightly, leads a strenuous life, apparently without effort, and displays every sign of alertness. It seems more probable that he was referring to mental and spiritual exhaustion rather than to ordinary physical tiredness. Political wiseacres were at first inclined to see in the Prime Minister's decision a mere tactical political manoeuvre, designed to discipline his opponents within his own party. Some, particularly among the General Zionists, have interpreted his move as an extension of his traditional opposition to the policy of international negotiation, formerly advocated by Dr. Weizmann and now inherited by Mr. Sharett. They maintain that his purpose is to discredit Sharett and his policies by saddling him with an impossible task, and by sabotaging his plans from outside the Government.

4. No doubt Mr. Ben Gurion is alive to the political advantages he may eventually derive from his withdrawal. His especial gift of dynamic leadership is more suited to a time of national emergency than to the solution of painful economic problems—the construction of precarious compromises between conflicting political conceptions and the patient conduct of international negotiation, which are the tasks confronting an Israel Government to-day. He may well feel that his dramatic retirement will greatly enhance his prestige, absolve him from identification with disagreeable policies, and perhaps provide him with a spring-board for an eventual return to power in time of crisis. Moreover, his withdrawal to the geographical desert will by no means condemn him to the political wilderness. He proposes to retain his seat in the Knesset and his membership of the Council of Mapai, and many of his closest political collaborators, in particular Mr. Lavon, who succeeds him at the Ministry of Defence, remain in the Government.

5. However, I believe that these considerations, though important, have nevertheless been secondary in his decision. Mr. Ben Gurion's very pre-eminence among his colleagues has meant that in the five-and-a-half years since the establishment of the State he has been daily burdened by constant responsibility for decisions on a wide variety of issues, great and small, and this without the advantage of the precedents and experience, on which statesmen of other nations can if they wish rely. I have heard no suggestion that the former Prime Minister's powers of decision had become weakened by this burden—quite the contrary. It is, however, generally accepted by those close to him that he feels he has worked for too long without refreshment at the springs of Zionist philosophy, and that he must escape from detailed responsibilities to consider the wider issues facing Israel and Jewry.

6. It is also generally admitted that Mr. Ben Gurion is sadly disappointed and gravely perturbed at what he feels is the current decline in the idealistic spirit of the country, the fragmentation of party politics, and the self-seeking and dilution of Socialist faith apparent within his own party.

7. Mr. Ben Gurion himself came to Palestine from Russia in 1906, at the age of 20, with the second wave of Zionist immigration. His life since then has been dedicated to the creation of Zion, and he has played a prominent part in every aspect of this task: stone-breaking on the roads under the Turks, service with the British army in the Palestine campaigns of 1916-17, farming in a Kibbutz, the formation of Jewish settlement defence, which later developed into the Israel army, and finally victorious leadership of the Israel forces in 1948 against the Arab attempt to destroy the infant State of Israel. It has therefore been a shock to him to realise that many, though by no means all, of the Jews who have come to Israel since the last world war regard the country not as the tangible realisation of a great national aspiration, and indeed of a divine destiny, but simply as a refuge, and often as a temporary one. This category of immigrant has been unable, and unwilling, to abandon the self-centred attitude of mind forced on them and their ancestors by conditions in the Diaspora, and to dedicate themselves to Zion in the same way as did the early immigrants. For the same reason, they tend to settle not on the land but in the

cities, where they find conditions and occupations most close to those they knew before. Mr. Ben Gurion has some of the naïvety of the fanatic and had, I imagine, assumed that Israel would develop into a nation of self-sacrificing Zionists, living in a vast Kibbutz. Faced with the realities of human nature, expressed in strong personal and party interests, he has felt the need to think out a new scale of values, and new plans for the future.

8. It is to these problems that I believe the former Prime Minister proposes to address himself. What methods he will choose cannot be guessed: probably he does not know himself. Much will depend on events, and the success of the Government in solving the country's problems, both internal and external, without him, and must also on what the country expects of him. Demands, or conceivably the absence of them, from public opinion, may well determine what course he takes. It is already being widely presumed that he intends to exert his powerful influence directly on the youth of all parties. If this opinion gains force, it is more than likely that Mr. Ben Gurion will lend it substance. Probably he will remain comparatively inactive for a considerable time unless a national emergency arises. He is, however, so much the most powerful political personality in Israel, and has for so long been identified with the moulding of the Jewish community in Palestine, that it would be surprising if he did not eventually return to active political life. He may well nourish ambitions to become the third President of Israel. If so, he would encounter little opposition, and once installed it would not be surprising if he moulded the office on the lines of the American rather than the French Presidency.

9. On the same day that he formally submitted his resignation to the President, Mr. Ben Gurion broadcast a farewell address to the nation. The text,⁽¹⁾ a copy of which I have the honour to enclose, is eloquent of his political philosophy. Throughout it runs strongly the traditional conception of the Jews as a chosen people and, by extension, of Israel as a State with an especial destiny. The task to be accomplished and which has been only begun, is the fulfilment of Kibbutz Galuyot, the gathering into Israel of Jews throughout the world and the welding of them into a united nation with one culture and one way of life. The methods prescribed are the dedication

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

of all Israelis to this end, exclusive reliance on their own efforts accompanied by implicit faith therein, and the full development of the spiritual and constructive genius of the Jewish people, which must find expression in the pioneering spirit. Mr. Ben Gurion makes no concession to human frailty. There is an echo of the ancient prophets in his words, and implicit in his call to duty and his promise of success is the threat of retribution at the hands of history if the response is not in full measure.

10. Mr. Ben Gurion is without doubt a great national leader, possessed of the strength derived from a profound conviction of the rightness of his cause. He is concerned exclusively with the fulfilment of the destiny of the Jewish people. In so far as international considerations contribute to this end, he will take account of them, but to his mind they play only a secondary role. I do not believe that he has a determined policy of expansion outside the present boundaries of Israel, but rather that he has an unpractical faith in the possibilities of developing the country's desert and other resources to nourish a population of six or more millions. If, however, time and experience proved him wrong, he would,

I think, have no hesitation in embarking on a course of dynamic expansion.

11. Two recent observations, reported to the Ambassador's Air Attaché by the officers to whom Mr. Ben Gurion addressed them, are, I think, significant. When a junior officer, in answer to an enquiry, said that he had now one child, the Prime Minister told him to go home and get three more. To the Israel Military Attaché in Paris he remarked that the Western Powers would only take Israel seriously when she had a population of at least six million.

12. If I were an Arab leader and aware both of the potential capabilities of the Israelis, and of their belief in Mr. Ben Gurion's leadership I would decide, on reading his speech, that the interests of the Arab world lay in getting Israel thoroughly tied up with international guarantees behind her present frontiers, preferably with minor adjustments, as soon as possible.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Washington, Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Jedda and to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

ANTONY MOORE.

VR 1072/1

No. 51

ISRAELI-ARAB RELATIONS

Sir J. Troutbeck to Mr. Eden. (Received January 2, 1954)

(No. 213. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *December 28, 1953.*

I have read with great interest Sir Francis Evans's despatch No. 260 of the 8th of December, on the subject of Israeli-Arab relations.

2. It is unfortunately the case that, as in Israel, so also in the Arab States, or at any rate in Iraq, opinion on the Palestine problem has been steadily hardening as time goes on. The younger generation who had their minds formed in Western educational establishments and have now begun to govern the country are more parochial and even more intractable in their approach than their seniors who were trained by the Ottoman Turks.

3. In an endeavour to improve the situation, Her Majesty's Representatives in

the Arab States were semi-officially requested in the summer of 1951 to embark upon a "gradual process of education" of the Arabs in order to persuade them of the desirability in their own interest of a peace settlement with Israel. This process may be said to have culminated in Lord Llewellyn's historic speech at the United Nations Assembly in December 1952 which aroused such a storm of indignation throughout the Arab world. Education was then seen to be not merely ineffective, but liable to be positively dangerous. It may be confidently predicted that Mr. Eric Johnston will have the same experience if he persists in his present venture into Middle Eastern politics. Nor do I believe that such arguments as are suggested in paragraph 15 of Sir Francis Evans's despatch would be more persuasive

than those used hitherto. The reason is not far to seek. Indeed, Sir Francis Evans provided it himself very vividly when in a letter of the 15th of November, 1952, he described Israel as "an intrusion of the Western into the Islamic civilisation." That goes to the root of the matter. For the Arabs do not desire the intrusion of an alien and aggressive civilisation into the lands which their ancestors conquered and converted many centuries ago. They have not forgotten that the Christians tried this once, and their hope and belief is that one day—it may be many years hence—the Zionist invasion will meet with the same fate as the Crusades. That is their most sacred wish and they will do nothing willingly to make things easy for Israel. And even if some far-sighted Arab politician were to think differently, he would remember that Moslems have a short way with politicians who take an unpopular line. A Cabinet Minister in Iraq relishes no more than his colleagues in other countries the prospect of having his throat cut.

4. Realising the difficulties of persuasion, Sir Francis Evans suggests that it may need to be reinforced by measures of compulsion. The question then arises what forms such measures could take. He himself suggests that we might threaten to withdraw the Tripartite Declaration and leave the Arabs to face Israel alone. I do not think that such a threat would have much effect upon the Iraqis beyond making them very angry, as they have largely discounted the Tripartite Declaration in advance, believing that it would in fact never be used against Israel on account of the strong Jewish influence in the signatory countries. In any case it would be presumably necessary to denounce the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty as well. On the consequences of our doing that it is not for me to comment. But since reading Sir Francis Evans's despatch I have been searching my mind to consider what sanctions would be available to us for use against Iraq who does not lag behind her Arab sisters in intransigence. Indeed, she prides herself as having never even concluded an armistice with Israel.

5. My search has led to no profitable answer as all the possible sanctions that occur to me would either be ineffective or lead straight to measures of retaliation which would hurt us far more, at any rate in the short term, than our own measures would hurt Iraq. We could, for example, pillory Iraq in the United Nations, proving by extracts from her own press that she is

unfit to take part in debates on the administration of other backward territories. But that would not incline her to a milder attitude towards Israel and would in any case hardly be fair at a time when her Government was seriously trying to put the house in order. Then we could refuse to recruit further technicians for the railways, the Port of Basra and other governmental institutions. But the Iraqis would no doubt find technicians elsewhere. Already there are far too many German technicians in the country. Then we could drop all attempts to increase Anglo-Iraqi trade and threaten to expel Iraq from the sterling area. But that would harm us more than Iraq. We could discourage the admission of Iraqi students into our educational establishments. But, if we did so, they would go to others. The best way of showing that we really meant business would, I think, be to denounce the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and at the same time place a ban on the supply of military equipment to Iraq. That would indeed make the Iraqis "sit up," if I may use the expression. But I beg leave to doubt whether it would make them less stubborn. On the other hand the consequences to our own interests could not fail to be formidable. We should quickly lose our bases and other military privileges as well as our present co-operation with the Iraq Government both in the military and political fields. We should have to expect unpleasant consequences to the Iraq Petroleum Company and other British interests. And the Iraqis would no doubt do their best to inflame anti-Western sentiment throughout the Moslem world and indeed throughout the so-called Asian-African bloc. What advantage the Soviet Government would be able to derive from this complete reversal of our traditional policy I cannot say, but clearly we should be offering them a welcome opportunity to fish in excessively troubled waters.

6. While therefore I fully understand the dilemma posed in Sir Francis Evans's despatch, and while I agree with him in particular when he says that "if Israel aggression proved for one reason or another to pay off, our standing in the Arab States would be far lower than it is at present," nevertheless I fear that the kind of positive policy he seems to have in mind would lead to results so damaging to our interests that it could hardly be contemplated even in the most extreme of circumstances.

7. A further question presents itself. Would a peace treaty concluded in such

an atmosphere—I am assuming that our measures of compulsion would be successful—lead to the improved relations which would be its purpose? Frankly I see no reason to suppose so at all. In my many talks about Palestine with Iraqi politicians I have on occasion got them to agree that they would be prepared to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel on the basis of the original United Nations resolution partitioning Palestine. (Israel's acceptance of that resolution is, I may add, the only concession which the Iraqis would regard as "substantial.") But when they somewhat reluctantly accept the principle of peace on that (apparently impossible) basis, they, and particularly the younger politicians, do not have in mind the kind of peace that the Israelis would wish to see. The Arab peace would indeed be even more restricted than the present peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. They do not contemplate in any circumstances having normal commercial and economic relations with Israel, still less receiving an Israeli diplomatic or consular mission in Bagdad. They might not even be prepared to lift the boycott and could argue that the Western powers themselves do not seem to find any incompatibility between an economic boycott and peaceful relations.

8. Conceivably if a peace treaty were freely negotiated (and this on the Arab side would have to be on the basis of the original United Nations resolution), and provided the Israelis were to shew by deed as well as word a desire to live at peace and harmony with their neighbours, and provided we did not badger the Arabs overmuch—then the time might come when the Arabs would relax their hostility. But it would be idle to expect it if the peace were forced upon them by the compulsion of the Western Powers. Could it honestly be expected that frontier tension would in such an atmosphere grow less?

9. And what of the attitude of Israel? How long would she remain content with any frontier that might be expected to emerge from a peace treaty however brought about? The utterances of leading Zionists down the years do not suggest an encouraging answer. And for how long would she accept the economic and other

frustrations from which she would undoubtedly continue to suffer at the hands of the Arabs? And if once again she become restive, what then? Sir Francis Evans doubts whether our present guarantee, if put to the test, would prove effective. Why should a new guarantee be more effective? Indeed, it would hardly be honest to give a new guarantee at all if our chief motive for imposing a settlement was that we doubted our ability to implement the present one against an Israeli challenge.

10. In fact, the more I think about this intractable problem the more convinced I am that unless we can force the Israelis to give up land—and the difficulties in doing so are self-evident—there is no "positive" policy at our disposal. We cannot "persuade" the Arabs. How many eminent men have not tried and failed? Compulsion would, if my argument is right, only drag us further into the slough of despond and frustration. I submit that all we can do at present is to keep quiet and stand by our bond as expressed both in our treaties and in the Tripartite Declaration, and meanwhile do our utmost to keep Palestine out of the headlines. I fear that this may be unpalatable doctrine, for it is difficult to keep quiet when there is great pressure from so many quarters to be active. But at the height of our strength in the Middle East and at a time when we were in physical control of the Holy Land with both Arabs and Jews dependent on us, all our efforts to bring the two together failed miserably. Today our power is greatly weakened and will weaken still further if we evacuate the Egyptian base. We have in addition discovered that the Arab world is vital to our general strategic and economic interests. I submit that we should make very sure that space and oil in the Middle East no longer matter before we sacrifice them to a will-of-the-wisp.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv and Jedda, to the Head of the British Middle East Office, Fayid, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

J. M. TROUTBECK.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ER 1012/1

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN ISRAEL

Sir F. Evans to Lord Salisbury. (Received August 27)

(No. 182. Confidential) Tel Aviv,
My Lord Marquess, August 24, 1953.

I have the honour to forward herewith a report on leading personalities in Israel for 1953.

I have, &c.
F. E. EVANS.

Enclosure

Glossary

AGUDAT ISRAEL.—World organisation of strictly orthodox Jews; founded in 1912; opposed Zionism for many years as running contrary to Jewish Messianic beliefs; since the establishment of the State it has co-operated with the Jewish Agency and the Government.

AHDUT AVODA (Also written as Achdut Ha-Avoda and L'Ahdut Avoda).—The most moderate group within Mapam. (See Mapam.)

GENERAL ZIONIST PARTY.—Conservative middle class party in Israel, protagonists of private enterprise.

HAGANAH.—Haganah was the underground Jewish armed defence force controlled by the Jewish Agency during the Mandate. Became the regular army of Israel on the establishment of the State.

HAMASHBIR HAMERKAZI.—Histadrut Wholesale Co-operative Society.

HAPOEL HAMIZRAHI.—Religious Labour party.

HASHOMER HATZAIR.—Extreme Left Socialist Zionist youth movement and political party. A faction of Mapam.

HISTADRUT.—The General Federation of Jewish Labour in Israel.

HERUT.—Extreme Nationalist political party in Israel. (See I.Z.L.)

HEVER HAKVUTZOT (The Association of Kvutzot).—Hever Hakvutzot is an organisation of pro-Mapai collective settlements in the country.

IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI.—Underground terrorist group Founded in 1937 to fight the Mandatory régime. (Dissolved since the creation of the State and formed into a new party—Herut.)

JEWISH AGENCY.—Central Jewish body combining all Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists alike. Founded in 1929 and now concerned with education and Zionist activities abroad and with the absorption of immigrants into Israel.

KIBBUTZ.—(plural, Kibbutzim: resident of, Kibbutznik). A collective agricultural settlement.

KIBBUTZ ARTZI (Country-wide Kibbutz).—Kibbutz Artzi is the organisation of kibbutzim belonging to the Hashomer Hatzair movement.

KNESSET.—Assembly—the Israel Parliament, which has only one Chamber.

18718—7 47674

MAPAI.—Initials of "Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel," the Labour Party; Israel's largest political party. (Moderate Socialist.)

MAPAM.—Initials of "Mifleget Poalim Me-uhedet," United Workers' Party, or the Left-wing Socialist Labour Party (fellow-travellers). It comprises three factions: Hashomer Hatzair, Ahdut Avoda and Poalei Zion Smol.

MIZRAHI.—Religious Conservative party.

PALMACH.—The former crack striking force of the Haganah, formed of Mapam adherents.

POALEI ZION.—The Jewish Socialist Movement abroad, of Mapai complexion.

POALEI ZION SMOL.—A faction of Mapam, similar to Ahdut Avoda.

SOLEL BONEH.—Soliel Boneh is the Histadrut's building-contracting institution, the largest in Israel.

VAAD LEUMI.—The General Council of the executive body of the elected Assembly which represented the Jewish communities in Palestine during the Mandate (now dissolved).

WORLD MACCABI UNION.—Union representing Maccabi Sports Clubs throughout the world. It organises the Maccabiah or International Jewish "Olympic" Games. "Maccabi" is Israel's oldest sports organisation.

Leading Personalities in Israel, 1953

INDEX

1. Agron (Agronsky), Gershon.
2. Alon (Paikowitz), Yigal.
3. Aranne (Aharonovitz), Zalman.
4. Argov (Grabovsky), Meier.
5. Avidar, Aloof (Brigadier) Josef.
6. Avner (Hirsch), Gershon.
7. Avriel (Überall), Ehud.
8. Azania (Eisenstadt), Baruch.
9. Bader, Menahem.
10. Bader, Dr. Yochanan.
11. Barkatt (Burstein), Reuven.
12. Bar Rav Hai, David.
13. Barth, Dr. Aharon.
14. Bartur, Moshe.
15. Bar-Yehuda (Idelson), Israel.
16. Barzilai, Israel.
17. Bastoni, Rustum.
18. Becker, Aharon.
19. Beigin, Menahem.
20. Bejarano, Moshe.
21. Ben-Aharon, Yitzhak.
22. Ben Gurion, Amos.
23. Ben-Gurion (Grin), David.
24. Ben-Tov (Gutgold), Mordechai.
25. Ben-Zvi (Shimshelevitz), Yitzhak, M.B.E.
26. Berger, Herzl.
27. Berman, Dr. Adolf.
28. Bernstein, Dr. Perets (Fritz).
29. Biran (Bergman), Dr. Avraham.

30. Burg, Dr. Shlomo Joseph.
31. Chazan, Yaakov Arie.
32. Chizik, Isaac.
33. Cohen, Haim (Herman Cohn).
34. Comay, Michael Saul.
35. Dan, Hillel.
36. Dayan, Aloof (Brigadier) Moshe.
37. Dinaburg, Professor Ben-Zion.
38. Dobkin, Eliahu.
39. Dori (Dostrovsky), Rav-Aloof Yaakov.
40. Eban (or Even), Aba (Aubrey Solomon).
41. Efrati, Josef.
42. Eftir, Yaakov.
43. Elath (Epstein) Eliahu.
44. Eliashar, Eliahu.
45. Eliashiv (Friedman), Dr. Shmuel.
46. Erem (Kazarnovski), Moshe.
47. Eshkol (Shkolnik), Levi.
48. Eytan (Ettinghausen), Walter George.
49. Foerder, Dr. Yeshayalm (Herbert).
50. Galili, Israel.
51. Goldstein, Dr. Sydney.
52. Granott (Granovsky), Dr. Abraham.
53. Habibi, Emile.
54. Hachohen, David.
55. Hakim, Monsignor George.
56. Harari (Blumberg), Izhar.
57. Heftman, Joseph Chaim.
58. Herzog, Yitzhak.
59. Hoofien, Eliezer Siegfried, M.B.E.
60. Horowitz, David (Dolek).
61. Hushi, Aba.
62. Hyman, Zemach (Cecil).
63. Joseph, Dr. Dov (Bernard).
64. Josephthal, Dr. Giora.
65. Kariv (Krakowski), Itzhak.
66. Klebanoff, Yaakov.
67. Kidron (Rosenberg), Mordechai.
68. Kohn, Dr. Yehuda Pinhas (Leo).
69. Kol (Kolodny), Moshe.
70. Kollek, Theodore (Teddy).
71. Laskov, Aloof (Brigadier) Chaim.
72. Lavon (Lubianiker), Pinhas.
73. Levanon, Chaim.
74. Levavi, Arie.
75. Levin, Rabbi Yitzhak Meir.
76. Limon, Aloof (Commodore) Mordechai.
77. Livneh (Liebenstein), Eliezer.
78. Locker, Berl.
79. Lourie, Arthur.
80. Makleff, Aloof (Brigadier) Mordechai.
81. Mazar (Maisler), Dr. Benjamin.
82. Meron (Muenzner), Dr. Gershon Yaakov.
83. Mikunis, Shmuel.
84. Myerson (née Mabovitz) Mrs. Golda.
85. Nakkara, Hanna.
86. Namir (Nemirovsky), Mordechai.
87. Naphtali, Dr. Peretz (Fritz).
88. Nurock, Mordecai (Max).
89. Nurok, Rabbi Mordecai.
90. Palmon, Yehoshua.
91. Pearlman, Moshe.
92. Raday (Berman), Chaim.
93. Raphael (Werfel), Itzhak.
94. Rifting, Yaakov.
95. Rokach, Israel, C.B.E.
96. Rokach, Isaac.
97. Rosen (Rosenblueth), Pinhas-Felix.
98. Rosette, Maurice.
99. Sahar (Sacharov), Yehezkel.
100. Saphir, Yosef.
101. Sasson, Eliahu.
102. Schocken, Gustav Gershon.
103. Senator, Dr. David Werner, O.B.E., Ph.D.
104. Serlin, Yosef.
105. Shaltiel, Aloof (Brigadier) David.
106. Shapira, Moshe.
107. Sharett (Shertok), Moshe.

108. Sharif (Scharf), Zeev.
109. Shenkar, Arie Leib.
110. Shiloah (Zaslani), Reuven.
111. Shinnar (Schneebalg), Pinhas, E. (Felix).
112. Shitreet, Behor Shalom.
113. Simon, Dr. Michael.
114. Smoira, Moshe.
115. Sneh (Kleinbaum), Dr. Moshe.
116. Sprinzak, Joseph.
117. Tolkowsky, Aloof Mishne (Colonel) Dan.
118. Toubi, Tewfik.
119. Tsur (Tchernowitz), Yaakov.
120. Uziel, Ben-Zion Meir Chai.
121. Wahrhaftig, Zerach.
122. Wilenska (Breitstein), Mrs. Esther.
123. Wilner, Meier (formerly Dov Kovner).
124. Yaari (Wald), Meir.
125. Yadin (Suknik), Rav-Aloof Yigal.
126. Zuubi, Seifeddin Muhammad.

Obituary

Weizmann, Dr. Chaim.

1. Agron (Agronsky), Gershon

Editor and journalist.

Born 1893 at Czernigov (Russia). Emigrated to the United States in 1916 and studied at Philadelphia University. Edited a Yiddish paper in 1917. Joined Jewish Legion in 1918 and on demobilisation settled in Palestine. In 1920-21 and 1924-27 head of the Zionist Organisation Press Bureau. In the interval he was editor of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in New York. Back in Palestine in 1924 he became correspondent for some English newspapers. In 1932 he founded *The Palestine Post* (now *Jerusalem Post*). He lost the financial control in 1948. In 1949 he became director of Israel Information Services, but resigned in February 1951, to return to the editorship of the *Jerusalem Post*.

Mr. Agron is Israel's leading English-language journalist, though of American rather than British outlook. He claims to be pro-British but is only really so on his own terms. In politics he tends towards the Left. Had diplomatic ambitions and is disappointed that they have not been realised.

2. Alon (Paikowitz), Yigal

Born in 1909 and a member of Kibbutz Ginosar (a Mapam settlement), Yigal Alon was the founder and first commander of the Palmach, the crack Israel striking force, largely composed of Mapam kibbutzniks, which distinguished itself in the Palestine War but was subsequently disbanded owing to its Left-wing ideals. Yigal Alon held the rank of Aloof (Brigadier) in the Palestine War and commanded the Israel forces in the Negev campaign, as a result of which the Egyptian Army was driven out of the Negev. He has claimed publicly that he could easily have occupied Gaza and Hebron in 1948, but was ordered not to do so by the Government. In 1949 he was retired from the army in the purge of Mapam commanders and he subsequently went to England to study and was very favourably impressed. He spent a long time in London studying economics and social questions.

Mr. Alon is regarded by Israelis as a born leader of men and is looked on by young people as a national hero. He has recently been trying to build up a personal following in the Mapam kibbutzim in opposition to Moshe Sneh (q.v.).

3. Aranne (Aharonovitz) Zalman

Mapai Deputy (1949).

Born at Yuzovka (Stalino) in South Russia in 1899. Attended the Agronomic Institute in Kharkov. Was a Zionist before the Russian Revolution and from

1920 was a member of the Central Committee of the underground Zionist Socialist Party. Came to Palestine in 1926. First a labourer, he later made a career in the secretariat of Jewish labour organisations, finally becoming a secretary of the Workers' Council of Tel Aviv. He was a delegate to the World Zionist Congresses of 1933 and 1935 and is a member of the Zionist Organisation's Action Committee.

In 1935-36 Mr. Aranne was in London studying trade union questions on behalf of the Histadrut. In the latter he has held the posts of Treasurer, Head of the Publicity Department and Director of the Workers' Training College. Originally associated with the Achdut Ha'avoda (Union of Labour) movement, Mr. Aranne followed it when in 1927-30 it amalgamated with other groups to form the Mapai Party, but he remained faithful to Mapai when the Left-wing of the movement again broke away in 1944. In 1948 he became Mapai's first Secretary-General and a Deputy in 1949. In the Knesset he became chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, a position he held until February 1951, when he resigned to organise Mapai's election campaign. After the elections he resigned his post of Secretary-General of Mapai.

Mr. Aranne, who is a forceful speaker, has played a prominent and constructive part in Knesset debates. In 1950 he was one of Israel's delegates to the General Assembly of the United Nations. He is also one of his party's leading political tacticians. A possible future Foreign Minister. Is friendly.

4. Argov (Grabovsky), Meier

Mapai Deputy (1949), and Secretary-General of Mapai (1951). Born in the Ukraine in 1905. Came to Palestine 1925. Active in the Histadrut's trade union department, he became a member of the Histadrut executive, chairman of the Tel-Aviv labour exchange and chairman of the Union of Israel Labour Exchanges. In the Second World War he served with the Jewish Brigade. He sat as a representative of the Va'ad Leumi Executive on the Emergency Committee of 1947-48. Member of the Provisional Council of State in 1948, elected Deputy in 1949. He was also a member of the Zionist General Council. In the Knesset he became the chief Mapai whip, and as such has played an important part in the recurring political crises. In February 1951 he succeeded Aranne (q.v.) as chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.

He retains these functions in the second Knesset, and in addition is chairman of the Steering Committee. In November 1951 he succeeded Aranne as Secretary-General of Mapai.

5. Avidar, Aloof (Brigadier) Josef

Commander, Central Area.

Born in Russia in 1906. Took part in the organisation of Haganah and served with Wingate's night squads from 1936-37, losing an arm in operations. He was a senior staff officer from 1948 onwards and became a regional commander in October 1949, after having previously been quartermaster-general. He was put in charge of the Northern Area and in May 1952 was transferred to the command of the Central Area. He led an army delegation to Yugoslavia in 1952. He is married to a daughter of Yaakov Tsur (q.v.).

6. Avner (Hirsch), Gershon

Diplomat.

Born in Berlin in 1919. Studied at Oxford and became president of the Union, subsequently serving in London with the Jewish Agency's Political Department. On coming to Israel he became head of the Western European Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In March 1952 he took part in

the negotiations for reparations from Western Germany as political adviser to the Israel delegation. Subsequently he was appointed counsellor and chargé d'affaires in Hungary and Bulgaria and is now counsellor at the Israel Embassy in London.

Mr. Avner is highly intelligent and an agreeable personality. His wife is a naturalised British subject.

7. Avriel (Überall), Ehud

Director-General of the Ministry of Finance (1952).

Born in Vienna in 1918, Mr. Avriel came to Palestine just before the Second World War and joined a kibbutz. In 1943 he went to Istanbul on behalf of the Jewish Agency and took part in the rescue of Jews from Germany, co-operating also with Allied intelligence organisations. From 1945 to 1948 he was in Czechoslovakia and in 1948 he was appointed first Israel Minister to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In June 1950 he was transferred to Bucharest. He accompanied the Prime Minister on his private journey to Athens and London in December 1950, and in April 1951 was appointed Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office. In November 1951 he was appointed to supervise the administration of United States grant-in-aid funds. In June 1952 he was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in succession to Horowitz (q.v.), continuing to be responsible for grant-in-aid matters. He resigned from this post in June 1952 and retired to a Kibbutz settlement. Agreeable and co-operative, Mr. Avriel had the reputation of being a competent official, but was not thought to be of the same calibre as Mr. Horowitz. He was, however, one of Mr. Ben-Gurion's chosen lieutenants. He was cited as an "American agent" in the Slansky-Clementis purge trial in Prague in 1952.

8. Azania (Eisenstadt), Baruch

Mapai Deputy (1951).

Born in Russia in 1905. Educated at the University of Königsberg. Studied law. He was Secretary-General of the Poalei Zion in Germany from 1928-29 and a member of the World Office of Poalei Zion. He was a delegate to Zionist congresses and came to Palestine in 1933. From 1945-49 he was a member of the Histadrut Executive and worked as a teacher. In February 1951 he was given a seat in the Knesset to fill a Mapai vacancy. He took an active part in the Mapai secretariat and was one of the leaders of the Kibbutz Meuhad federation before its disruption. In 1951 he was re-elected to the second Knesset on the Mapai list and a month later he became a member of Mapai's seven-man steering committee.

9. Bader, Menahem

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born 1902 in Poland. High school education. Came to Palestine in 1920. A member of Kibbutz Mizra. In the Second World War he took a leading part in the organisation of Jewish illegal immigration. Under the Provisional Government of 1948 he was Director-General of the Ministry of Labour and Reconstruction. In 1949 he was elected a Mapam member of the Knesset, and became chairman of its Economic Committee. Not re-elected in 1951. In March 1952 he went on an unsuccessful mission to Europe for his party to try to obtain the release of Mordechai Oren by the Czech authorities.

Mr. Bader is heavy, slow, Germanic and doctrinaire.

10. Bader, Dr. Yochanan

Herut Deputy (1949).

Born in 1901 at Cracow. Studied law at Cracow University and was a leader of the Revisionists in

Galicia. Came to Palestine in 1943, worked as a journalist and economist and was also active in the Irgun Zvai Leumi. Associated with the Revisionist paper *Hamashkif* and became editor of *Herut* on joining that party in 1948. Elected Deputy, 1949, and was chairman of the Herut-Revisionist World Executive, 1949-51. Re-elected 1951. He is a member of the Herut Executive Committee.

Dr. Bader is the leading Herut expert on economics. He is a poor speaker but a clear thinker who commands a more attentive hearing than most members of his party.

11. Barkatt (Burstein), Reuven

Director of the Political Department of the Histadrut.

Born in Russia in 1906. Educated at Strasbourg and the Sorbonne.

Mr. Barkatt is a leading member of the Histadrut Executive Bureau of nine, and is Political Secretary and head of the International Arab and Organisation Departments of the Histadrut. He is also a member of the Central Committee of Mapai. He led the Histadrut delegation to the United Kingdom in 1950 and travels extensively to international labour conferences, again visiting England in 1952. He was one of the Mapai representatives at the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon in January 1953, subsequently visiting Indonesia and India. Speaks English, French, Hebrew, Russian and German. He is shy and reserved at first but talks interestingly when his reserve is broken down and has a sense of humour. He is very friendly. A strong character.

12. Bar Rav Hai, David

Mapai Deputy (1949).

Born in Russia in 1894. Educated at universities in Germany and Russia. Came to Palestine in 1924. Was deputy chairman of the Haifa Jewish Community Council, a member of the Israel Bar Association and a member of the Va'ad Leumi. He also practised as a lawyer. Elected to the first Knesset on the Mapai list in 1949 and became a member of several important Knesset committees. Re-elected to the second Knesset in 1951, he became in November 1951 chairman of the Knesset House Committee.

13. Barth, Dr. Aharon

Banker.

Born in 1890 in Berlin. Educated at Berlin and Heidelberg Universities and at the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary. One of the leaders of the Mizrahi religious Zionist movement in Germany. Came to Palestine and entered the Anglo-Palestine Bank (now the Bank Leumi), of which he is general manager. He is also on the board of the Foundation Fund and of the Hebrew University. During the World War he was chairman of the Executive Committee for the Enlistment and Relief Fund and for the National War Loan. In 1950 he was appointed chairman of a new State Corporation for the development of the Negev. He is a member of the Economic Advisory Council and was President of the Congress Court at the 23rd Zionist Congress in 1951. In November 1952 he was asked by the religious parties to stand for the Presidency but after thinking it over he declined.

Dr. Barth is strictly orthodox. He is a strong dignified man, and is prepared (outwardly, at least) to be helpful.

14. Bartur, Moshe

Government official.

Born at Moseiska in 1919. Came to Palestine from Germany and until 1948 lived in a kibbutz, of which he is still a member. He became Deputy

Director of the Economic Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950 and in 1951 Acting Director of the Division. He has travelled extensively on economic delegations and in 1952 accompanied Mr. Horowitz to London. He is helpful and well-meaning.

15. Bar-Yehuda (Idelson), Israel

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born 1895 in Poland. Trained as engineer. Came to Palestine in 1926 and joined kibbutz Yagur, near Haifa. Was one of the founders of Achdut Avoda. He became a member of the Va'ad Leumi and was a delegate to Zionist congresses. Elected to the Knesset on the Mapam list in 1949, he became Mapam whip and soon made his mark as a parliamentarian. Re-elected in 1951. He is a member of the Zionist General Council and the Mapam Central Committee.

Though an active member of the peace movement who has denounced United States "warmongers" and strongly opposes the rearming of Western Germany, he is one of the moderates in Mapam who oppose the out-and-out pro-Soviet line of the Hashomer Hatzair majority. At Mapam Council meetings he has stressed the Soviet Union's opposition to Zionism and its refusal to allow Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel and has strongly opposed undue subservience to the Communist bloc.

16. Barzilai, Israel

Mapam leader.

Born in Poland and educated there, the son of a timber merchant. Joined Hashomer Hatzair and later studied at the Sorbonne. Settled in Palestine in 1934, joining a Hashomer Hatzair kibbutz at Karkur, which subsequently merged with Kibbutz Negba. Was active in Hashomer Hatzair political work and in Histadrut activities and was a founder member of the Israel-Poland Friendship League. In April 1946, he visited Poland as an Israel unofficial representative and in August 1949, was appointed Minister at Warsaw, the only member of Mapam to be given a diplomatic post abroad. His staff were also members of Mapam. He held this post until the end of 1950, when he returned to Kibbutz Negba. In April 1953 he was elected political secretary of Mapam in place of Riffin (q.v.). He appears to be an Orthodox Mapam member who, while holding extreme Left views, is a convinced Zionist and opposes out-and-out identification with Stalinism.

17. Bastoni, Rustum

Mapam Deputy (1951).

An Arab born at Tira near Haifa in 1923. After an Anglican education he studied architecture at Haifa. Later he became Secretary-General of the Arab Section of Mapam, a member of the Israel Committee of the World Peace Movement and of the National Committee of the Israel-U.S.S.R. Friendship League. In 1949 he stood unsuccessfully as a member of the "Arab national bloc." In 1951 he was elected to the Knesset on the Mapam list. He was a delegate to the Warsaw Peace Congress in 1951, and the Vienna Peace Conference in 1952. At the end of 1952 he at first supported Dr. Sneh and the pro-Soviet dissidents who broke away from Mapam and helped to organise the "Left Faction" but in March 1953 he quarrelled with his associates and asked to be readmitted to Mapam.

18. Becker, Aharon

Trade union official.

Born in Poland in 1905. Came to Palestine in the 'twenties and has been for over twenty years a trade union official. He is now head of the trade union department of the Histadrut (General Con-

federation of Jewish Labour), a post which he has held since June 1949. A member of the Histadrut Executive. In 1950 he led a trade union delegation to Yugoslavia and from 1943-48 he was a director of Hamashbir Hamerkazi and head of its industrial department. In 1951 he visited the United Kingdom to study trade union and labour affairs and also to improve his English. He also visited the United States, France and Canada on trade union affairs. A trade union member of the Economic Advisory Council.

Mr. Becker is an influential trade union leader and a possible successor to Mr. Namir as Secretary-General of the Histadrut. He is friendly and well-disposed and a powerful opponent of Mapam. Though an able man, his health is not good, and like many Israel leaders, consistently overworks.

19. Beigin, Menahem

Leader of Herut Party.

Born 1913 at Brest-Litovsk. Studied law at Warsaw University. At an early age joined the Revisionist Youth Movement, Betar. Appointed head of Betar in Czechoslovakia in 1936 and was head of its Polish section in 1939. After Soviet occupation of East Poland he was arrested and sent to Siberian concentration camps. Released under the Stalin-Sikorsky agreement, he joined the Polish Army with which he came to Palestine in 1942. He later left it and joined the anti-British underground movement, becoming leader of the terrorist "National Military Organisation" (Irgun Zvai Leumi). He emerged in public after May 1948, when he announced the transformation of the Irgun into a political party, the "Freedom Movement" (Herut), under his leadership. In September 1948, he succeeded in incorporating the majority of the Revisionist Party into it. Elected Deputy 1949 and 1951, though since his re-election he has rarely appeared in the Knesset.

To revive his dwindling party he campaigned actively against negotiations with Germany on reparations and, after instigating serious riots in Jerusalem in January 1952, he went abroad to raise funds and gain support.

Mr. Beigin is a lean sinister-looking intellectual with vulture-like features and rimless glasses. His undoubted oratorical talent and keen intelligence are warped by bitter extremism. Hatred of the British is still one of his main preoccupations and he glories in his murderous past. His memoirs were published in 1951, and an English edition, "The Revolt," was put on sale in London.

20. Bejarano, Moshe

Industrialist.

Born at Plovdiv, Bulgaria, in 1902. Educated in Switzerland and Italy. With his brothers he established a leading cigarette business in Bulgaria and on coming to Palestine he co-operated with them in the foundation of the "Assis" fruit-juice, citrus product and cigarette factory at Ramat Gan. From 1948-49 he was commercial counsellor to the Israel Legation in Moscow.

Mr. Bejarano is a Sephardic Jew and he and his brothers talk Ladino among themselves. He, himself, is highly intelligent and sophisticated and speaks a number of languages. He frequently represents Israel at commercial conferences abroad. He and his wife are much seen socially in Tel Aviv. His brother, Shimon Bejarano, is a General Zionist Member of the Knesset.

21. Ben-Aharon, Yitzhak

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born in Bukovina in 1906. Studied economics and law in Berlin. Came to Palestine in 1928 and joined kibbutz Givat Haim. Was a delegate to Zionist Congresses and became a member of the Zionist Actions Committee and of the Histadrut Council. During the Second World War he served

in the British Army as a captain in the Royal Engineers; prisoner of war 1941-45. He became secretary-General of Mapam and was elected to the Knesset in 1949 and 1951. Member of the Central Committee of Mapam. Though a member of Achdut Avoda, he is a powerful man in the Mapam Party organisation. He is well disposed and speaks good English, but in public advocates a "neutralist" foreign policy identified neither with Russia nor with the West. An intense, serious and impressive personality.

22. Ben Gurion, Amos

Assistant Inspector-General of Police (1950).

Born in London in 1920, the son of David Ben-Gurion (q.v.). Educated at Herzlia Gymnasium, Tel Aviv, and the Kadoorie Agricultural School, Mount Tabor. Joined the British Army in 1940 and served with the Jewish Brigade in the Italian, Belgian and Dutch campaigns, being demobilised in 1946 with the rank of Major. Was Liaison Officer of Haganah with the British Army from 1947-48 and conducted the negotiations with the British authorities about the status of Jaffa in May 1948. During the Palestine War he commanded an infantry regiment and saw action near Tel Aviv and at Latrun. During the first cease-fire in June 1948 he acted as a liaison officer. Later in the year he joined the Israel Police Force, in which he has since served as Superintendent and later Assistant Inspector-General.

Mr. Ben Gurion is a serious and agreeable man who appears to be well-disposed. He has an English Gentile wife, who comes from the Isle of Man.

23. Ben-Gurion (Grin), David

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (1948).

Born at Plonsk in Poland in 1886 of an orthodox Jewish family, he received a traditional religious education, which he managed to supplement. Early in life he became interested in the Jewish Socialist movement (Poale Zion). His activities as a revolutionary orator during the pogroms of 1905 led to his being blacklisted by the Russian Government, and in 1906 he emigrated to Palestine. He worked as an agricultural labourer at Petah Tikva and later at the wine cellars at Rishon-le-Zion. He continued his Socialist activity and persuaded the local Socialists to turn from Yiddish to Hebrew. In 1913 he spent a year studying law at Constantinople. In 1915 he was expelled from Palestine to Egypt, still being a Russian subject, and made his way to the United States. Here he helped to prepare pioneer settlers for Palestine and American Jewish units for the British army. He became a private in the Royal Fusiliers and returned to Palestine with General Allenby's army.

After the war he took part in the formation of the Achdut Avoda (United Labour) Party (1919) and in the same year was elected to the Zionist Executive. He played a leading part in the creation of the Histadrut and remained its general secretary until 1933. In 1930, when Achdut Avoda and Hapoel Hatzair merged to form Mapai, he emerged as the unquestioned leader of the party. From then on he became an increasingly important figure in the Zionist movement. In 1935 he joined the Executive of the World Zionist Organisation and became chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem and the effective leader of Palestine Jewry. He was bitterly opposed to the White Paper of 1939, and events favoured his line rather than the restraint advocated by Dr. Weizmann, then the outstanding figure in the Zionist movement. The Second World War delayed the crisis. Mr. Ben-Gurion threw himself wholeheartedly into the war effort and the recruitment of Jews, though later his motives were probably more political than otherwise. In 1942, while Weizmann hesitated, he sponsored the Biltmore programme,

which called for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth and army and unrestricted immigration. In 1946 he was interned for eight months for connivance at terrorism. In 1947, after the United Nations partition resolution, he was elected chairman of the National Council and put in charge of security and defence. When the Mandate ended he was already the appointed leader of a shadow Government. He took over the Defence portfolio and his personal energy and initiative were an important factor in Israel's victory over the Arabs. The war was under his personal direction, and he emerged from it a national hero. After it he quickly and ruthlessly suppressed the private army of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and purged the army of Mapam leaders, destroying the separate identity of the Palmach and making the army his own loyal instrument.

In the 1949 elections Mapai emerged the strongest party and Ben-Gurion formed a coalition Government. He subsequently made periodical efforts to broaden his Government but without success. Disagreements with the religious parties became ever more acute and finally brought about the defeat of the Government in 1951. After the 1951 elections he formed a new coalition not very different from the old, in which he continued as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. He spent May 1951 touring the United States, primarily to raise funds. In December 1952 he formed a new coalition Government with the General Zionists, again becoming Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Mr. Ben-Gurion is a man of great energy and self-confidence and will brook no opposition. He keeps a tight hand on the armed forces, which are very much under his personal control. He is brusque and impulsive and enjoys defying conventions; emotional and with a streak of Messianic fervour; a forthright and determined leader with a direct and fundamentally honest approach. He is an admirer of Mr. Churchill and the England of 1940. He is a voracious reader, with a predilection for Plato, and speaks several languages, including English. His wife, formerly a nurse, comes from New York.

24. Ben-Tov (Gutgold), Mordechai

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born in 1900 at Grodzisk near Warsaw. Attended the Politechnion and University of Warsaw and Law Classes, Jerusalem. Came to Palestine in 1920. A founder of the Hashomer Hatzair movement. Delegate to various Zionist congresses and member of the Zionist Executive (1935). Member of the Agricultural Committee (1938). Delegate to the Round Table Conference, London (1939). Member of the Histadrut Executive Committee (1942). Member of the Provisional Council of State and Minister of Labour and Reconstruction in the Provisional Government (1948). Was elected to the Knesset in 1949 and 1951. Became, in 1951, chairman of the Knesset Economic Committee. In December 1952 he led the Israel delegation to the Vienna "peace conference."

Mr. Ben-Tov is essentially a man of Hashomer Hatzair. He is a member and resident of Mishmar Ha'emek, one of its leading communal settlements, where his wife runs the school, which has considerable local renown. For years he has been editor of *Al Hamishmar*, organ of the movement. He is a man of considerable erudition and speaks six languages, and has made a study of Arab-Jewish relations. Fellow journalists say that he will always be found on the side of the majority in Mapam, and indeed he appears now to be a time-server.

25. Ben-Zvi (Shimshelvitze), Yitzhak, M.B.E.

President of Israel (1952).

Born 1894 at Poltava. Studied at Kiev University and was an active promoter of Socialist Zionism in

Russia, Germany and Switzerland. Settled in Palestine in 1907. Studied law at Istanbul University (1913-14), was expelled from Palestine (1915), went to the United States, worked on preparing pioneers for Palestine, helped to recruit the Jewish Legion and served in it (1918-20). One of the founders of the Va'ad Leumi (General Council of the Jewish Community); from 1920 onwards member of its Presidium and its president from 1931 to 1948. Twice appointed to the High Commissioner's Council, but resigned; in both cases on the immigration issue. In 1937 he represented the Jewish community in Palestine at the coronation of King George VI. Has been delegate at Zionist Congresses and a member of the Zionist General Council. A founder of the Histadrut and of Mapai. Member of the Provisional Council of State (1948) and of the Knesset (1949). Re-elected 1951.

In November 1952 he was nominated by Mapai as their candidate for the Presidency and a month later he was elected to that office on the third ballot.

Mr. Ben-Zvi is a simple and modest man who is universally liked and respected, and he has shown dignity, moderation and sense in his new office, which is largely symbolic. He is quite unaffected, and lived for years in a small wooden hut in Jerusalem. Before being elected President he took little part in active politics, but was looked upon as the "grand old man" of Mapai. He is a leading orientalist and the author of several books and many articles, and an authority on the Samaritan community. One of his two sons was killed in the Palestine War.

26. Berger, Herzl

Mapai Deputy and journalist.

Born in Russia, 1904. Educated at Minsk and Jena University. Came to Palestine in 1934 after having been prominent in Germany and Poland in the Zionist cause, and secretary-general of Poalei Zion from 1933-34. Since 1935 a member of the editorial board of *Davar*, the Histadrut paper. He also edits a German language weekly for Mapai called *Dapim* and a daily for Hebrew-learners called *Omer*, and on occasion takes a strongly anti-Cominform line. Nominated to a Mapai vacancy in the Knesset, February 1951, and re-elected 1951.

Mr. Berger is a slight little man with a wry neck and is pleasant with a rather shy sense of humour. He and his wife live in one of the poorest quarters of Tel Aviv where Mrs. Berger, a doctor, is greatly beloved.

27. Berman, Dr. Adolf

Fellow-travelling ex-Mapam Deputy.

Born in Warsaw in 1906. Educated in Poland and became a Doctor of Psychology. He is a brother of Jacob Berman, a leading Polish Communist. He was head of the Jewish Psycho-Technical Institute in Poland and a member of the Left Poalei Zion in Poland from 1925. He took a leading part in the Warsaw ghetto underground movement and after the Second World War became a member of the Polish parliament. In 1947 he became chairman of the Polish Central Jewish Committee and chairman of the Mapam Party in Poland. He settled in Israel in 1950 and became a member of the Mapam Central Committee. In July 1951 he was elected a member of the Second Knesset on the Mapam list. At the beginning of 1953 he collaborated with Sneh (q.v.) in setting up the "left faction" and at the end of January was expelled with Sneh from Mapam. He retains his seat in the Knesset, however.

Dr. Berman collaborates fully with the official Communist Party, with whom he is thoroughly identified.

28. Bernstein, Dr. Perets (Fritz)

Minister of Trade and Industry (1952) and leader of General Zionist Party (1943).

Born in 1890 at Meiningen (Germany). Studied at Meiningen University and Eisenach. Was in business in Germany and Holland, 1907-35. On the Executive of the Zionist Organisation of Holland from 1924 and its president in 1930-34. Came to Palestine in 1936, and founded the General Zionist paper *Haboker*. In 1937 he entered the Executive of the General Zionist Party. President of the party since 1943; unanimously re-elected in November 1949. He entered the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency in 1946 and in 1947 became head of its trade and industry department. In 1948 he became member of the Provisional Council of State and entered the Provisional Government as Minister of Trade, Industry and Supply, with responsibility for war-time controls. Elected Deputy, 1949, he declined to serve in the Government. Re-elected 1951. In November 1952, he was the General Zionist candidate for the presidency. A month later, when the General Zionists joined Mr. Ben-Gurion's Coalition Government, he became Minister of Trade and Industry. He has since steadily advocated the decontrol of foreign currency.

Dr. Bernstein is regarded with the respect due to a senior statesman. A rather massive person, he speaks quietly and without rhetorical effects, but his authority (particularly on economic questions) is considerable.

29. Biran (Bergman), Dr. Avraham

District Commissioner for Jerusalem (1948).

Born in 1909 at Petach Tikvah. Educated at Reali Intermediary School, Haifa, and Teacher's Seminary, Jerusalem. Graduated at John Hopkins University, Baltimore (M.A., Ph.D.).

From 1928 onwards worked as teacher in Haifa and Baltimore. Later held a fellowship at the American School of Oriental Research, Jerusalem, specialising in archaeology. Has participated in archaeological expeditions in Palestine, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq. In 1937 he entered the Palestine Government service as Cadet District Officer, Nazareth, and served as District Officer in various towns in northern Palestine. In 1946 he became District Officer in Jerusalem and at the end of the Mandate he entered the service of Israel as assistant Military Governor of the City. When military government ceased he became District Commissioner (or "Government Representative") for Jerusalem.

30. Burg, Dr. Shlomo Joseph

Minister of Posts (1952).

Born in Germany in 1909 and educated at the universities of Berlin and Leipzig (Ph.D.). He also undertook Jewish religious studies in Berlin and received a rabbinical diploma. Becoming a member of the religious pioneering movement, he joined the Palestine Office in Berlin and was active in Germany on behalf of Youth Aliyah. He came to Palestine in 1939 and entered the teaching profession in Tel Aviv. He is a leading member of Hapoel Hamizrachi, the religious Labour Party. Elected to the Knesset in 1949 on the religious bloc list, he became Deputy Speaker. He favoured the inclusion of his party within the Histadrut and emerged as one of the leaders of the "Lamifne" faction. Re-elected in 1951, he was appointed Minister of Health in Mr. Ben-Gurion's reconstituted coalition Government. When the General Zionists were included in the coalition in December 1952 he was given the Ministry of Posts.

31. Chazan, Yaakov Arie

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born in 1899 in Brest-Litovsk and educated in Poland. One of the founders of the Hashomer

Hatzair movement in Poland and of its world organisation. Came to Palestine in 1923 and helped to found the kibbutz at Mishmar Ha'emek, where he still resides. Is on the Secretariat of the Hashomer Hatzair Federation (kibbutz Artzi). Member of the Zionist General Council and delegate to Zionist Congresses since 1928. Member of the Histadrut Executive Committee. Member of the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund. Deputy 1949. Re-elected 1951.

Mr. Chazan is one of the most active Mapam leaders and a pro-Soviet extremist though he does not go so far as Dr. Sneh and remains a Zionist. He is given to immoderate statements and in a speech early in 1949 described Soviet Russia as his "second homeland." He is opposed to coalition with Mapai except on Mapam's own terms.

32. Chizik, Isaac

General Manager of Shimshon Cement Factory, June 1953.

Born 1907 at Sejera, Palestine, of a well-known local family. Educated at Tel Aviv and at University of Chicago and London School of Economics. Ph.B., M.A. A brother and a sister were killed in Arab disturbances in the 'twenties.

Joined Palestine Government in 1935 as district officer in Tulkarm, Lydda, Jerusalem and elsewhere. Director-General of Israel Police, 1948-49. Served in Prime Minister's Office and was Director-General of Negev Authority, 1950-51. Director of Tel Aviv Port, 1951, resigning 1953 to become general manager of the Shimshon Cement Factory.

Critical of the progress made by the Mandatory Government in developing Palestine, Mr. Chizik is himself a keen and efficient administrator. Able and friendly.

33. Cohen, Haim (Herman Cohn)

Attorney-General (1950).

Born in 1911 at Lübeck (Germany). Studied at Universities of Munich, Hamburg and Frankfurt. Came to Palestine in 1933 and studied at the Hebrew University and Rabbinical College, Jerusalem. In private legal practice 1937-48. In 1948 he became secretary of the Jewish Agency's Legal Council and was engaged in legal work in preparation for independence. In June 1948, he entered the civil service as State Attorney and Director of the Department of Prosecution in the Ministry of Justice; he later became Director-General of the Ministry as well. Appointed Attorney-General, February 1950, and Minister of Justice June 1952, continuing to hold the office of Attorney-General as well. In December 1952 he had to give up the Ministry of Justice and his seat in the Cabinet to make way for the Progressive and General Zionist members, but he remains Attorney-General.

Mr. Cohen is a non-party man and is not a member of the Knesset.

34. Comay, Michael Saul

Israel Minister to Canada (1953).

Born in 1908 at Capetown. Educated in South Africa (B.A., LL.B.) and practised at the South African bar till 1940. Served with South African Forces, 1940-46, in the Western Desert and in Britain, in Military Intelligence (Captain) and Army Education (Major); twice mentioned in despatches. After the war he came to Palestine as special representative of the South African Zionist Federation and entered the service of the Jewish Agency Political Department. Was attached to the Jewish delegation to the United Nations, 1947-48. He became Director of the British Commonwealth Division when the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was first established and in May 1952 Assistant Director-General in the Ministry, being responsible for the British Commonwealth, American and Western

European Divisions. He was appointed the first Israel Minister to Canada in 1953.

Mr. Comay is intelligent and able. He talks well and is outwardly friendly, but is a difficult and moody man who never relaxes. He is suspicious and critical of the United Kingdom (I have the impression that he is much influenced by the *New Statesman*), and is hypersensitive to criticism of Israel's policies. Formerly almost hostile, the prejudices of his wife (a vain woman) and himself have somewhat abated during the past three years.

35. Dan, Hillel

Managing director, Solel Boneh.

Born in 1900 at Vilna. Veteran Commander of the Haganah. Has held a series of increasingly important administrative posts in the Histadrut and is now a member of its Executive. He helped to relaunch Solel Boneh after its 1922 bankruptcy and make it a success, and since 1935 he has been responsible for policy in all Histadrut industrial enterprises. He is a director of the Israel Mining Company, a Government concern formed to exploit minerals in the Negev, and a member of the Economic Advisory Council, as well as a director of the German Reparations Purchasing Company.

Mr. Dan is a dictatorial character, who inspires respect but also fear in his subordinates. Said to be ruthless but a man of this word. Hates paper work but has a remarkable memory for salient facts and figures. Speaks no English.

36. Dayan, Aloof (Brigadier) Moshe

Chief of General Staff Branch at Army G.H.Q. (1952).

Born 1916 Degania (Galilee). Brought up at the co-operative settlement of Nahalal. His father, Shmuel Dayan, is a Mapai deputy, and his brother was killed in the Palestine War. Early associated with the Haganah and was a volunteer in Wingate's "night squads." Sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in 1939 for illegally engaging in secret military training, he was released in 1941 to join a scout unit formed to assist the British Army in Syria against the Vichy French. He lost his left eye in the fighting and now wears an eyeshield. In 1948-49 he commanded a Palmach Brigade and later was Military Commander of the Jerusalem area. He then headed the military section of the Israel mission at the armistice negotiations in Rhodes. On his return, was appointed chief Israel delegate to the four Mixed Armistice Commissions. Relinquished this appointment in November, 1949, becoming Regional Commander of the Southern Area with promotion to rank of Aloof. In October 1951 he relinquished this command and went to the United Kingdom for a course at the Senior Officers' School, Devizes. In May 1952 he was given command of the Northern Area and in December 1952 he went to G.H.Q. as Head of the General Staff Branch.

Brigadier Dayan, one of Israel's most successful officers, has shown skill not only in operations but also as a negotiator.

37. Di-Nur (Dinaburg) Professor Ben-Zion

Minister of Education and Culture (1951).

Born in the Ukraine in 1884. Educated at the universities of Berne and Berlin, the Institute of Jewish Studies in Berlin and the Yeshivot of Tels, Kovno and Wilna. Came to Palestine in 1921, and was on the staff of the Hebrew Teachers' Seminary at Beit Hakerem until 1948. Lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem from 1936-47 and in 1947 Professor of Modern Jewish History there, at the same time becoming Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and member of the university's executive council. A Mapai delegate to Zionist congresses and a member of the Jewish Community Council of Jerusalem, he was elected to the first Knesset in

1949 on the Mapai list. He was not re-elected in 1951, but on the formation of the new Cabinet in October 1951 became Minister of Education and Culture continuing as such in the Coalition Government formed in December 1952. He continued to lecture at the Hebrew University.

38. Dobkin, Eliahu

Member of the Jewish Agency Executive (1933).

Born Bobruisk, Russia, in 1898. Educated at high school and Kharkov University. An active Zionist, he administered the emigration office in Warsaw from 1914-30. He came to Palestine in 1932 and was subsequently elected deputy member of the Jewish Agency Executive (1935) and director of the Agency's Immigration Department (1932). From 1932 on he was continuously concerned with the organisation of immigration. He was a delegate to all the Zionist congresses from 1921 on and in 1933 became a full member of the Zionist Executive. He was a Mapai member of the Provisional Council of State from 1948-49 and later became chairman of the Organisation Committee of the Zionist Executive and was in charge of the arrangements for the 23rd Zionist Congress in Jerusalem. In 1951 he was re-elected a Mapai member of the Zionist Executive and became head of the Youth and Immigration Department of the Agency and also of its Administrative Department. He is also a member of the Foundation Fund Executive.

Mr. Dobkin is a leading member of Mapai but has hitherto devoted himself to Jewish Agency affairs and eschewed domestic politics.

39. Dori (Dostrovsky), Rav-Aloof Yaakov

Former Chief of Staff. President of Haifa Institute of Technology (1951).

Born 1899 at Odessa. In Palestine since 1906. Studied at Reali School, Haifa. Served in the Jewish Legion 1918-21, becoming sergeant-major. Studied at University of Ghent, Belgium, 1922-26, graduating as civil engineer. 1926-29, served in technical department of Palestine Zionist Executive. Associated from the start with the Haganah, from 1929 onwards he was entirely engaged in its service, becoming head of its training department, and, from 1939, its Chief of Staff. In 1945-47 spent eighteen months in the United States. Emerged into the open as Haganah leader in May, 1948, and directed military operations throughout the Arab war. In November, 1949, he relinquished the post of Chief of Staff and went abroad on sick leave. On his return he was seconded to the Prime Minister's office (May, 1950) to act as Head of its Science Division, representing the Prime Minister in relations with various scientific bodies. In February 1951 he became president of the Haifa Institute of Technology (Technion), continuing part-time as head of the Scientific Division. He also became chairman of the board of directors of the Israel Mining Company, a Government development organisation. In 1951 he was also appointed a Government director of the new Dead Sea potash company.

Rav-Aloof Dori is a man of broad culture and a good linguist who has spent much time in studying military literature and arranging for the production of military text books in Hebrew. A small bespectacled man, he looks more like a professor than a military commander, but he had experience of fighting in the Arab disturbances of 1921, 1929 and 1936-39. He has the reputation of being politically impartial, very hard working and personally modest. The reason given for his retirement from the army was weak health, and he undoubtedly suffers from an ulcerated stomach. But there were other reasons, among them his attachment to Haganah tradition and unadaptability to the needs of a modern army and his reluctance to weed out officers associated with Mapam.

(The rank Rav-Aloof has not been formally evaluated in terms of Western military ranks; unique to the Chief of Staff, it may be broadly rendered as "General.")

40. Eban (or Even), Aba (Aubrey Solomon)

Head of Israel Delegation to United Nations (1948) and Ambassador at Washington (1950).

Born in 1915 at Capetown of a Lithuanian Jewish family. Brought up in England and educated at Cambridge (1934-39), where he obtained a triple first in Arabic, Hebrew and Persian. Associated with the Zionist Movement from boyhood. Representative at the World Zionist Congress, Geneva, 1939. Commissioned in the British Forces, 1939, and sent to the Middle East as Chief Arab Censor at G.H.Q., Cairo, 1940. In 1942 he was appointed liaison officer with the Jewish Agency for special operations in the event of German occupation of Palestine. 1943, appointed Chief Instructor, Middle East Arab Centre, Jerusalem. 1946, head of the Jewish Agency's Information Department, London. Participated in the World Zionist Congress, Basle, 1946. Jewish Agency liaison officer with the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine, 1947. Went with the latter to New York, where he remained, assuming leadership of the Israel Delegation to the United Nations in July 1948. In May 1950 he was appointed to succeed Mr. Elath as ambassador in Washington, at the same time remaining Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

Mr. Eban, whose Hebrew name of Even has not become established, even in Israel, is highly intelligent. He is a very sharp controversialist in his official capacity and has been an eloquent though hardly conciliatory Israel spokesman at the United Nations. He is in the inner counsels of the Government on all foreign matters of importance. Like many leading Israelis he has too much on his shoulders.

41. Efrati Josef

Mapai Deputy (1949) and Deputy Minister of Agriculture (1951).

Born at Pinsk in 1897. Educated at an agricultural high school. Came to Palestine in 1914 and joined kibbutz Geva. Was a delegate to Zionist congresses and active in the organisation of agriculture within the Histadrut. He was elected a Mapai member of the Knesset in 1949 and again in 1951. In January 1951 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

42. Effer, Yaakov

Co-operative Manager.

Born in 1895 at Kishinev (Bessarabia). In Palestine since 1913. Manager of the Labour weekly *Hapoel Hatsair*, 1913-15. Starting as member of Degania communal settlement (1915-18), he made a career in the secretariat of the Agricultural Workers' Union and other labour associations, and became secretary of the Histadrut Executive Committee and manager of the Workers' Sick Fund (Kupat Holim). Since 1931 he has been Chairman of the Union of Co-operative Consumers' Societies. Edited the fortnightly bulletin *Co-operative Economics*. In 1934 he represented Mapai at the International Co-operative Alliance congress in Manchester. Has also been a labour delegate at several Zionist Congresses. He is now managing director of Hamashbir Hamerkazi (the Histadrut's wholesale purchasing co-operative), a director of the Workers' Bank and of the Israel Fuel Corporation, member of the Economic Advisory Council, and a member of the Histadrut Executive Committee.

Manager of one of the most powerful economic concerns in the country, Mr. Effer is an influential supporter of Mapai, on whose list of candidates his name appeared (as a matter of form) at the 1949

47674

elections. He speaks English and has had long and friendly relations with the management of the Co-operative Wholesale Society in the United Kingdom. A pleasant man of quiet demeanour.

43. Elath (Epstein), Eliahu

Minister at London (1950).

Born in 1903 at Snovsk (Ukraine), son of a timber merchant. Graduated at a non-Jewish school and began studying medicine at Kiev but was imprisoned in 1922 for participation in a secret congress of the Zionist Youth Movement. In 1923, after a short period of underground Zionist activity in Moscow, he made his way to Danzig to participate in a world conference of Hechaluts (pioneers). Remained in the Baltic for a year, organising illegal emigration from Russia via Latvia to Palestine, where he settled himself in 1925. Worked as agricultural labourer (secretary of the Rehovoth Labour Council) and construction labourer in Transjordan. Fought as a Haganah commander during the Arab disturbances of 1929. Studied Arabic at the Hebrew University and the American University, Beirut (1928-34). In 1930 he was awarded a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship for the study of the Syrian bedouin. From 1931-34 was Reuter's representative in Beirut. On completion of his studies joined the political department of the Jewish Agency and from 1934-45 was head of its Middle and Near East Division. Travelled extensively in the area, including Persia and Turkey. From 1945 onwards the Agency employed him on various political missions in the United States, including the San Francisco conference. On the declaration of independence he became Israel diplomatic representative in Washington, his status being raised in February 1949 to that of Ambassador. Transferred to London as Minister in June 1950.

Mr. Elath is a sociologist and orientalist and has written books on the Beduin (among whom he has lived) and on Lebanon and Transjordan. He is an extremely intelligent and likeable person who inspires confidence and gives an impression of honesty and straightforwardness as well as ability. His wife has similar qualities.

44. Eliashar, Eliahu

Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem (1951) and Sephardic Deputy.

Born in 1899 at Jerusalem of an old established family of local landowners. Served in the Turkish Army 1915-18. Attended the French University in Beirut and the Jerusalem Law Classes and in 1922 entered the Palestine Government service. Was in charge of the Trade Section and Official Receiver of Companies and Bankruptcies; edited the Official Census of Industries Report (1927-29) and the Government Commercial Bulletin. Left the service in 1934 and has since engaged in business. Is a director of several important commercial and financial companies and has been Managing Director of the Jerusalem Development Company and of Buildco, Ltd.

Mr. Eliashar was formerly on the Board of the Jerusalem Jewish Council, and became president of the Sephardic Community in Jerusalem. Elected to the Knesset in 1949, he became more openly critical of the Government. Finally, in May 1951, he had to resign leadership of the United Sephardim movement, of which he represented the wealthy Right-wing element. He was the first politician openly to propose in the Knesset (May 1950) that Israel should abandon neutrality and adopt a Western orientation. Has been deputy Mayor of Jerusalem since January 1951, and was re-elected to the Knesset in 1951 on the Sephardic and Oriental Communities list supporting the General Zionists. In November 1951 he was elected a vice-president of the World Federation of Sephardic Communities.

45. Eliashiv (Friedman), Dr. Shmuel

Minister at Moscow (1951); reappointed 1953.

Born in 1899 in Pinsk of a distinguished rabbinical family. Educated at Kovno, Kharkov and Toulouse. An active Zionist since his earliest days and from 1929-46 a member of the Zionist Executive. He came to Palestine in 1934 and later became a member of the Secretariat of the Histadrut Executive.

In August 1948 he was appointed director of the Eastern European Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was appointed minister to Prague and Budapest in April 1950 and was transferred to Moscow in February 1951 returning to Israel in February 1953 on the rupture of Israel-Soviet relations. His reappointment as Minister to Moscow on the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries was announced in August 1953.

Dr. Eliashiv is an unkempt and slightly lugubrious individual, studious and somewhat reserved. He knows Russian well and speaks English, though he is happier in French.

46. Erem (Kazarnovski), Moshe

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born in Russia in 1896. Educated at the universities of Leningrad and Moscow. Was from 1915-22 Commissar for Labour in the Soviet administration in Poland. He became one of the founders of the Poalei Zion Party and came to Palestine in 1924. He was a delegate to Zionist congresses and was a senior official in the Ministry of Minorities until its dissolution. He was also for a number of years a member of the Histadrut Executive. In politics he joined the Left Poalei Zion faction which merged with Hashomer Hatzair and Ahdut Avoda to form Mapam, and was elected a Mapam member of the Knesset in 1949 and re-elected in 1951. He took a prominent part in Peace Movement activities and on the occasion of Admiral Edelman's visit to Israel in 1951 he vigorously attacked the part the Royal Navy had played in preventing illegal immigration. He has consistently taken a stand with the extreme pro-Soviet members of his party. In 1951 he came into conflict with the Communist Party and was denounced by the Communist newspaper *Kol Ha'am* as a "veteran professional anti-Communist agitator" and as a "modern Titoist."

47. Eshkol (Shkolnik), Levi

Minister of Finance (1952).

Born in 1895 at Ortowo (Ukraine). Received a high school and religious education at Vilna and came to Palestine in 1914. In 1918 he served in the Jewish Legion. He then participated in the foundation (1920) of two communal settlements (Degania "B" and Kiryat Anavim) and the smallholders' settlement of Ataroth (1922). Always associated with agricultural enterprise and author of numerous articles on colonisation, in 1935 he became a director of "Nir," the Histadrut agricultural credit institution, and a member of the Histadrut's Central Agricultural Council. Founder and manager of the "Mekorot" water company (1937). Became a director of the Workers' Bank and of the public works and housing corporations "Bizur" and "Amidar."

In 1948 Mr. Eshkol served for a time as one of the three "Assistants to the Minister of Defence" in the Provisional Government. A member of the Zionist General Council and Jewish Agency Executive, he became Director of the Agency's Agricultural Settlement Department. In October 1949 he was appointed acting treasurer of the Agency and was confirmed in that post by the Executive Plenary in January 1950.

In 1951 he was elected to the Knesset on the Mapai list. He continued as treasurer and head of

the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, but in October 1951 he became Minister of Agriculture and Development as well. In June 1952 he succeeded Kaplan as Minister of Finance, retaining also direct charge of development (the department for which has been transferred to his charge). He subsequently gave up his post as Jewish Agency Treasurer, but remained in charge of the Agency's Settlement Department and continued as a member of the Agency's Executive.

Mr. Eshkol is a leading member of the Government and has acted as Prime Minister during Mr. Ben-Gurion's absence.

48. Eytan (Ettinghausen), Walter George

Director-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1949).

Born in 1910 at Munich. Went to England as a boy. Naturalised British subject, 1926. Educated at St. Paul's School, London, and Queen's College, Oxford. Was lecturer on German philology at the latter, 1936-46. Joined the Royal Armoured Corps 1939. Transferred in 1940 to Naval Intelligence in which he served till the end of hostilities. 1946, settled in Palestine and till 1948 directed the Jewish Agency's Public Services College. May, 1948, appointed Director-General (Permanent Under-Secretary) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Headed the Israel delegation to the armistice negotiations at Rhodes, 1948-49. Paid an official visit to India, 1952. He retains his interest in improving the quality of Israel's Civil Service and is chairman of the Public Commission for Civil Service Examinations.

Mr. Eytan is a highly intelligent and cultured person with moderate views though beneath his donnish exterior he is a fanatical Zionist. He has the reputation of being a good organiser. He has perhaps less influence over foreign policy than his position would appear to warrant.

49. Foerder, Dr. Yeshayalm (Herbert)

Progressive Deputy (1949).

Born in Germany 1901. Educated at the universities of Königsberg, Heidelberg and Freiberg. Was in practice as a lawyer in Berlin and secretary of the Zionist organisation in Germany. Came to Palestine in 1933 and was active in organising the settlement of middle-class immigrants. Was a delegate to Zionist congresses and was one of the founders of "Rassco," a company providing housing for immigrants. He was Food Controller from 1948-49. In 1949 he was elected to the Knesset on the Progressive list and was re-elected in 1951. He is a member of the advisory council to the Investments Centre and in November 1952 became chairman of the Public Advisory Council for reparations from Germany.

Dr. Foerder is pro-British, friendly and extremely intelligent and is the brains of the Progressive Party.

50. Galili, Israel

Mapam member.

Born in 1907 in Jaffa and received a secondary education in Palestine. Active in the Haganah from early youth, he was second-in-command of its underground forces and acted as its Commander-in-Chief during the first months of the Arab war in 1948. For a time he served as one of three "Assistants to the Minister of Defence" in the Provisional Government, but quarrelled with Mr. Ben Gurion over the spirit and organisation of the Army and the rôle of Palmach in it, and was dropped. He became the principal spokesman of Mapam on military matters. He was a member of the Knesset from 1949-51. Though bitter about the Army Mr. Galili showed himself conciliatory on other questions debated by

Mapam and Mapai. In the winter of 1949-50 he was active in the negotiations between the two parties and led the Mapam minority group which wished to continue them. Though opposing the Israel Government's stand over Korea and the secession of the Histadrut from the World Federation of Trade Unions, he emerged as a leader of the less extreme wing of Mapam, who opposed the out-and-out pro-Cominform stand of Hashomer Hatzair. In June 1951 he was still a member of the Mapam Central Committee of five, but, probably as the result of disagreements with the extremists, he was placed last on the Mapam list for the 1951 elections, with no hope of re-election. In April 1952 the struggle between him and the extreme pro-Soviet group came to a head, and he was forced to resign from the Mapam Central Committee and from all other party committees. He is still, however, a member of the party.

Mr. Galili is a resident member of the mixed kibbutz at Na'an, which he helped to found (1930), and Chairman of the Regional Council in which it is comprised. He is a forceful speaker but lacks education.

51. Goldstein, Dr. Sydney

Scientist.

Born in 1903 at Hull, Yorkshire. Studied at Leeds and Cambridge (M.A., Ph.D. (1928)). Spent a year as a Rockefeller Research Fellow at the University of Goettingen and then worked at Manchester and Cambridge Universities. At Manchester, where he lectured in applied mathematics, he built up a school of fluid mechanics which has been described as "unsurpassed in Europe." At Cambridge he became a Fellow of St. John's. During the Second World War he worked on aeronautics at the National Physical Laboratory. He became chairman of the British Council for Aeronautical Research and a Fellow of the Royal Society.

In 1950 Dr. Goldstein came to Israel and began building up from nothing a Department of Aeronautical Engineering at the Haifa Institute of Technology with American funds. In 1951 he became vice-president of the institute.

Dr. Goldstein is one of the few Anglo-Saxon Jews who have thrown up distinguished careers to help build up the Jewish State. He is a strong, forceful personality.

52. Granott (Granovsky), Dr. Abraham

Chairman of the Jewish National Fund.

Born in 1890 at Falesti (Bessarabia). Studied law and economics at Universities of Freiburg and Lausanne (Doctor of Law). Joined the staff of the Jewish National Fund in Holland, 1919; appointed its managing director, 1925; elected member (1934) and Chairman (1945) of its Board of Directors. In Palestine since 1922. Author of several books on Palestine land problems on which he is the leading authority. Director or chairman of various development, settlement and water companies. Member of the Executive Council of the Hebrew University and president of two important cultural foundations.

In the Provisional Council of State (1948-49) Mr. Granott was one of the six representatives of the General Zionists, but he left them at the foundation of the Progressive Party, of which he was elected Deputy (1949). He was not very active in the Knesset. He was at one time Chairman of the Finance Committee, but devoted himself mainly to the National Fund (Keren Kayemet), of which he is now chairman. In 1951 he was elected to the Second Knesset on the Progressive list, but resigned this seat two months later.

53. Habibi, Emile

Arab Communist Deputy (1951).

Born at Haifa in 1921. Educated at secondary school. Became a journalist and editor of the Communist paper *Al Ittihad*, being prominent in Communist activities in Palestine. He was fifth on the Communist list at the 1949 elections but was unsuccessful, and first entered the Knesset at the 1951 elections. He appears to be a member of the Communist Central Committee and director of the party educational courses. He is prominent in "Peace Movement" activities and has attended peace congresses at Tunis, Berlin and Vienna.

54. Hacoheh, David

Mapai Deputy (1949). Nominated Israel Minister to Burma July 1953.

Born in 1898 at Homel (White Russia). His father, a distinguished Hebrew writer and founder of co-operative financial institutions, brought him to Palestine as a boy (1907). Educated at Herzliya Gymnasium in Tel Aviv and the military school, Istanbul. Served as a Turkish Army officer in the First World War. Studied at the London School of Economics. A founder of Solel Boneh (1924) and now managing director of it and various other associated companies of the Histadrut and Chairman of the Zim Shipping Company. Became Municipal Councillor, Haifa, in 1927 and was Deputy Mayor from 1948-51. Has been member of the Jewish Elected Assembly and the Histadrut General Council. During the Arab rebellion he was associated with Brigadier Wingate in the organisation of the "Night Squads." During the Second World War he collaborated with the Ministry of Economic Welfare in organising pro-Allied broadcasts to Syria and supplied Solel Boneh personnel for work with the British Forces outside Palestine. An important member of the Haganah and believed responsible for its sapper work, in 1946 he was among the Zionist leaders detained at Latrun. Elected Deputy (Mapai) in 1949 and re-elected to Second Knesset in 1951, he became a member of Mapai's Steering Committee and of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. He was an alternate delegate to the 1951 United Nations General Assembly and took a prominent part in Inter-parliamentary Union activities. Nominated first Israel Minister to Burma in July 1953.

Mr. Hacoheh is an energetic and forceful man and a dominant personality in Haifa, where he spends most of his time. A very successful business manager, he behaves more like a typical company director than a trade unionist. His wife (née Bracha Habas, which is still her *nom de plume*) is a prominent journalist and Mapai intellectual.

55. Hakim, Mgr. George

Greek Catholic Archbishop of Acre, Haifa, Nazareth and Galilee.

Born at Tanta, Egypt, in 1908. Educated at the Jesuit College at Cairo and St. Anne's Seminary, Jerusalem. Ordained priest in 1930, he taught at the Patriarchal School in Beirut and then became moderator and subsequently principal of the Patriarchal School at Cairo. He made a great success of this post. In Egypt he published a French periodical called *Le Lien* and he also founded an Arabic periodical called *Ar-Rabita (The Link)* which was published in Haifa.

In 1943 he came to Haifa as Archbishop. Though at first opposed to the founding of the Jewish State, he has found a *modus vivendi* with the Israel authorities and is allowed to pay visits to Beirut on church and refugee business. He is anti-Communist, and his recent activities among the Arab population in Israel have brought him into violent conflict with the Communist Party.

56. Harari (Blumberg), Izhar

Progressive Deputy (1949).

Born in 1908 at Jaffa. Educated at the Herzlia Gymnasium at Tel-Aviv, the Sorbonne, the Law School in Jerusalem and the London School of Economics. He also studied at the School of Journalism in Paris. From 1934 he was in private legal practice and in 1938 he became legal adviser to some municipal councils. He was a delegate to Zionist Congresses and a member of the Zionist Actions Committee and of the Central Committee of the Israel Bar Association. In 1948 he joined the Israel army and was appointed vice-president of the Military High Court with the rank of Sgan-Aloof (Lieut.-Colonel). He retired from the army after his election to the Knesset in 1949, where he became chairman of the House Committee and made a considerable contribution to the determining of parliamentary procedure. He was re-elected in 1951. He is one of the leading legal experts in the Knesset and plays an active part in debates. He has advocated the unification of education and the passing of a series of fundamental laws to be eventually combined in one constitution. In July 1950 he was a member of the parliamentary delegation to the United Kingdom. In 1953 he was offered the post of first Israel Minister to Canada but turned it down.

57. Heftman, Joseph Chaim

Journalist.

Born in 1888 at Briansk (Russia). Religious education. Worked as editor and member of editorial board of various Hebrew and Yiddish papers abroad. Was on the Executive Council of Jews of Poland. In Palestine since 1934. Editor of the Hebrew daily newspaper *Haboker* (General Zionist) and President of the Jewish Journalists' Association in Israel, he became in 1952 chairman of the General Zionist Party executive. Member of the Zionist General Council. A prolific writer. In the autumn of 1950 he was one of a group of journalists who paid an official visit to the United Kingdom.

Mr. Heftman is a charming and friendly person with courteous old-fashioned manners. But he is old for his years and situations are apt to escape from his control.

58. Herzog, Yitzhak

Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazim (1936).

Born at Rodvilski in 1888. Educated at Leeds University (M.A.), and is a D.Litt. of London University. Also studied at the Sorbonne and Ecole des Langues Orientales, Paris. Became a Rabbi in 1910. Was Rabbi of Belfast (1916) and Chief Rabbi of the Irish Free State (1925). Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazi Community in Palestine since 1936, resident in Jerusalem. Member of various learned societies and author of numerous books and studies.

A venerable-looking figure in a top hat, Dr. Herzog appears on all national occasions among the leaders of Israel. He is not much consulted by them but wields considerable indirect influence through the religious party in the Knesset. His fierce opposition to the Women's Conscription Amendments introduced by Mr. Ben-Gurion in the spring of 1951 and again in 1953 produced direct conflict between the Rabbinate and Mapai, but on other occasions he has usually managed to keep clear of politics. He has the reputation of being sincerely anglophile. A man of great learning and considerable acumen.

59. Hoofien, Eliezer Siegfried, M.B.E.

Banker.

Born in 1881 at Utrecht. Attended Amsterdam Commercial College and entered a private banking firm at Amsterdam (1899). Public Accountant, Amsterdam (1903-09). Director of the Zionist

Central Office, Cologne (1909-12). Came to Palestine in 1912 and entered the Anglo-Palestine Bank (now the Bank Leumi le Israel): assistant general manager (1912), joint general manager (1919), general manager (1924-47), chairman of the board of directors since 1947. Honorary president of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Chamber of Commerce. Chairman and managing director of the General Mortgage Bank and chairman of the Mortgage Bank. In 1948 he was appointed economic co-ordinator attached to the Prime Minister's Office.

He is a strong personality, influential and respected. He has on several occasions publicly urged drastic reductions in Israel's standard of living to enable her to balance her payments, and has attacked the Prime Minister and the Government for failing to take the necessary measures to avert economic collapse.

60. Horowitz David (Dolek)

Economist.

Born 1899 at Drohobycz (Galicia). Educated at Lwow and Vienna. Came to Palestine in 1919. Took part in land reclamation, Nahalal (1921). Member, Histadrut Council (1920) and Executive Council (1923). Author of books on economic and political subjects. Economic adviser to the American Economic Committee for Palestine (1932-35). Economic Adviser to the Treasury of the Jewish Agency, Director of its Economic Department and Co-Director of its Economic Research Institute (1935-48). Lecturer at the High School for Law and Economics, Tel Aviv. Was member of various Government committees of the mandatory régime, including the Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry and the Textile Advisory Board. Appeared as economic expert before the Royal Commission of 1937, the Anglo-American Commission of 1946 and the United Nations Commission of 1947. Was attached to the latter as liaison officer and followed it to Lake Success as member of the Jewish Delegation. Director-General of the Ministry of Finance from May 1948 until June 1952, and from 1950-52 was also Economic Adviser to the Government. In March 1953 he was appointed first director of the new State Bank and put in charge of the preparatory work for it. A month later he also became chairman of the Foreign Currency Board. A director of Histadrut workers' housing companies, of a South African group of companies and other enterprises.

Mr. Horowitz is a man of unusual energy and intelligence and for four years dominated the Ministry of Finance. He had all the strings of financial and economic policy in his hands. He is an able and skilful negotiator, and played the leading Israel part in the conclusion of the Anglo-Israel financial agreement of March 1950 concerning the liquidation of the Mandate, and the negotiations for the release of Israel's sterling balances, and the unsuccessful negotiations for sterling credits for the purchase of oil in 1952.

He did not see eye to eye with Mr. Ben-Gurion and resigned his office as soon as Mr. Kaplan left the Ministry of Finance. Until 1952 he carried the main burden of keeping Israel solvent, and the strain told on him heavily.

61. Hushi, Aba

Mayor of Haifa (1951).

Born 1898 in Poland and educated there. Came to Palestine in 1920 and first worked as a labourer in Haifa port and in the settlements. Later occupied various positions in the Haifa Labour Council and became its secretary. He was one of the founders of the Palestine Labour Union.

In due course he became a member of the Histadrut Executive and of the management of Solel

Boneh. In 1949, as a member of Mapai, he was elected to the Knesset, and remained a member until January 1951, when he was elected Mayor of Haifa.

A man of great energy, Mr. Hushi is dictatorial and ruthless but unquestionably able. He has great plans for the improvement of Haifa and is throwing himself wholeheartedly into them. He has for long enjoyed good relations with Arabs and advocated solidarity between Jewish and Arab labour.

62. Hyman, Zemach (Cecil)

Israel Minister to South Africa (1951).

Born in London in 1889, the son of an East-End Rabbi. He and his wife met when they were medical students. He served in Palestine during the First World War in the Jewish Legion and settled in the country in 1922, joining the staff of Barclays Bank (D.C. & O.) and becoming manager of its Western Jerusalem branch. He was appointed Economic Counsellor in Washington in 1950 and transferred to South Africa as Minister at the end of 1951. He has three children.

63. Joseph, Dr. Dov (Bernard)

Minister for Development June 1953.

Born in 1899 at Montreal. Studied law at London and McGill Universities (Ph.D., LL.B.). Was President of the "Young Judea" organisation in Canada. Came to Palestine in 1921. Was in private legal practice in Jerusalem and for several years served as legal adviser and Deputy Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, for which he went on special missions to the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa. Member of its Executive, 1945-48. One of the Jewish leaders detained at Latrun in 1946. Originally a Revisionist, he joined Mapai in 1933. In 1948 he became Military Governor of Jewish Jerusalem and successfully organised essential supplies during the siege. Elected Mapai Deputy, 1949, and appointed Minister of Supply and Rationing, he succeeded, despite much public grumbling, in applying an "austerity" programme of rationing and price control which did much to stem inflation. He was also "temporarily" Minister of Agriculture.

In the Cabinet reshuffle of October 1950, which was largely occasioned by criticism of his handling of economic controls, he took over the Ministry of Communications. Re-elected to the Second Knesset in 1951, he became Minister of Trade and Industry and also Minister of Justice in Mr. Ben-Gurion's reconstituted coalition Government. In the Government reorganisation of June 1952 he was relieved of the Ministry of Justice, but continued as Minister of Trade and Industry. On the entry of the General Zionists into the coalition in December 1952, he had to give up the Ministry of Trade and Industry to them but retained his seat in the Cabinet. In June 1953 he was appointed Minister for Development.

Dr. Joseph has a rather mild and unimpressive exterior, but is endowed with considerable courage and intelligence. By family connexions and personal inclination he is anglophile. His wife also is Canadian born. A daughter was killed in the Palestine War in 1948.

64. Joseptal, Dr. Giora

Treasurer of the Jewish Agency.

Born at Nuremberg in 1912. A leading member of the Jewish Agency Executive, he was for a number of years head of the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency and in 1952 succeeded Eshkol as treasurer. He is a member of kibbutz Gal-Ed, near Haifa. A leading member of Mapai, he was in August 1951 re-elected to the Zionist Executive as a Mapai member. In March 1952 he was a member of the Israel delegation which negotiated with representatives of Western Germany for the payment of

reparations. Two months later he was offered the Ministry of Finance by Mr. Ben-Gurion but refused it. In October 1952 he was appointed chairman of the German Reparations Purchasing Company.

65. Kariv (Krakowski), Itzhak

Mayor of Jerusalem (1952).

Born at Pabianice in Poland in 1903. Received an orthodox education. Came to Palestine in 1924 and worked for four years in the Poalei Mizrachi movement. Joined the Mizrahi Bank and became its Jerusalem manager. In 1951 he became a Municipal Councillor in Jerusalem and in 1952 was elected Mayor, representing the Right-wing orthodox coalition majority. He is married and has three children.

Mr. Kariv has not been a success as Mayor of Jerusalem but he took over the municipality when it was in such a chaotic state and so hamstrung by lack of funds and by dissensions in the Municipal Council that it is doubtful whether any man could have done much better.

66. Klebanoff, Yaakov

General Zionist Deputy (1949) and a Deputy Speaker of the Knesset (1953).

Born in Russia in 1887 and educated at Russian, German and Swiss Universities. Edited a Zionist weekly in Russian from 1907 to 1920 and was secretary of the Zionist Organisation in Russia from 1913-17 and later a member of its Central Committee. Came to Palestine in 1921 and has since been in private legal practice. He lives on Mount Carmel and is a member of the Central Committee of the Bar Association. He has been a General Zionist member of the Knesset since 1949 and has attended meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union abroad. In 1953 he was elected one of the Deputy Speakers of the Knesset.

Mr. Klebanoff is pleasant and agreeable and speaks good English.

67. Kidron (Rosenberg), Mordechai

Diplomat. Deputy to permanent Israel delegate to United Nations (August 1953).

Born in South Africa and served in Second World War in South African Air Force and Infantry. Came to Palestine after the war and studied at the Hebrew University. During the siege of Jerusalem he was military governor of the southern part of the city. After the Palestine war he joined the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was sent abroad on several missions. He became in 1949 first secretary and in 1950 counsellor at the Israel Legation in London and in 1951 returned to the Ministry as head of the International Relations Division.

Mr. Kidron has an almost exaggeratedly English manner, but cannot be relied on as pro-British on that account. He is efficient and quick. His wife is Italian, and pleasant.

68. Kohn, Dr. Yehuda Pinhas (Leo)

Political Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1948) and to the President.

Born Frankfurt-am-Main in 1894. Educated at the universities of Strasbourg, Berlin and Heidelberg (Doctor of Law). Secretary of the Central Office of the World Zionist Organisation, London, 1919-23. Secretary of the Hebrew University Committee in London from 1924-25 and of the Board of Governors of the university from 1925-31. Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation 1931-33, during which time he wrote a book on the Irish Constitution. Secretary of the Political Committee of the Jewish Agency 1934-48. In 1948 he became

political adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has served with successive Israel delegations to United Nations General Assemblies and in 1948 he produced a draft constitution for Israel, which has never been adopted. He is one of the Government representatives on the Executive Council of the Hebrew University.

Dr. Kohn is a charming and scholarly man of conservative views, but does not appear to wield or to wish to wield very great power within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

69. Kol (Kolodny), Moshe

Member of the Zionist Executive (1937).
Born at Pinsk in 1911. Educated there and at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, having come to Palestine in 1932. Always an active Zionist, he was one of the founders of the General Zionist Organisation in Palestine. He was appointed to the Zionist Executive in 1937 and was first chairman of the Central General Labour Office in Israel. He was a member of the Provisional Government from May 1948 until February 1949, but since 1949 has concerned himself almost exclusively with Jewish Agency affairs, being in charge of Youth Aliyah, and with the organisation of Jewish appeals. In 1949 he was one of the General Zionists who formed the Progressive Party and was third on the party's electoral list, but did not take his seat. In July 1951 he was again elected, but resigned two months later, when he became Deputy Treasurer of the new Jewish Agency Executive and again head of the Youth Aliyah Department of the Agency. He still sits in the Zionist Executive as a General Zionist.

70. Kollek, Theodore (Teddy)

Head of the Prime Minister's Office (1952).
Born at Vienna in 1911. A member of kibbutz Ein Gev. He acted as Haganah envoy to the United States before the end of the Mandate and was a leading Haganah intelligence officer, and was also active in the Zionist cause in England as a member of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency. In 1950 he became head of the North American Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1950 also he acted as secretary to the conference of American Jewish leaders in Jerusalem and at the end of the year was appointed Minister at the Israel Embassy at Washington to supervise fund-raising activities. In 1952 he was released to go to Harvard, but a month later was recalled to Israel and was appointed head of the Prime Minister's Office.

Mr. Kollek is one of Mr. Ben-Gurion's trusted lieutenants and appears to be a coming man. He speaks good English and is frank, forthcoming and intelligent, but has as yet little administrative experience.

71. Laskov, Aloof (Brigadier) Chaim

Ex-Commander of the Air Force.

Born in Russia in 1919. Came to Palestine as a child and was educated at the Reali School at Haifa. He served in the Haganah as a young man and from 1936-37 was a member of Wingate's night squads. From 1941-46 he saw much active service in the British Army, reaching the rank of major. He joined the Israel Army in 1948 and became a staff officer, a battalion commander and later a brigade commander. In August 1948 he became Director of Training, a post which he held for over three years, during which time he wrote some of the army textbooks. He paid an official visit to the United Kingdom in 1951 and in August of that year was appointed Commander of the Air Force. He was removed from this command in May 1953, after differences with General Makleff, and has gone to study in England. Brigadier Laskov speaks English, German and Arabic in addition to Hebrew.

Of all the senior officers in the Israel armed services Brigadier Laskov is the most outspokenly pro-British and has a great admiration for British service methods. He is direct and forceful and has the reputation of being an extremely hard worker. He has great powers of organisation, personality and drive.

72. Lavon (Lubianiker) Pinhas

Minister without Portfolio (1952).

Born 1904 at Kopyczunice in Poland. Studied law at Lwow University. A founder of the Gordonia Youth Movement, he came to Palestine in 1929 and with its first pioneers participated in the foundation of Hulda communal settlement, of which he is still a member. Active in foundation and enlargement of the federation of Mapai communal villages (Hever Hakvutsoth). Served in the secretariat of Mapai 1935-37, and has been on its Executive Committee since 1943. Member of the Histadrut Executive since 1944 and secretary-general from July 1949 to October 1950. Chairman of the Solel Boneh Council and member of the Zionist General Council. Mapai Deputy, 1949. Took a leading part in efforts made at the beginning of 1950 to bring Mapam into the Government. Led a Knesset delegation to the United Kingdom in July 1950. In October 1950 he became Minister of Agriculture, a post he held till October 1951, when he left the Government as a result of differences with his colleagues over the priority to be given to foreign currency allocations for food imports. Re-elected to second Knesset, 1951.

One of Mapai's outstanding figures, he was brought into the Government again as Minister without portfolio in August 1952. Previously little known to the public, he has made his mark as a forceful speaker in the Knesset. Dignified and able, but somewhat lacking in education.

73. Levanon, Chaim

Mayor of Tel Aviv (1953).

Born in 1899 in Cracow, Galicia. Educated at a Yeshiva and at Cracow University. After the first world war he entered an engineering college and was one of the founders of the Mazrachi Youth Movement. He went to an agricultural training farm for Zionist pioneers and in 1927 he came to Israel and settled in Petah Tiqva, becoming a teacher. He was a founder of the General Zionist Youth Movement and Secretary-General of the party in his area. In 1931 he became Secretary-General of the whole party, travelling abroad frequently on party missions. He was one of the founders and directors of the party newspaper *Haboker*. After 1939 he established and became secretary of the General Zionist Workers Association. In 1951 he was elected a councillor and subsequently Deputy Mayor of Tel Aviv. In December 1952 he became Acting Mayor when Mr. Rokach became Minister of the Interior, and in April 1953 he was elected Mayor.

74. Levavi, Arieh

Diplomat.

Born at Vilna in 1912. On joining the Israel Foreign Service he was posted to the Israel Legation in Moscow, returning to the Ministry in 1950 on his appointment as head of the Eastern European Division. In May 1952, on the reorganisation of the Ministry, he became Assistant Director-General in charge of the Eastern Europe and Mediterranean areas.

75. Levin, Rabbi Yitzhak Meir

Agudat Israel Deputy (1949).

Born 1894 at Gur (Poland), the son of a Rabbi. After an ultra-religious education he helped to found and later presided over the Polish branch of the

World Agudath Israel. Served as representative of Orthodox Jewry in the Warsaw Community Council and was for many years a member of the Polish Sejm. He frequently visited Palestine and, though opposed to political Zionism, did much to propagate the idea of immigration in orthodox circles.

Settling in Palestine in 1940, Rabbi Levin, as a leading member of the Palestine Agudists, went on several missions to the United States and later became Chairman of the World Executive of the Agudath Israel. He was one of the organisers of the "Rescue Committee" for European Jewry. When in May, 1948, the Agudists ceased posing as "non-political" and agreed to participate in the Government of the new State, Rabbi Levin entered the Provisional Government as Minister of Social Welfare. Later in the year his party combined with the Mizrahi groups to form the United Religious Front and he retained the Social Welfare portfolio after the 1949 and 1951 elections, in both of which he was returned to the Knesset at the head of the Agudat Israel list. He ceased to be a Minister when the Agudist parties left the Government in September 1952.

A small bespectacled man with a large beard, wearing a long black coat and skull cap, Rabbi Levin cuts a very rabbinical figure. He is given to making scenes over questions of religious observance, equality of rights for religious Jews and so on. But like many ultra-orthodox Jews he combines reactionary obscurantism with shrewd business capacity.

76. Limon, Aloof (Commodore) Mordechai

Commander of the Navy (1950).

Born in 1924 at Baranowice. Commodore Limon has been concerned with naval affairs since 1942, when he enlisted in the naval branch of the Palmach. He ran training courses for the Palmach at Caesarea and later served in Norwegian and American merchant ships. In 1945 he was put in charge of an organisation, which proved abortive, for the organisation of Jewish immigration from Egypt. He then entered France with false documents and was active in organising illegal immigration into Palestine. In the Arab War he first served as navigator of an aircraft bringing arms and supplies from Europe and then, returning to the navy, took part in various engagements against the Egyptians. He became Chief of Naval Operations, and in December 1950 was made an acting Aloof and appointed to his present post. He paid an official visit to the United Kingdom in 1951.

Limon has a quiet reserved manner and speaks good English. He appears to be respected by members of his Service but is not an outstanding personality.

77. Livneh (Liebenstein), Eliezer

Mapai Deputy (1949).

Born 1902 at Lodz (Poland). Educated at a secondary school in Germany and privately in Germany and England. Came to Palestine in 1920 and became a member of kibbutz Ein Harod. Visited Germany from 1929 to 1931 and on return to Palestine joined Mapai. In 1935-36 he was in the United Kingdom on behalf of the Kibbutz Meuhad movement. He became in due course a member of the Histadrut executive and one of Mapai's leading publicists. He served on the editorial staff of *Davar* and the Jewish Agency "Maarachoth" and from 1948-49 was editor of the Mapai daily newspaper *Hador*. He also edited the Haganah underground news sheet from 1941-47. He became very anti-Soviet and now edits his own weekly paper *Beterem*. In 1950 he declined an offer of the post of Director of the Voice of America Hebrew broadcasts. He is a member of the Zionist Executive and the Mapai Secretariat and a founder of the Israel-America Friendship League.

Mr. Livneh, a strong supporter of Mr. Ben-Gurion and one of Mapai's more intelligent backbenchers, belongs to the extreme Right wing of the party, and is not afraid of taking an independent line on occasions. He has always been a bitter opponent of Hashomer Hatzair.

78. Locker, Berl

Chairman, Jewish Agency Executive (1948).

Born in 1888 in Russia. Studied economics and political science at Czernowitz University. Came to Palestine before the First World War and helped to found the labour movement. Originally member of the Poalei Zion party (World Secretary 1918-28 and United States Secretary 1928-31) he later joined Mapai. Member of the Jewish Agency Executive since 1931 and its representative in London from 1937 onwards, he succeeded Mr. Ben-Gurion as its chairman in 1948. He was re-elected chairman in 1951 and is also joint president of the Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod).

Mr. Locker has spent a large part of his life abroad. He took an active part in the World Federation of Trade Unions as representative of the Histadrut. He speaks fluent English, and is friendly but not very impressive.

79. Lourie, Arthur

Assistant Director-General-designate and head of the British Commonwealth Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1953).

Born in South Africa in 1903. Educated at Cape Town, Cambridge and Harvard (M.A. LL.B.). Was in private law practice in South Africa and lecturer in Roman Dutch Law at the Witwatersrand University 1927-32. Political secretary to the Jewish Agency in London 1933. After the Second World War he became director of the United Nations office of the Jewish Agency in New York and in 1946 he was liaison officer with the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry in Palestine. In 1948 he became Israel Consul-General in New York and Deputy Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations. In 1950 he was given the personal rank of Minister. He is married and has two children. Quiet and unobtrusive he appears to be friendly, intelligent and helpful.

80. Makleff, Rav Aloof (General) Mordechai

Rav Aloof (General) Chief of Staff (1949).

Born in 1920 at Motza, Palestine, of a family most of whose members were murdered by Arabs in 1929. Graduate of the Technical College, Haifa. On leaving it, joined Wingate's "night squads" and served in the Haganah. Joined the British Army in 1941 and served till 1945, first with the Buffs in the Middle East and then in the Jewish Brigade in Europe, rising to the rank of major. Was an officer of the Israel unit which took Haifa from the Arabs in April, 1948, and subsequently fought as junior and senior officer (Divisional Chief of Staff) throughout the 1948 campaign in Galilee. Headed the military delegation at the armistice negotiations with Lebanon and with Syria, 1949, and then became Director of Staff Duties and in November 1949 Deputy Chief of Staff. Attended a course at the Administrative Staff College, Henley, in 1952, and subsequently visited the United States. In December 1952, he was appointed Chief of Staff (i.e. Commander-in-Chief of all three services) in succession to General Yadin and promoted to "Rav Aloof."

He has a high reputation in Israel as a fighter and is certainly quick, shrewd and intelligent. But he is not a commanding personality and lacks presence. Moreover his general military knowledge and experience are inevitably extremely limited. He is not of the same calibre as his predecessor. It is

generally believed that he owes his appointment to his willingness to adapt himself to the ideas of Mr. Ben-Gurion.

He speaks English and Arabic. Married.

81. Mazar (Maisler), Dr. Benjamin

President and Rector of the Hebrew University (1953).

Born Grodno, Poland, in 1906. Educated at schools in Russia and Germany and at the Universities of Berlin and Giessen (Ph.D., 1938). Came to Palestine in 1929 and worked as an archaeologist, carrying out a number of excavations. Connected with the Hebrew University since 1943, he was chairman of its Institute of Jewish Studies and lecturer on the historical geography of Palestine. In 1951 he was elected to a professorship at the University, and in June 1952 he became Rector. In March 1953 he was also elected president of the University.

82. Meron (Muenzner), Dr. Gershon Yaakov

Economist and General Manager of the Israel Fuel Corporation (1951).

Born 1904 at Mannheim, Germany. Studied at the University of Heidelberg where he took the degrees of doctor of laws and doctor of economic science. Lecturer in commercial law, 1928. Served in various Government capacities, 1929-32. Left Germany in 1932 for Palestine where he was first employed with Barclays Bank. Manager of the Jacob Japhet Bank, Tel Aviv, 1934-35. Financial and economic adviser to Solel Boneh, 1945-48. Director of the Economic Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1948-51. During 1950 was also for some months Director-General of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Became General Manager of the Israel Fuel Corporation, September 1951.

Has written several books on sociological, economic and legal subjects and on Germany. Published, 1944, "Jewish Labour Economy in Palestine" in co-operation with Ernest Kahn, and, 1947, "Labour Enterprise in Palestine." Extremely intelligent, Dr. Meron is a friendly and likeable person, strongly pro-British and keen to strengthen Anglo-Israel relations. In spite of a somewhat sorrowful demeanour, he has a strong sense of quiet humour.

83. Mikunis, Shmuel

Communist Deputy (1949).

Born in 1904 in Poland. Came to Palestine in 1921. Employed by the Shell Company as an engineer in Tel Aviv and was at one time an actor at the "Ohel" Theatre, of which he was one of the founders. Worked with the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement. Imprisoned in 1941 for illegal Communist activities. Published *Kol Ha'am* in Tel Aviv, 1944, and was at one time Secretary-General of the League for Friendly Relations with the U.S.S.R. Studied tactics and propaganda methods of Communist organisations in France and after the World War was in touch with French resistance and Jewish Communist circles. Communist member of the Elected Assembly, 1944. Elected leader of the Palestine Communist Party in 1945. As such, he represented the Party at the British Empire Communist Parties Conference in London, 1947, became Member of the Provisional Council of State, 1948. In 1948 he arranged a merger with local Arab Communist elements and was elected Deputy, 1949, at the head of the combined "Israel Communist Party" list. In the summer of 1949 he made a tour of East European capitals. In February 1951 he was summoned for organising illegal demonstrations against General Robertson. He visited Moscow in 1952.

Mr. Mikunis is reported to have been taken severely to task by the Cominform on various issues and may not now wield real power within the Communist party. But he is still ostensibly its leader in the Knesset, where he appears as a consistent supporter of Russian policy and virulent critic of the Government. He speaks fluent Russian and Yiddish.

84. Myerson (née Mabovitz), Mrs. Golda

Minister of Labour (1949).

Born in 1898 at Kiev. 1906, emigrated with her father, a carpenter, to Milwaukee, United States, where she attended high school, graduated at the Teachers' Training College (1920) and joined the Poalei Zion (Socialist-Zionist) Party. Settled in Palestine in 1921, starting as member and agricultural labourer of Merhavia Kibbutz (Hashomer Hatsair), 1921-24. With Solel Boneh, 1924-26. Since 1928, member of the Working Women's Council and its representative in the Histadrut Executive. Associated with Mapai since its foundation (1930). Very active as Histadrut fund-raiser, frequently visiting the United States and the United Kingdom; spent the whole of 1932-33 in America in this capacity. Delegate to Zionist Congresses since 1929 and to the Imperial Labour Conference, London, 1930. Member of the Zionist General Council. Chairman of the Sick Fund (Kupat Holim), 1936-48. Member of the Va'ad Leumi, 1938-48. Director of a number of local economic and cultural institutions. Head of the Histadrut Political Department from 1940 and secretary of the Histadrut Executive, 1945-46. Member of the War Economic Advisory Council set up in 1943. Acting head of the Jewish Agency Political Department during the internment of political leaders in 1946, and head of its Jerusalem branch, 1947.

In May, 1948, Mrs. Myerson became member of the Provisional Council of State but resigned from it on appointment as Israel Minister in Moscow (August 1948 to April 1949). Elected a Mapai Deputy in 1949, she became Minister of Labour and Social Insurance. Mrs. Myerson is a strong and attractive personality and a good speaker, being probably Israel's best fund-raiser in the United States. She made no headway with the Russians and was not happy in Moscow, but with her organising capacity and long experience of labour questions she is well fitted for her present post. Her husband died in May 1951. In 1953 she led the Israel delegation to the second half of the United Nations General Assembly.

85. Nakkara, Hanna

Arab Communist lawyer.

Born at Acre in 1912. Greek Orthodox. Educated at St. George's School, Jerusalem, the Aley School in the Lebanon, the American University at Beirut and Damascus University, where he studied law. Completed his law studies in Palestine in 1936. Supporter of the League for National Liberation which in 1948 merged in the Israel Communist Party. In May 1948 he fled to the Lebanon but returned early in 1949. Was detained in Acre prison for five months but on his release was allowed to reside in the country. He is an active Communist and contributes to *Al-Ittihad*, the Haifa Communist newspaper. In 1951 he has been successful in a series of High Court actions on behalf of Arabs denied permanent residential status.

86. Namir (Nemirovsky) Mordechai

General Secretary of the Histadrut (1950) and Mapai Deputy (1951).

Born Bratolubovka, Ukraine in 1897. Educated in Russia. Came to Palestine in 1924. Worked as

an unskilled labourer and then as circulation manager of the Labour newspaper *Davar*. He then worked for some time as secretary of the Tel-Aviv branch of Achdut Avoda (the Jewish Labour Party) and on his own account as a statistician. In 1929 he was made director of the Statistical Department of the Histadrut. In 1933 he became also a municipal councillor in Tel-Aviv. In 1940 he was detained by the Palestine Government on charges of agitating against the 1939 White Paper and the Land Transfer Regulations. In 1943 he became Secretary-General of Mapai and from 1944-48 he was head of the Trade Union Department of the Histadrut and a member of the Histadrut Secretariat. He was also a delegate to Zionist congresses.

In May 1948 he was sent as a special envoy to Roumania, and later as counsellor to Moscow, where in 1949 he became minister. Returned to Israel in December 1950 to become General Secretary of the Histadrut. Elected to Second Knesset on Mapai list in 1951.

Mr. Namir is a widower and a quiet and unpretentious man of great charm. He speaks some English. As the head of the Histadrut and a member of the Mapai Executive Committee he is a powerful and influential figure.

87. Naphtali, Dr. Peretz (Fritz)

Minister of Agriculture (1952).

Born at Berlin in 1888. Educated at Berlin University. Worked as a journalist from 1912 and was economic editor of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* 1921-26. Manager of the Economic Research Bureau of the German Labour Movement 1926-33. Was one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party in Germany and of the Social Democrat Trade Unions. Represented German trade unions in the Reichs-Wirtschaftsrat. Joined the Poalei Zion. Came to Palestine in 1933 and became a lecturer at Haifa Institute of Technology and Tel Aviv. Became managing director of the Workers' Bank (1938-45) and a member of the Tel Aviv municipality (1939) and later economic adviser to the Prime Minister. Elected to the Knesset in 1949 on the Mapai list, he was prominent as chairman of economic committees. Re-elected in 1951, he became Minister without portfolio in the reconstituted coalition, with charge of economic co-ordination. This function led in 1952 to chairmanship of the Economic Advisory Council, and in June 1952, on the reorganisation of the Government, he became Minister of Agriculture. He is a member of the Histadrut Executive.

Dr. Naphtali is one of Israel's leading Socialist economists.

88. Nurock, Mordecai (Max)

Minister to Australia (1953).

Born in Dublin in 1893 and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. Served in the British Army from 1915-19 and came to Palestine in 1919 as secretary to the Zionist Commission. In 1920 he joined the Colonial Administrative Service and served in it in Palestine from 1920-36, beginning as Assistant Private Secretary to the High Commissioner and later becoming Acting Chief Secretary in the Palestine Administration and Secretary to the Customs Tariff Board. From 1936-45 he served in Uganda in several capacities, including those of Deputy Governor of Uganda and Uganda member of the East African Defence Council. From 1945-47 he served as Financial Adviser in the local government and internal communications division of the Control Commission for Germany, and subsequently as Deputy Director of the Division. From 1947-49 he was Civil Establishment Officer in the Allied Commission for Austria. In 1949 he came to Israel as adviser to the Government on Personnel Affairs

(1949-51) and Financial Secretary to the Hebrew University (1951-52). Mr. Nurock is married and has two married daughters. Pleasant and amiable he is reported to be efficient and extremely hard working.

89. Nurok, Rabbi Mordecai

Mizrahi Deputy (1949).

Born in Latvia in 1884 and educated at religious schools and the University of St. Petersburg. Was a delegate to the Sixth Zionist Congress and to all Zionist Congresses from the Twelfth to the Twenty-Second. He was a member of the Latvian Parliament and was at one time Minister for Jewish Affairs in the Latvian Government. A war-time refugee, his entire family were wiped out by the Nazis in Riga. He was later active in organising illegal immigration from the U.S.S.R. to Palestine by way of Latvia and Danzig. He came to Palestine from Siberia in 1945.

In Israel Rabbi Nurok became a member of the Conservative Religious Mizrahi Party and was elected to the Knesset in 1949. He took a prominent part in inter-parliamentary union affairs and led a Knesset delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference at Dublin in 1950 and to another in Turkey in 1951. He was re-elected to the Second Knesset in 1951 and in November 1952 was appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the Coalition Government. He voted against the Government, however, over reparations from Germany. In November 1952 he was put forward as a possible candidate for President. A month later he relinquished the Ministry of Posts on the formation of the new Coalition Government and refused the post of Deputy Minister for Social Welfare.

Rabbi Nurok is a dignified and respected figure and is not afraid of taking an independent line. He is friendly but ponderous and speaks German and Russian but no English.

90. Palmon, Yehoshua

Adviser on Arab affairs in the Prime Minister's office (1949).

Born at Tel Aviv in 1914 and speaking fluent Arabic, Mr Palmon was employed until 1940 at the Palestine Potash Company's works at the northern end of the Dead Sea. From 1940-48 he was in the Middle East section of the Jewish Agency and from 1948-49 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking up his present post in 1949. He is the senior civilian official dealing with all aspects of the Arab minority in Israel. In December 1950 he was appointed a member of the Special Committee dealing with the application of the Absentees Property Law.

Touchy and difficult; does not speak English.

91. Pearlman, Moshe

Director of the Government Information Services (1951).

Born in London, 1911. Educated at the London School of Economics. Was a journalist in London, New York and Palestine from 1934 to 1938. In 1938 he became Public Relations Officer of the Jewish Agency in London. He served in the British army from 1940 to 1946 and was demobilised as a major. In 1948 he was appointed director of the Foreign Press Division of the Public Information Office and in 1951 was made head of the Government Press Service, at the same time holding active rank as an officer in the Israel army. Later he was made head of all Government information services, including broadcasting, films, the press information office and the publicity department.

Disconcertingly like Groucho Marx in appearance, Mr. Pearlman has established a reputation for minor eccentricities. His actions do not always fulfil the promise of his affable address, and it may be doubted

whether he has wholly shed the anti-British sentiments voiced in his book on the Israel army. In the past year or two he has been under attack by sections of the Press, who allege incompetence, and by sections of Mapai, who would prefer to see his post filled by a person—preferably a Mapai member—whose career had longer and deeper associations with the growth of Israel.

92. Raday (Berman), Chaim

Socialist Administrator.
Born in 1908 at Bender (Bessarabia). Attended the Hebrew Gymnasium at Kishinev, came to Palestine in 1924, and worked as agricultural and building labourer till 1928, also finishing his education at Reali School, Haifa. In 1929 he went to Montreal to study agriculture, becoming headmaster of a Jewish agricultural school, and a founder of the Gordonia pioneering organisation which was later associated with Mapai. In 1931 he studied agriculture in France, and on his return worked as an agricultural engineer. He helped to found Naharya and became manager of its co-operative and Mukhtar. 1938, secretary of the Railway Workers' Organisation. From 1939, served the Histadrut Executive as liaison officer with the British Army and during the World War became secretary of its Political Department. After the war he represented the Histadrut at the International Labour Organisation and opened in Paris a Histadrut office for liaison with foreign labour movements. Returned 1947 and joined the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, of which he later became secretary. He collaborated in preparing the framework of the Foreign Ministry, of which he became Secretary-General (i.e., Establishment Officer) on its establishment in 1948.

He resigned early in 1952 and subsequently took charge of a new investment trust in the Agricultural Bank.

Mr. Raday is pleasant and quite friendly (though said to have been anti-British in the past) and is reputed to be efficient.

93. Raphael (Werfel), Itzhak

Member of the Jewish Agency Executive (1948) and Hapoel Hamizrachi Deputy (1951).

Born in 1914 at Sasow, Galicia. Educated at religious schools in Poland, the University of Lvov and the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. He was secretary of a religious workers' movement in Galicia and on coming to Palestine in 1935 became a member of the Va'ad Leumi and a leading member of the religious workers' party Hapoel Hamizrachi. He soon became a prominent figure in the World Zionist Organisation, becoming a director of the Jewish National Fund and from 1941-47 director of the Trade Department of the Jewish Agency and in 1948 a member of the Jewish Agency Executive. In the Palestine War he was a member of the Jerusalem Committee who ran Jerusalem throughout the siege. From 1949 onwards he was head of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department and as such was primarily responsible for the organisation of the flow of Jewish immigrants to Israel. In 1951 he was elected to the Knesset on the Hapoel Hamizrachi's list and in the same year he became Hapoel Hamizrachi's representative on the Zionist Executive.

Mr. Raphael is married to the daughter of Rabbi Maimon (formerly Fishman).

94. Riftin, Yaakov

Mapam Deputy (1949).
Born in Poland in 1901. High school education. Joined Hashomer Hatzair in Poland and came to Palestine in 1929. Worked as a farmer in several kibbutzim, was a delegate to several Zionist congresses and undertook numerous missions on behalf

of the labour movement. Attended the 1947 United Nations General Assembly as a member of the Jewish Agency delegation. Elected a Mapam Deputy in 1949, he emerged as one of the leaders of the extreme Left-wing pro-Soviet wing of the party. He is a member of the Zionist Executive, the Mapam Central Committee, the Israel-U.S.S.R. Friendship League, the Kibbutz Artsi Executive and the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset. When the pro-Soviet Sneh group broke away from Mapam in January 1953, it was generally assumed that he would join them, but his ties with his kibbutz were too strong and he did not do so, being subsequently denounced by the group as a Titoist. He was, however, deprived by Mapam of his office as Political Secretary, though he remained a member of the party's central committee. Member of kibbutz Ein Shemer.

Mr. Riftin is a living example of the contradiction in Mapam between Stalinist ideals and devotion to Zionist and kibbutz life.

95. Rokach, Israel, C.B.E.

Minister of Interior (1952) and General Zionist Deputy (1949).

Born in 1896 at Jaffa. Educated at Technical Institutes of Lausanne and Zürich. Worked as electrical engineer in the United Kingdom and Palestine. Municipal Councillor, Tel Aviv, since 1922; Vice-Mayor, 1927; Mayor from 1936 to 1953. Former member of the War Economic Advisory Council (1943) and of the Citrus Control Board. A director of various cultural, political and economic enterprises. Elected General Zionist Deputy, 1949, and re-elected to Second Knesset, 1951.

When the General Zionists entered Mr. Ben-Gurion's Coalition Government in December 1952, he became Minister of Interior, subsequently resigning (with every sign of reluctance) as Mayor of Tel Aviv.

Mr. Rokach is a powerful personality and shares the leadership of the General Zionist Party with Mr. Bernstein. He is a tough and none too scrupulous politician and, though energetic, seems lacking in commonsense. He and Mr. Ben-Gurion have hated each other for years. He is well-disposed towards the United Kingdom and is agreeable but rather self-important. Married.

96. Rokach, Isaac

Chairman of the Pardess Syndicate (Citrus Growers) and leading member of the Citrus Marketing Board and head of the Consolidated Maritime Agency, who are agents in Israel for the British Conference Lines.

Born near Tel Aviv in 1894. Educated in Palestine and at a school of commerce in Lausanne. Has since been in business and in farming. He served in the Turkish Army in the war of 1914-18.

Mr. Rokach is brother of Israel Rokach, the Minister of the Interior, and appears to be an influential figure.

97. Rosen (Rosenblueth), Pinhas-Felix

Leader of Progressive Party (1948) and Minister of Justice (1952).

Born in 1887 in Berlin. Studied law at Universities of Freiburg and Berlin. Leader of Zionist youth organisations in Germany. Served six years in the German Army, including the First World War. President of the Zionist Federation of Germany, 1920-23. Spent 1923-25 in Palestine. Returned to Germany 1925. In London, 1926-31, as member of the World Zionist Executive in charge of its Organisation Department. Settled in Palestine 1931; in private legal practice there, 1932-48. Municipal Councillor, Tel Aviv, since 1935. One of the founders (1941) of the Aliya Hadasha Party (new

immigrants, mostly from Germany and Central Europe) and its President. Member of the Elected Assembly, 1944. 1948, member of the Provisional Council of State and Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government. In September, 1948, the bulk of his party merged with a section of the General Zionists to form the Progressive Party, under his leadership. Elected Deputy, 1949, and resumed the portfolio of Justice. In the Government crisis of October 1950 he tried unsuccessfully to form a Cabinet. After the 1951 elections he left the Government when his party refused to rejoin the coalition without the General Zionists. In 1952 he was again offered the Ministry of Justice on a "personal" basis, but refused it. On the formation of a new Coalition Government in December 1952, however, in which the General Zionists and Progressives were included with Mapai, he accepted the Ministry of Justice.

Mr. Rosen is a sound lawyer, specialising in company law, but he suffers from a certain germanic pedantry and heaviness. In political outlook he is a moderate liberal, and is well-disposed to the United Kingdom. He is generally respected.

98. Rosette, Maurice

Clerk of the Knesset.

Born in London in 1903. Educated at London University, and the University of Wales. He became chief cost clerk of the Stepney Municipality and was active in Jewish and trade union affairs. He stood unsuccessfully for Parliament. In due course he became head of the Information Department and parliamentary agent of the Jewish Agency in London, a member of the board of deputies of British Jews, chairman of the Political Committee of Poale Zion in England and secretary of the Jewish National Board for Great Britain. He settled in Israel in 1949 and became clerk of the Knesset. In 1950 he accompanied the Israel Parliamentary Delegation to the United Kingdom.

Mr. Rosette's knowledge of British political life and methods is various and extensive. He is pleasant and intelligent and well informed on parliamentary and constitutional matters. Mr. Mikardo, M.P., is married to his sister.

99. Sahar (Sacharov), Yehezkel

Inspector-General of Police (1948).

Born in 1907 at Jerusalem. Studied at the High School of Commerce, Tel Aviv. Worked for several years in the Anglo-Palestine Bank. In 1933 studied at the London School of Economics and while there was private secretary to Dr. Weizmann, 1940, on a Zionist mission to the United States. 1941, enlisted and served with the Eighth Army in the Western Desert as commander of a Palestine R.A.S.C. Company. Discharged as major after serving in Austria. He subsequently acted as liaison officer between the A veteran of the Haganah, he became Inspector-General of Police and Director-General of the Ministry of Police at the foundation of the State. Jewish Agency and British Headquarters in Palestine. In January, 1950, his rank was made equivalent to that of Chief of Staff (rav-alooft).

Mr. Sahar, though critical of British handling of security in the mandatory period, is friendly and intelligent and seems desirous of maintaining British traditions in the Israel Police Force. In 1949 he spent several weeks in the United Kingdom, France and the United States studying police organisations and methods. On his return his enthusiasm for Scotland Yard was almost unbounded.

100. Saphir, Yosef

Minister of Communications (1952).

Born in Jaffa in 1902, educated in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and became a farmer and citrus grower,

joining the Executive of the Farmers' Federation in 1938. In 1939 he became the managing director of the Pardess Syndicate, one of the largest citrus growing co-operatives. A year later he became Mayor of Petah Tiqva, a post he held until 1951, becoming chairman of the Home Affairs Committee. When in 1952 the General Zionists entered the Government he was appointed Minister of Health but on his return from abroad he insisted on being given the Ministry of Communications and exchanged portfolios with Mr. Serlin. He is a man of considerable determination and organising ability and seems well-disposed to the United Kingdom. He is married and has two daughters.

101. Sasson, Eliahu

Minister to Italy (1952).

Born before 1898 at Aleppo. Brought up in Syria and studied in Turkey. At one time he was a teacher in the French-Jewish School of the Alliance Israélite at Damascus. Active at first in the Syrian nationalist movement, he later devoted himself entirely to Zionism and became (about 1936) head of the Arab Section of the Jewish Agency's Political Department in Jerusalem. Head of the Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948. Took a leading part in the armistice negotiations at Rhodes and headed the Israel delegation to the Conciliation Commission in Lausanne (1949) with the rank of Minister. At the end of 1949 he was appointed first Israel Minister to Turkey. In 1952 he was transferred to Rome.

Mr. Sasson speaks perfect Arabic. While working for the Jewish Agency he established the reputation of being not only a connoisseur of Middle East affairs but also *persona grata* with many leading Arab politicians. He is one of the few Sephardic Jews in the Israeli Foreign Service.

102. Schocken, Gustav Gershon

Newspaper editor.

Born in 1912 at Zwickau (Saxony) where his father owned a chain store network. Educated at Universities of Heidelberg and London (Social Science). In Palestine since 1933. His family founded Schocken Verlag in Berlin (1931-39) and he is director of its Palestine branch (Schocken Publishing House, Ltd.). In 1937 he and his father took over publication of the principal Hebrew paper of the country, the independent *Ha'aretz*, which he has since edited.

Mr. Schocken speaks fluent English. He has a cosmopolitan outlook in contrast to the somewhat limited horizon of many of his journalist colleagues. Visited United Kingdom officially in 1950.

103. Senator, Dr. David Werner, O.B.E., Ph.D.

Executive vice-president of the Hebrew University (1935).

Born at Berlin in 1896. Educated at the Universities of Berlin, Munich and Freiburg. Was general secretary of the Federation of Jewish Organisations in Germany from 1920-21 and ran the European offices of the Joint Distribution Committee from 1925-30. He was a member of the Jewish Agency Executive from 1930-45. He became administrator and executive vice-president of the Hebrew University in 1935 and was re-elected vice-president in 1953, when he ceased to be administrator.

Dr. Senator is a Germanic and dictatorial individual. He resisted and largely defeated Professor Brodetsky's efforts to introduce British methods into the University. He strongly advocates the recovery of Mount Scopus.

104. Serlin, Yosef

Minister of Health (1952).

Born in Bialystok in 1906 and educated at Lwow and Warsaw University. He became a lawyer and in 1930, private secretary to the prominent Zionist, Nahum Sokolov. He came to Palestine in 1933 as an active Zionist, establishing himself in the practice of law and commercial enterprise and becoming chairman of the political committee of the Karen Hayesod, deputy chairman of the World Union of General Zionists and a member of the Council of the World Zionist Organisation. In 1949 he was elected to the Knesset on the General Zionist list and in 1950 he visited England with the Israel Parliamentary delegation. He was re-elected to the second Knesset in 1951 and became one of the deputy speakers. When the General Zionists entered the Government in 1952 he was appointed Minister of Communications but immediately afterwards had to relinquish this post to Mr. Saphir and take on the Ministry of Health. He does not appear to be a very forceful personality and has not as yet made any great mark. He is married and has two sons.

105. Shaltiel, Aloof (Brigadier) David

Minister at Rio de Janeiro (1951).

Born in 1903 in Germany. Served as an officer in the French Foreign Legion during the Riff War. Came to Palestine in 1924 and joined the Haganah. Went to Europe to obtain arms for it, was imprisoned by the Nazis and tortured by the Gestapo. Returned to Palestine in 1941 as an exchange prisoner, and received the underground Haganah appointment of Area Commander in Haifa and then (till February, 1948) Chief of Intelligence. Commanded the Israel Brigade in Jerusalem throughout the siege of 1948 but was later removed, reportedly for failure to capture the whole city. In October, 1948, he was in charge of the investigation of the activities of dissident military groups. He then visited Czechoslovakia and several South American States, and on return was appointed Inspector General of the Army. He relinquished the post on becoming Commander of the Frontier Force in November, 1949, but was found too independent and unorthodox for the latter and removed in April, 1950, on being appointed Military Attaché for France and Benelux countries, with residence at Paris. Appointed Minister to Brazil in 1951. Since November 1952, he has also acted as Minister to Venezuela. Friendly and entertaining with a charming wife.

106. Shapira, Moshe

Minister of Social Welfare and Religious Affairs (1952).

Born in 1899 at Grodno (Poland). Son of a rabbi, he was educated at the Rabbinical Seminary, Grodno, worked for a time in the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, Lithuania, and in 1924-25 studied in the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary. An active Zionist from early youth and a founder of the Religious Workers Party (Hapoel Hamizrachi). Represented it at World Zionist Congresses since 1923 and became its outstanding leader and chairman in Palestine, where he settled in 1925. Member of the Zionist General Council since 1927. Elected alternate member of the Jewish Agency Executive in 1935 and since then associated with its Immigration Department. Full member of the Executive, 1945-48. Represented Hapoel Hamizrachi in the Provisional Council of State, 1948, and was Minister of Immigration and Health in the Provisional Government. Negotiated a merger (the Religious bloc) with the Mizrachi and Agudist parties for the elections of 1949 and was returned as Deputy. In the new Government he continued as Minister of Immigration and of Health and also became Minister of the Interior. Relations between him and his Mapai colleagues broke down early in 1951, but after the elections he retained the Ministry

of Interior in the new coalition, relinquishing the Ministries of Health and Immigration but assuming that of Religious Affairs as a new responsibility. On the entry of the General Zionists into the Coalition in December 1952, he relinquished the Ministry of Interior but retained that of Religious Affairs and in addition took on the Social Welfare portfolio.

For over twenty years he has struggled to avoid a split in Hapoel Hamizrachi over the question of whether it should join the Histadrut—a course to which he is opposed. He is said to devote all his spare time to Talmudic study.

107. Sharett (Shertok), Moshe

Minister for Foreign Affairs (1948).

Born in 1894 at Kherson (Ukraine). Emigrated to Palestine with his parents 1906. Educated at Herzliya Gymnasium, Tel Aviv. Studied law at Istanbul University (1913-14). 1915-18, served as Turkish Army officer (interpreter attached to German liaison staff). 1918-20, on the staff of the Zionist Commission, Jerusalem, and active in the Hitachdut (United Labour) movement. Spent 1920-25 in England, taking B.Sc. degree at London School of Economics and entering the English Executive of Paolei Zion, which he represented at British Labour Party conference. 1925-31, on the editorial staff of the Histadrut organ *Davar*, of which he also produced a weekly edition in English. Joined Mapai on its foundation, 1930, and was later elected to its Executive. 1931-33, private secretary to Arlosoroff, Head of the Jewish Agency Political Department; succeeded him as its Head in 1933 and retained the position, with membership of the Executive, till 1948. In this capacity, was the Agency's main channel of contact with the Government of Palestine and went on numerous missions abroad. During the Second World War was head of the Jewish Agency's Recruiting Department and active in promoting the formation of the Jewish Brigade group. Was one of the Jewish leaders interned at Latrun, 1946. Re-appointed head of the Political Department by the Zionist Congress of December, 1946, but with orders to head it from Washington, he was throughout 1947 the Agency's principal delegate to the United Nations Organisation. In 1948 he became member of the Provisional Council of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, and was later obliged to resign from the Jewish Agency Executive. Elected Deputy (No. 2 on the Mapai list) in 1949 and again in 1951, he has continued as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He acted as Prime Minister when Mr. Ben-Gurion and Mr. Kaplan were away in 1951, and visited the United Kingdom in 1952.

Mr. Sharett is an agreeable individual, a remarkable linguist, a voluble talker, and a very quick worker. He is identified with a policy of reasonableness in the handling of foreign affairs in contrast to the more ruthless approach and single-mindedness of Mr. Ben-Gurion; but he is not in the same class as Mr. Ben-Gurion as a national leader. Personally popular, he is quick to help deserving causes and has his finger in many a pie. Speech-making in the provinces is one of his pastimes. He is frequently abroad.

108. Sharif (Scharf), Zeev

Secretary of the Government (1948).

Born at Seletin in 1906. Began his career in the Jewish Agency and in 1947 was secretary of its Political Department. From November 1947, he was secretary of an Emergency Committee of thirteen political leaders which made technical preparations for the establishment of an independent administration. When in March 1948, this gave place to the bodies which later emerged as the Provisional Council of State and Provisional Government of Israel, he continued to act as their principal secretary, and

under a further reorganisation he became head of the Prime Minister's office, with the title of "Secretary of the Cabinet and Director-General." In April 1951 he was superseded as head of the Prime Minister's office, but he remained Secretary of the Government and became Civil Service Commissioner.

109. Shenkar, Arie Leib

President, Manufacturers' Association (1925).

Born in 1877 in Kiev Province, Ukraine. Was a textile manufacturer in Moscow for many years. In 1908 he came to Palestine and purchased land for members of a group of which he was treasurer and vice-president. Returning again in 1924 he founded the Lodzia Textile Company, of which he is owner and Managing Director, and the Industrial Bank of Palestine, of which he is Chairman. President of the Manufacturers' Association since its foundation in 1925. Chairman of the Industrial Credit Council of the Palestine Corporation (London) and a Director of the Tel Aviv Development Company.

Mr. Shenkar is a highly respectable old man. He is not happy in the modern world of controlled economy and has made vigorous public attacks on the policy of the Government. He does not speak English.

110. Shiloah (Zaslani), Reuven

Minister, Israel Embassy in Washington, 1953.

Born in 1909 at Jerusalem. One of a family of five. His father is a Jerusalem Rabbi. Educated at the Hebrew University and the Teachers' Seminary, Jerusalem. Specialised in Arabic studies and has travelled extensively in the Middle East. Early connected with the Haganah; organiser of its Arab intelligence service. Taught Arabic in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and from 1935 to 1937 was a teacher at the Alliance School at Bagdad. Visited Kurdistan in 1932. In 1932 he was editor of the Arab section of the *Palestine Post*. Friend of Arlosoroff, who interested him in the Socialist youth movement. As assistant political secretary, Histadrut Executive, in charge of Arab affairs (1932-36), he helped to found the Arab Association of Palestine Workers. During the riots of 1936 he was lent by the Histadrut to the Jewish Agency's Political Department and remained in it till 1948. He became head of the Intelligence Section of the Haganah and was for many years liaison officer between the Political Department and British military authorities, including General Wingate. Member of the Jewish Delegation at the Round Table Conference in London (1939). During the World War, as Jewish liaison officer, he assisted the Allies in planning operations behind the enemy lines in neighbouring Arab States and Europe. Went to San Francisco in 1945 as a Jewish Agency delegate to the United Nations Conference and remained in America and Europe for over a year, including a special Haganah mission in the United States and service in the Jewish Agency office in London (1946), and as Mr. Ben-Gurion's secretary while in Paris. On the establishment of the State of Israel he became "Special Adviser" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, holding the third place in its hierarchy. Took a leading part in discussions with the Conciliation Commission at Lausanne (1949) and in secret negotiations with Jordan (1949-51). Was a member of the Israel delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1950.

Mr. Shiloah is a serious and sinister-looking individual with a scar across his rather Asiatic features, acquired in the bombing of the Jewish Agency. He improves on closer acquaintance. Since 1939 he has been very close to Mr. Ben-Gurion and is now a power behind the throne in so far as relations with Israel's neighbours are concerned. He is

able but probably unscrupulous where his country's interests are concerned. He was responsible for Israel's intelligence services from 1948-52. His wife is American.

He was appointed Minister to the Israel Embassy in Washington in August 1953.

111. Shinnar (Schneeberg), Pinhas E. (Felix)

Head of Israel Purchasing Mission at Cologne (1953).

Born in Stuttgart in 1905 and educated at high school there and at the Universities of Heidelberg, Tuebingen and Frankfurt. Was manager of a trust company in Germany and official receiver at a Magistrates' Court in Berlin before coming to Palestine in 1934. Since coming to Israel he has held many important posts in the economic and commercial world. He has been a director of investment companies and of the leading Hebrew newspaper *Ha'aretz* and Controller of Fuel at the Ministry of Finance, and he was for some time Director of the Department for "Imports without Payment." He was also for some time Economic Counsellor at the Israel Legation in London. On his return to Israel in 1951 he became Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on German Affairs and a director of the Israel Petroleum Distribution Company. He was put in charge of the negotiations for a Reparations Agreement with Germany in 1952 and carried the negotiations through to a successful conclusion. In April 1953, he was appointed head of the Israel Purchasing Commission in Germany with the personal rank of Minister, and was put in charge of all purchases made under the Reparations Agreement. Before accepting this post he insisted on being given wide powers and considerable discretion.

112. Shitreet, Behor Shalom

Minister of Police (1948).

Born in 1895 at Tiberias of an old-established Arabic-speaking family. Educated at the "Alliance Israelite" School and Rabbinical College, Tiberias, and later (1926-30) at the Law Classes, Jerusalem. Though a Sephardi, he joined the Zionist Movement in 1910. Started as a teacher of French, Hebrew and Arabic and later worked in his father's business. In 1919 he joined the Police Force under British military administration and subsequently made a career in the Department of Police and Prisons of the Government of Palestine, specialising in criminal investigation. 1927, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Tel Aviv. Instructor (1928) and head (1931) of the Police School in Jerusalem. Left the Police in 1935 to become Magistrate, sitting in Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa and other courts. Chief Magistrate, Tel Aviv, 1945; Senior Magistrate, 1947. From 1942 onwards he helped to organise the Sephardim in defence of their rights in the Jewish community and later became chairman of the Sephardic Committee formed for this purpose. As such he entered the Provisional Council of State, 1948, and became Minister of Police and of Minorities in the Provisional Government. Later in the year he pledged his support for a "Popular Party," but as it did not materialise, he headed in 1949 the list of the "Union of Sephardic and Levantine Communities" of which he and three others were elected deputies in the Knesset. In the new Government he carried on with the same two portfolios, but that of Minorities was abolished in June 1949. In 1951, following the disintegration of the Sephardim movement, he was included in the Mapai list for the elections. He led the Israel delegation to the international conference of Sephardic Jews in Paris in 1951 and is a vice-president of the World Federation of Sephardic Communities.

Mr. Shitreet is a leisurely and expansive oriental who is as much at home with Arabs as with Jews. Though he has little education and no European

experience, he was a competent magistrate, courageous, hard-working and with a reputation for honesty. He appears to be keen on maintaining British traditions in the Israel Police Force.

113. Simon, Dr. Michael

Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Born on September 19, 1901 at Berlin. Studied at the Universities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Tuebingen. Dr. Simon came to Israel in 1924, and in 1925 and 1926 was a teacher at the Hebrew Secondary School at Haifa. In 1926 and 1927 he served as secretary of the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem and in the following year he was appointed as editor of the Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine in which position he served until 1934. He then took up an appointment as general secretary of the Migdal Insurance Company. From 1945 to 1948 Dr. Simon was director of the Jewish Agency Department for Resettlement of Ex-Servicemen. He was a veteran member of the Haganah and participated in actions in 1929 and 1936-40, also in the defence of Jerusalem in 1947-48. Dr. Simon has written numerous articles on history, education and physical training and is the author of a book on "Physical Culture and National Education."

Dr. Simon is a hardworking, somewhat fussy, but on the whole capable bureaucrat, with a wide knowledge and considerable experience. In his job as the first Chief of Protocol he has been ready to recognise his inexperience, and to ask advice from members of the diplomatic corps. He is an enthusiastic sailor and is a reserve officer in the Israel Navy with a proper admiration for the Royal Navy. He is not without a sense of humour of the German type, and is generally pro-British.

He has an intelligent, friendly and voluble wife.

114. Smoira, Moshe

President, Supreme Court (1948).

Born in 1888 at Königsberg. Studied at Universities of Königsberg, Munich, Berlin (law), Giessen, Heidelberg, Frankfurt (Semitics). Served in the German army, 1912-18. Legal practice in Berlin and, since 1923, in Palestine. Lecturer at the Law Classes, Jerusalem, from 1923. Member of the Council of Legal Studies from 1925. Was legal adviser to the Histadrut. President of the Supreme Court in Jerusalem since its inauguration in September 1948.

Dr. Smoira is a sound legal expert, but learned rather than profound. Under his chairmanship the Supreme Court has proved an impartial body independent of political influence. Not well versed in criminal law. Slightly pompous. He is a vice-chairman of the Hebrew University.

115. Sneh (Kleinbaum), Dr. Moshe

Deputy (1949) and leader of "Left Faction" (1953).

Born in 1899 at Radzyn (Poland). Graduated in medicine at Warsaw University (M.D.) but took up journalism and politics, becoming chairman of the Zionist Students' Organisation and later leader of the General Zionist Organisation in Poland. A delegate to Zionist Congresses from 1933, he was elected member of the Zionist Actions Committee in 1935. In 1939 he served as captain in the Polish army, was taken prisoner by the Russians, escaped and reached Palestine via France in 1940. From 1940 to 1946 he served on the staff of the Haganah underground forces, becoming Chief of Staff by 1944, and engaged in organising illegal immigration. He was also active in politics in the "A" Group of General Zionists. In 1945-46 he took a leading part in bringing together the General Zionists "A" and "B" (Left and Right wings) and for a short time presided over the united

party. In 1945 he also entered the Jewish Agency Executive and acted as its ambassador at large in Europe.

During this period Dr. Sneh adopted a pro-Soviet orientation and at the end of 1947, having quarrelled with the General Zionist Party and the Jewish Agency, he resigned from both and took a leading part in founding the leftist United Labour Party (Mapam). Though, unlike other participants, he brought with him no organised body, he became a member of the Mapam Central Committee and of the editorial board of the party's newspaper *Al Hamishmar*. In July 1948 he attended the World Jewish Congress and sided with the East European delegates who tried to give it a pro-Soviet bias. Elected Mapam Deputy in 1949, he has led the extreme Left wing of the party and in 1949-50 was influential in preventing it from joining Mapai in the Government coalition. He became the leading spirit in the Israel branch of the Soviet-sponsored "Peace Movement" and secretary of the League for Friendship with the U.S.S.R. Re-elected to the Second Knesset in 1951. In January 1953, he and his supporters broke away from Mapam and formed the "Left Faction," an extreme pro-Soviet group which collaborates closely with the Communist Party.

Dr. Sneh is a good speaker and a clever man, but is regarded by his political opponents as an insincere schemer who turned pro-Soviet for reasons of personal ambition. He is certainly an active fellow-traveller, and an unprincipled opportunist. He is regarded by the Israel authorities as a dangerous man and almost certainly the chief Cominform representative in Israel, and is a much more redoubtable figure than any of the official Communist leaders in Israel.

116. Sprinzak, Joseph

Speaker of the Knesset (1949).

Born in 1886 in Russia. University studies in Russia and Switzerland. Came to Palestine in 1909, already a Zionist-Socialist, and entered the labour movement becoming a leading member of Mapai. Repeatedly represented the Histadrut, of which he was one of the founders, at Zionist congresses; is chairman of the Zionist General Council Presidium. For many years member of the Histadrut Executive, he was its secretary-general from 1935 to 1949. On the board of directors of the Jewish National Fund, Foundation Fund and various other institutions. Was member of the Elected Assembly and Va'ad Leumi Executive. In August 1948 he entered the Provisional Council of State (replacing Mrs. Myerson) and soon after was elected its chairman. Elected Deputy (5th on the Mapai list) in 1949 and president (Speaker) of the Knesset, he relinquished the General Secretariat of the Histadrut in July. During Dr. Weizmann's absences abroad in 1949 and 1950 he acted as President of Israel and in 1951 became acting President for the duration of Dr. Weizmann's illness. Re-elected to the Second Knesset in 1951 and re-elected Speaker.

Mr. Sprinzak is a good chairman with a strong sense of humour and is generally liked and respected in the Knesset, but in his conduct of parliamentary procedure he frequently shows bias in favour of Mapai and the Government coalition. A small thick-set man with a large drooping moustache, he cuts a slightly comical figure. A prominent sponsor of cultural and educational institutions. Speaks very little English but is outwardly friendly. A close friend of Mr. Ben-Gurion.

117. Tolkovsky, Aloof Mishne (Colonel) Dan.

Commander of the Air Force (1953).

Born in Tel Aviv in 1921. Educated in England (B.Sc.). Joined the R.A.F. in 1942 and served as a

fighter pilot in 238 Squadron in the Mediterranean theatre from 1943-44. Released as a Flight Lieutenant in 1945. Joined the Israel Air Force in 1948 and played a leading part in planning operations in the Palestine War as a Deputy Director of Operations. In 1950 he was appointed Inspector General, but in 1951 he retired. He was recalled shortly afterwards and appointed Deputy Air Officer Commanding, succeeding Aloof Laskov as Air Officer Commanding in May 1953. Aloof Mishne Tolkovsky, who is the son of the Israel Minister to Switzerland, speaks Hebrew, French and perfect English and is the most highly educated and cultivated of the air force commanders, but beneath a polished manner he is intensely nationalistic, shrewd, secretive and aggressive.

118. Toubi, Tewfik

Communist Deputy (1949).

Born in 1922 at Haifa. A fairly able journalist, editor of the Arab Communist Weekly *Al Ittihad*. A founder of the Arab Workers' Congress and one of the leaders of the Arab League for National Liberation, he followed the latter when in 1948 it merged with the (Jewish) Palestine Communist Party to form the united Israel Communist Party. Elected Deputy in 1949 (second on the Communist list) he has been very active in voicing Arab grievances before the Knesset, in the "Peace Movement" and in other forms of agitation. In the summer of 1949 he accompanied Mikunis on a tour of East European capitals. In 1950 he attended the Warsaw Peace Conference and was elected a member of its Presidium. He has since attended other Communist Peace Conferences in Berlin and Vienna. Re-elected to the Second Knesset in 1951. He visited Moscow with Mikunis in 1952.

He is a Greek Orthodox Christian and is married to a Jewess. He is also alleged to be a former colleague of Haj Amin el Hussein.

119. Tsur (Tchernowitz), Yaacov

Israel Ambassador-Designate at Paris (1953).

Born at Wilna in 1906 and educated at Jerusalem and at the Universities of Florence and Paris. He came to Palestine in 1921 and in 1926 was employed by the Tel Aviv municipality. He joined the editorial board of *Ha'aretz* in 1929 and later worked in the headquarters of the Jewish National Fund. He was the Jewish Agency's representative in Egypt from 1943-45 and from 1947-48 was chairman of the Mobilisation Committee in Jerusalem. He went to the Argentine as Minister in June 1949, and was described by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires as a thoughtful-minded and friendly colleague with an agreeable wife. He speaks fluent English and Russian.

120. Uziel, Ben-Zion Meir Chai

Chief Rabbi of the Sephardim (1939).

Born in 1880 at Jerusalem. Educated at a Rabbinical College in Jerusalem. Teacher and later Principal of the Tiferet Yerushalayim religious college. Rabbi of the Sephardic Community of Jaffa, 1912-20. Chief Rabbi of Salonika, 1920-23. Chief Rabbi of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, 1923. Elected Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Palestine in 1939. Head of the Mif'al Hatorah organisation for support of Talmudic schools. Member of the Mizrahi executive. Member of the Jewish Agency Council from 1929.

Though he has published a series of books entitled "Uziel's Judgments," "Uziel's Treasures," "Uziel's Chapters," he is not a man of scientific outlook or European experience. Owing to this and to the relative smallness of the Sephardic community, he carries much less weight in Israel than his Ashkenazi colleague, Dr. Herzog. He speaks Arabic, French and some English.

121. Wahrhaftig, Zerach

Hapoel Hamizrachi Deputy (1949).

Born in Warsaw in 1902. Educated at a Yeshiva and at Warsaw University. He was in private legal practice from 1933 to 1939 and lived in the United States before coming to Palestine in 1945. He was vice-president of Hapoel Hamizrachi, chairman of the Central Palestine Office from 1936 to 1939 and deputy director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs in New York from 1942 to 1947. From 1947 to 1948 was director of the Law Department of the Va'ad Leumi in Jerusalem. In 1948 became director of the Research Institute for Jewish Law at the Ministry of Justice. He was a member of the Provisional Government Council from 1947 to 1948, and was elected a Deputy in 1949 and in 1951, when he was appointed Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs a post to which he was reappointed in December 1952. For a few months he was also Chairman of the Knesset Legislation Committee.

He is a member of the Zionist General Council. In the Knesset he has considerable influence. He is an authority on a wide range of subjects, a Liberal, and a conscientious and earnest legislator. On religious matters he is less extreme than most members of the Orthodox parties.

122. Wilenska (Breitstein), Mrs. Esther

Communist Deputy (1951).

Born in Lithuania in 1918. Educated at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Came to Palestine as an immigrant in 1933. Joined the Communist Party and became a member of its Central Committee. Meier Wilner, also a Communist Deputy, was her first husband. She was elected to the Political Committee of the Palestine Communist Party in 1945 and to its Central Committee in 1946. She became head of its propaganda office in Haifa in the same year. She is now secretary-general of the Communist Party and a Communist member of the Histadrut Executive. In July 1951 she was elected to the Knesset on the Communist list. She has been a municipal councillor at Tel Aviv since 1950. Associate editor of the Communist newspaper *Kol Ha'am*.

She is certainly one of the leading Communists in Israel and displays great activity. She is thought to be very able, but entirely humourless. A good rabble-rouser, she is regarded by the Israel authorities as a force to be reckoned with.

123. Wilner, Meier (formerly Dov Kovner)

Communist Deputy (1949).

Born in Poland in 1919. Educated at the Hebrew University. Came to Palestine as an immigrant in 1938. Was a member of the Provisional State Council. Deputy 1949 and 1951. He has made a series of violent speeches in the Knesset and elsewhere and is often on the verge of being suspended. An active member of the Peace Movement and a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee and Politburo.

124. Yaari (Wald), Meir

Mapam Deputy (1949).

Born Reshov (Galicia) in 1897. Educated in Poland, at Vienna University and at the Agricultural Institute in Vienna. Was a pupil of Sigmund Freud. Served in the Austrian army in the First World War. Came to Palestine in 1920. He was one of the founders of Hashomer Hatzair in Vienna and in Palestine became one of the chief leaders of the party and a member of its world executive. He lives in Kibbutz Merhaviah and is a member of the executive of the Kibbutz Artzi. A member of the Zionist General Council and of the Histadrut Executive. In 1949 he was No. 2 on the Mapam list. He afterwards played a leading part in the abortive negotiations with Mapai for the forming of a coalition. In 1951 he was re-elected at the head of the party list

Mr. Yaari is one of the real leaders of Mapam and one of the chief figures in the tightly disciplined Hashomer Hatzair. In the Knesset he has been content to leave Sneh and Rittin to act as the party's spokesmen. At the end of 1952, however, he led the opposition to Sneh in Mapam and eventually forced Sneh and his supporters out of the party in January 1953. He has been active in the peace movement and presided over its first public meeting in Tel Aviv. He is a member of the World Committee of the movement, attended the Warsaw Peace Conference in 1950 and was elected a member of its Presidium. He also attended the World Peace Council in Berlin in 1952.

Unspectacular but effective, he achieves his objectives by slow stages, but with the persistence of a termite.

125. Yadin (Sukenik), Rav-Aloof Yigal

Former Chief of Staff.

Born in 1918 at Jerusalem, son of Professor Sukenik the archaeologist. Studied at the Hebrew University (M.A., archaeology); specialised in history of ancient wars in Palestine and has published various studies. Served in the Haganah from 1933. Was in Wingate's "night squads." A senior Haganah staff officer till 1937, he was District Instructor, Jerusalem, in 1938. After the World War he appears to have been appointed head of a department for planning operations in support of the resistance movement in Palestine, but to have resigned and returned to civilian life in 1946 when the Jewish political leaders were interned. On the outbreak of disturbances following the United Nations Partition Resolution he was called back to active service in December 1947. From then till January 1949, as Chief Operations Officer he successfully directed the campaigns in Galilee, the Jerusalem corridor and the Negev. He then became chief of "G" Branch, took a leading part in the Rhodes armistice negotiations, went on a tour of European countries and in September 1949, was attached to the Prime Minister as personal military adviser. In November 1949, he was promoted to Rav-Aloof (the highest rank) and replaced Dori as Chief of Staff. Presumably in execution of Mr. Ben-Gurion's army policy, his appointment as Chief of Staff was followed by a

weeding out of Mapam officers and various measures of military reorganisation. In December 1952, he resigned as Chief of Staff after differences with Mr. Ben-Gurion and was succeeded by the more amenable Makleff. He departed for England to study archeology.

Rav-Aloof Yadin combines the self-confidence of a locally-born "sabro" with the learning of a Jewish scholar. He has an intimate knowledge of the Palestinian terrain. Utterly humourless, he appears to suffer from an inferiority complex and is an awkward personality, though in private intercourse friendly enough. He is undoubtedly able and it is probable that he will sooner or later return to power in Israel in some capacity. Speaks English and Arabic.

126. Zuubi, Seifeddin Muhammad

Arab Democrat Deputy (1949).

Born in Nazareth in 1913. Was employed for about ten years as a food inspector by the Nazareth Municipality. In 1944 he became a land broker and it became known that he was being paid by the Jewish National Fund, a fact which considerably embarrassed the Zuubi clan in Nazareth and Galilee. In 1947 his family, which had formed itself into a party, publicly disowned him for his active co-operation with the Jews. An attempt was made on his life by Arabs in 1947. In 1949 he was put up as an Arab candidate for the Knesset by Mapai against the wishes of his clan and was elected as one of the two Nazareth Democratic members. In 1951 he was re-elected on the "Israel Arab Democrats" list, who support the Government.

He owns property in Galilee. At the end of 1950 he owed the Jewish National Fund £1.7,000 and he is believed to have fallen further into debt during 1951. He knows little English or Hebrew and appears to be an opportunist with no strong convictions.

Obituary

Weizmann, Dr. Chaim. First President of Israel. Died November 1952.

ER 1902/1

No. 53

ISRAEL: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Sir F. Evans to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st January)

(No. 9. Confidential) Tel Aviv,
Sir, 15th January, 1953.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Israel.

I have, &c.

F. E. EVANS.

Enclosure in No. 53

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Argentina

Dr. Pablo Manguel, Minister (14th September, 1949).

*Born in 1912, Dr. Manguel has a legal background and has written various books on labour problems in the field of trade unionism and co-operative societies. He has Jewish blood and is believed to be secretary-general of the Israelite Organisation of Argentina, which is affiliated to the Peronista Party. He has already paid three visits back to Buenos Aires and claims close friendship with the Argentine President. Here his main concern seems to be his living difficulties though his verbosity in indifferent French enlivens diplomatic corps meetings. Nobody takes him seriously. He has a large family retinue and a not unattractive wife. (Written in 1950.)

Dr. Manguel spends most of the time abroad and is little seen in Israel where he is regarded as a figure of fun.

Belgium

M. Eugène Dubois, Minister (20th April, 1950).

M. Dubois is a career diplomat who has served in the Belgian Foreign Service since 1922. He came to Tel Aviv from Bucharest, having been transferred prematurely because he has a Roumanian wife. She has great charm and good nature; he is rather dull, except when breaking all speed limits. Like most of the Latin representatives here he dislikes Israel and takes little interest in its problems.

Brazil

Sr. José Fabrino de Oliveira Baiao, Minister (28th March, 1952).

Sr. Fabrino is a career member of the Brazilian Foreign Service who has served several times in London, though from 1930 to 1934 he left the Service and engaged in politics, being closely associated with the *Integralist* (Fascist) Party. He also served in Glasgow from 1942 to 1945. He is a friendly individual who is married but unaccompanied by his wife. He is not greatly troubled by the lack of work in representing Brazilian interests in Tel Aviv, and entertains at his hotel on a considerable scale. His passion is dancing, in the most florid South American manner. He speaks good English.

Bulgaria

M. Georgi Kostov Bogdanov, Minister (13th May, 1952).

M. Bogdanov has a murky past in Bulgaria, having been a colonel in the Security Forces and a leading light in the Ministry of the Interior. He holds the Order of the 9th September First Class. He is a heavy man of middle height with a stern and soldierly face relieved by a ready smile and rather twinkling eyes. He appears to be in his early fifties and is married, his wife being an emaciated little person. His manner is agreeable but understandably taciturn.

Chile

A new Minister has not yet been appointed to replace Sr. Errazuriz. He will presumably reside like his predecessor in Ankara.

Czechoslovakia

M. Alois Bartusek, Chargé d'Affaires.

No Minister has been appointed since the departure of Dr. Goldstücker and bad relations between Israel and Czechoslovakia make it improbable that one will now be appointed. M. Bartusek endeavours to make himself agreeable, but is unprepossessing and uneasy. He has got into trouble with the Israelis by circulating bulletins repeating the charges against Israel Ministers and officials and against Zionism made at the Prague trial in 1952. He is a career member of the Czechoslovak Foreign Service and an ardent Communist. He speaks French, German and Russian.

Denmark

Mr. H. P. Hoffmeyer, Minister (7th December, 1950).

Resides in Turkey.

France

M. Pierre Gilbert has been appointed Ambassador but is not expected to arrive until February. He was born in 1907 and entered the French Foreign Service in 1932 as a specialist in oriental languages. He spent most of the pre-war period in China and served with the Free French Forces from June 1940. He was suspended by the Vichy Government in July 1940 and deprived by them of his French nationality in October 1942. He served with the French National Liberation Committee in Algiers and rejoined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1944. In 1947 he became French Minister at Bangkok and subsequently French Ambassador at Lima. He is a Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur and also holds the Croix de Guerre and the Resistance Medal. He is married to a Greek wife. As a result of a shooting accident he has only one lung.

Greece

M. Jean Moschopoulos, Diplomatic Representative (23rd February, 1952).

M. Moschopoulos, who resides in Jerusalem, where he was previously Greek Consul-General, is recognised by the Israel Government as performing most of the

functions of a diplomatic representative although Greece has not yet accorded *de jure* recognition to Israel.

Hungary

M. Istvan Romhanyi, Chargé d'Affaires (19th June, 1950).

M. Romhanyi speaks only Hungarian and does not consort with non-Communist missions. He was previously Consul-General at New York.

Iceland

M. Helgi P. Briem, Minister.
Resides in Stockholm.

Italy

Marchese Raimondo Giustiniani, Minister (26th January, 1951).

*In his early fifties, Marchese Giustiniani is a member of an old Genoese family and has been in the Italian Diplomatic Service since 1947. Before coming here he was counsellor in Paris and had previously served there as well as at Vienna and Berlin. Little is known of his record during the war. (Written in 1951.)

Although a gay and amusing bachelor, and very good company, Marchese Giustiniani is shrewd and can be serious. He does not enjoy Israel but contrives to see the funny side of life. He speaks excellent English.

Netherlands

Jonkheer M. P. van Karnebeek, Minister (12th November, 1950).

Mr. van Karnebeek, who was born in 1908, comes of an old Dutch diplomatic family. After having been Mayor of Zwolle he entered the Dutch Foreign Service in 1945 and was last Chargé d'Affaires at Karachi.

He lives in Jerusalem, being thus isolated from his colleagues. He is agreeable and speaks excellent English, but his reliability is open to doubt. His Belgian wife is a coloratura lady of statuesque build and overwhelming manner, who can perform the difficult feat of speaking three or four languages equally well and at once.

Norway

Mr. Ernst Hougen, Minister (23rd October, 1952).
Resides at Athens. Previously acted as Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires in Israel.

Roumania

M. Constantin Stanesco, Minister (21st December, 1951).

M. Stanesco appears to be about forty and is pleasant and amiable and of middle-class appearance, with an ingratiating but nervous manner. He gives the impression of being a time-server. Formerly counsellor in Tehran, he speaks little English but fluent French.

He returned to Roumania at the time of Anna Pauker's arrest. I do not expect to see him back.

Soviet Union

M. Pavel Ivanovitch Erchov, Minister (17th August, 1948).

*M. Erchov, who is forty, was previously a teacher and entered the Soviet Foreign Service in 1943 as counsellor at Athens where we were colleagues and where he remained until 1948. We are superficially on friendly terms but have had no serious talks here. His horizon is extremely limited, even for a Soviet

representative, and he and his staff (most of whom lead a communal existence in the former Russian church compound in Jaffa) are rarely seen about.

M. Erchov is a sad-looking, spiritless creature and power in the legation is concentrated elsewhere. His wife is rather pleasant. M. and Mme. Erchov both understand and speak a little English and he gets along fairly well in French. (Written in 1950).

M. Erchov still leads a very restricted life and does not mix with non-Communist missions except on purely formal occasions. We have no real point of contact.

Sweden

Mr. Gösta Hedengren, Chargé d'Affaires (4th April, 1951).

Mr. Hedengren is a career officer who came here from Vienna where he had also been Chargé d'Affaires. He is in his early fifties and has seen service at a large number of diplomatic and consular posts in Europe.

He is pleasant but not impressive and rather colourless. His second wife, though the daughter of a former Swiss Minister to London, is more French than anything else and an incessant but not profound talker.

Switzerland

M. Otto Karl Seifert, Minister (26th October, 1951).

M. Seifert was born in 1902 and educated at St. Gallen. He was engaged in private business in Spain and Italy before entering the Swiss Foreign Service in 1934 and subsequently served in Rome, Madrid and Budapest, becoming a counsellor in 1948. He became commercial counsellor in Vienna in 1950 and is the first Swiss Minister to be appointed to Israel. M. Seifert and his wife are both charming and delightful people who are extremely friendly and agreeable. Both speak English, she well and he with some difficulty. They are not happy in Israel.

Turkey

M. Şefkati Istinyeli, Minister (22nd December, 1952).

M. Istinyeli was born in Constantinople in 1897, the grandson of a former Vizier. He was educated at Constantinople and at Paris and is a career diplomat with considerable experience. He was Minister in Bucharest and Sofia before coming to Tel Aviv. He is a bachelor and a keen bridge player and a notorious gossip. He has only recently arrived but he makes an impression of shrewdness and I suspect enjoys intrigue. Though unprepossessing, he is friendly and forthcoming.

He speaks no English.

United States

Mr. Monnett B. Davis, Ambassador (26th February, 1951).

Mr. Davis, the doyen of the diplomatic corps, is a career diplomat in his middle fifties who was Ambassador to Panama before being appointed to Tel Aviv. He is conscientious and objective, in contrast to his predecessor, the ardent Zionist Dr. McDonald, and is personally friendly; he is very secretive and has not responded to my persistent efforts to establish a close working relationship. He is ponderous and long-winded and makes very heavy weather of the lightest task. Both he and his wife have not been happy in Israel and have suffered from ill-health here. Neither is stimulating company.

Uruguay

M. Juan C. Arizti, Chargé d'Affaires (12th November, 1951).

A career diplomat, but probably the most discontented of all the corps here. He and his wife have felt lonely and unhappy and have been unable to settle down. Presumably he has no work to do, and he hates Israel.

His French is bad, his English worse. His wife speaks fair French. Neither is very prepossessing.

Yugoslavia

Dr. Dusan Bratic, Minister (30th April, 1951).

*Dr. Bratic was born in 1898 and practised law until he joined the Yugoslav Agrarian Party before the war. He was in a German concentration camp

from 1941-45 and was Minister of Justice for the Republic of Serbia from 1946 until February 1948, when he was appointed Minister to Copenhagen and Stockholm.

Both Dr. Bratic and his homely wife speak German and he is also able to get along in French. We have only just exchanged visits but he is obviously all out to be friendly. (Written in 1951.)

He has an active and interested mind, and can take credit for a satisfactory growth of intercourse between Yugoslavia and Israel. He continues cordial and friendly.